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Recent years have seen an explosive increase in the number of English-language 
signs held by political protesters in autocracies throughout the world, signaling activists’ 
desire to capture the attention and interest of a global audience. Innovations in 
telecommunications make it easier than ever before for people in one country to know 
what actors elsewhere are doing, and to solicit their attention and assistance in an 
increasingly interconnected global context. How does this awareness of a global 
audience shape citizens’ decisions to protest in authoritarian regimes today? How might 
support from external support from democracies elsewhere or intervention from 
dictatorships affect protesters’ perceptions and decision-making strategies? 
I propose several causal mechanisms to answer these questions in the following 
dissertation. First, I posit that external support from democracies elsewhere bolsters 
protesters’ resolve to campaign against the regime. This attention provides protesters 
with four types of benefits, each of which alters their perceptions and strengthens their 
decision to maintain their efforts – 1) a psychological benefit of purposive solidarity 
(the cognitive and emotional sense that they are not alone and that their movement will 
succeed); 2) a strategic benefit of transnational learning from activists elsewhere; 3) a 
physical benefit through the credible threat of checking and sanctioning should 
autocrats’ response to activists become too forceful; and 4) a material and political 
benefit by establishing strong linkages with diaspora or democratically-minded 
citizens abroad that provide logistical support to protesters on the ground and lobby 
their own leaders to support the movement. 
Conversely, what effects might autocratic intervention have on protesters’ 




domestic context at hand. Outside intervention to support an embattled leader can 
signal incumbent vulnerability by suggesting that the regime cannot stay in power 
without help from abroad, but external support can also cause fear of increased 
repercussions should the incumbent stay in office. I posit that in semi-authoritarian 
regimes, the first effect will dominate and cause an unexpected backlash in which 
protesters see their leader as increasingly fragile, subsequently strengthening their 
efforts to remove him or her from power. In fully autocratic states where the regime is 
already equipped with a powerful security apparatus, however, I propose the second 
mechanism will dominate – intervention will cause deterrence and intimidation as 
protesters perceive the dangers involved in challenging the regime as even more 
threatening than before.  
I test these hypotheses in the following dissertation in three ways. First, I present 
a case study of Ukraine’s 2013-2014 Euromaidan movement to illustrate my causal 
mechanisms in action. I spent six months in Ukraine interviewing and surveying more 
than 120 Members of Parliament, reporters, activists, and civil society leaders to 
examine how protesters’ beliefs about Western support and Russian intervention 
shaped their behavior. These interviews illustrated the fact that for many protesters, 
attention and support from Western states and organizations (particularly the European 
Union, the United States, and the Ukrainian diaspora) was central in strengthening their 
will to continue campaigning against the regime. Further, many of my interviews 
showed how protesters resented overt Russian support for ex-President Viktor 
Yanukovych; their actions were driven partly by the need to keep Ukraine from 




Second, I independently designed and implemented an original survey 
experiment at three Ukrainian universities, recruiting nearly two hundred students to 
learn about their willingness to protest in future movements should one arise. I asked all 
participants to read a vignette stating that they lived in a repressive state where students 
had begun to protest against an authoritarian government that was reversing recent 
democratic reforms in favor of retrenched autocracy. Participants in the first treatment 
group learned that democracies elsewhere were supporting the protest, participants in 
the second treatment group learned that autocracies elsewhere were intervening to 
suppress the protest, and participants in the control group received no information 
about external actors at all. Following this, all subjects rated their willingness on a ten-
point scale to engage in three forms of protest, each of which represented an 
increasingly intense form of participation. Findings show that for the most intensive 
type of protest activity, individuals are significantly more likely to protest when they 
believe that democracies elsewhere support them (p < 0.001).   
Finally, I provide a series of five comparative case studies- Ukraine’s 2004 
Orange Revolution, a 2011 uprising in Bahrain, a failed revolt in 2005 Uzbekistan, 
Lebanon’s 2005 Cedar Revolution, and Venezuela in 2019 – to examine how these 
trends hold across temporal and geographical contexts. This project has a number of 
pressing and timely implications both theoretical and normative, given the current crisis 
that liberal democratic governance is facing across the globe amidst the rise of right-
wing, populist illiberal regimes. Supporting movements in authoritarian regimes that 
champion respect for human rights, civil liberties, and freedom of speech is of critical 
importance, and I show in this dissertation that such considerations should play a 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 October 1, 2019 saw the Communist party celebrate the seventieth anniversary of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the country’s mainland, marking seven decades 
since the party was able to push Kuomintang forces to Taiwan and consolidate its firm 
hold on the state’s power. The streets of Beijing were full of parades, with 15,000 troops 
and 580 vehicles and missiles making their way through the city’s roads in 
commemoration. In Hong Kong, however, the day was marked instead by intense 
clashes between armed security forces and largely unarmed protesters, many of them 
students and civic activists. Over the course of the day, police forces would fire 1,400 
rounds of tear gas and 900 rubber bullets into the crowd in efforts to quell their 
uprising. Certain parts of the city even saw police employ live bullets in their battle 
against protesters, with some forces going so far as to shoot an 18-year old in the chest. 
 The violent conflicts marking October 1 in Hong Kong were the latest and most 
dramatic events in more than four months of widespread protests for increased 
autonomy from China and greater respect for democratic norms, human rights, and civil 
liberties. The movement was initially sparked by Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie 
Lam’s decision to support a bill that would allow the Chinese government to extradite 
residents of Hong Kong who had been charged with a crime and bring them to China for 
a sentencing before courts on the mainland. This plan would upend a lengthy tradition 
in which Hong Kong citizens faced trial instead before their own courts, judicial 
institutions with a reputation for being far more free and fair than their counterparts in 
Beijing.  The campaign grew actively throughout the summer of 2019, leading tens of 
thousands of the city’s residents to take to the streets in increasingly contentious 




 Consistent throughout the protests were activists’ impassioned appeals to the 
outside world for assistance and support. Protesters regularly held signs and banners 
brandishing messages written in English, clearly demonstrating a desire to reach a 
broader audience beyond their immediate East Asian neighborhood. Leading 
oppositional figures conducted interviews and recorded videos for international news 
agencies, soliciting global attention in outlets including Time, the Washington Post, and 
the New York Times. Furthermore, thousands of protesters joined hands in August 2019 
to create the “Hong Kong Way,” a human chain that was designed to mimic the “Baltic 
Way” of 1989 that served as a signal from the occupied Soviet territories of Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania that citizens there desired freedom and independence from the 
Soviet Union’s repressive and authoritarian form of government. 
 While the 2019 Hong Kong protests represent one specific protest movement at 
one specific point in time, it is broadly emblematic of a number of other popular 
mobilizations that have taken place in contexts from Egypt to Zimbabwe to Nicaragua to 
Algeria. Across the world, citizens in the twenty-first century have become increasingly 
emboldened to take a stand against autocratic leaders in hopes of securing greater 
provisions for human rights and civil liberties. At the same time, it is easier now than 
ever before for activists to transmit their messages to states across the globe through 
social media, streaming online services, and cable television. Unlike the heavily 
censored and closed environments that characterized the Soviet Union and China in the 
twentieth century, today’s world provides a multitude of opportunities for savvy activists 





 What effects do international actors, both democratic and authoritarian, have on 
protesters’ decision-making strategies and calculations regarding the risks and rewards 
of joining an anti-governmental movement in autocratic states? How might expressions 
of solidarity towards the movement or signals of support for an embattled leader alter 
citizens’ beliefs and shape the campaign’s broader chain of events? These are important 
questions, and I address these pressing topics in the following dissertation to explore 
the role they play in shaping states’ domestic politics today.  
 This introduction will proceed by outlining and detailing each of the theoretical 
and empirical chapters that follow, describing how each piece contributes to the broader 
framework of the dissertation. In doing so, I demonstrate the ways in which my project 
address the fundamental questions posed above and illustrate the many original and 
valuable contributions that my research makes to existing studies in this area. 
 In Chapter 2, I begin by presenting and exploring the fundamental theoretical 
framework that forms the core of my dissertation and informs the three subsequent 
empirical chapters. I study the ways in which international forces such as external 
democratic support and autocratic intervention can shape the decision-making 
strategies of protesters in authoritarian and hybrid regimes. My explicit focus on the 
interplay between the global and national spheres is the core contribution of this 
project, as few existing analyses have systematically taken into account both sets of 
variables in determining how they jointly affect activists’ perceptions and beliefs. 
Studying both the domestic and international domains is of critical importance in a 
world that is becoming ever more globalized and interconnected. External forces will 
become increasingly influential as technology continues to develop, making this 




First, I hypothesize that external support from democracies elsewhere bolsters 
protesters’ resolve to campaign against the regime. This attention provides protesters 
with four benefits, each of which alters their perceptions in important ways– 1) a 
psychological benefit of purposive solidarity (the cognitive and emotional sense that 
they are not alone and that their movement has a greater chance to succeed); 2) a 
strategic benefit of transnational learning through which oppositional strategies can 
transcend national borders; 3) a physical benefit through the credible threat of checking 
and sanctioning should autocrats’ response to activists become too forceful; and 4) a 
material benefit by establishing strong linkages with diaspora or democratic groups that 
provide logistical and political support to protesters on the ground. Each of these 
mechanisms can reduce individuals’ perceptions of threat and raise the likelihood that 
their movement stands a chance at success, increasing the probability that they will 
remain steadfast in their cause. 
 Conversely, what effects might autocratic intervention have on protesters’ 
perceptions? I predict two competing effects. Assistance from autocrats elsewhere to 
support an embattled leader can signal vulnerability by suggesting that the regime 
cannot stay in power without help from abroad, but external intervention can also cause 
fear of repercussions should the incumbent stay in office. I posit that in semi-
authoritarian regimes, the first effect will dominate and cause an unexpected backlash 
in which protesters see their leader as increasingly fragile. In fully autocratic states 
where the regime is equipped with a powerful security apparatus, however, I propose 
the second mechanism will dominate – intervention will cause deterrence and 
intimidation as protesters perceive the dangers in challenging the regime as even more 




freedom and independence matter a great deal as well – when media sources are unable 
to relay an unbiased account to an international audience, this enhances leaders’ ability 
to repress protests and decreases the likelihood that the campaign will prevail.  
In addition to detailing the main theoretical claims that inform my analysis, I 
present a brief literature review that situates my work within the broader range of 
scholarship that has been published on these topics. This includes numerous examples 
of specific mechanisms from my framework that highlight the ways in which my theory’s 
components operate in practice. These provide evidence that the theory travels to a 
range of contexts and is not limited to one time or place alone, extending the veracity of 
my broader claims.   
Following this presentation of my theoretical framework, I turn to empirical 
analysis in Chapter 3. Here, I provide a detailed case study of Ukraine’s 2013-2014 
Euromaidan protest movement involving dozens of first-hand interviews and 
surveys that I conducted across six months of fieldwork in 2017.  This event is highly 
relevant for testing the mechanisms of my theory for multiple theoretical and contextual 
reasons that I explore more deeply in later sections of this project. Euromaidan, or the 
Revolution of Dignity, represents a case in which protesters seeking reforms, 
democracy, and control of rampant corruption took to the streets to demand change. In 
doing so, they secured a significant amount of support from democratic forces and 
organizations elsewhere. At the same time, protesters were also highly cognizant that 
Vladimir Putin and his allies in Russia were playing their own part in propping up 
Ukraine’s autocratic President at the time, Viktor Yanukovych.  
 I interviewed more than 120 Members of Parliament, reporters, activists, civil 




Western support and Russian intervention shaped their behavior.  Speaking with such a 
wide range of individuals provided me with both a breadth and depth of perspectives, 
ensuring that I did not speak with only one particular type of respondent alone. 
Moreover, the fact that I spoke with people who were largely “elite” in their knowledge 
and experience guaranteed that these individuals were credible experts on the topic at 
hand. All participants whom I interviewed were either specialists in policy analysis and 
activism or were participants who had been centrally involved in Euromaidan from its 
inception, meaning that in many cases I was speaking with people who had been on the 
front lines from the movement’s very first days until its final conclusion. 
 In speaking with my respondents, I adapted a range of strategies to secure as 
comprehensive and reliable a trove of information as possible. I procured a significant 
amount of qualitative data, as each interview lasted anywhere from thirty to ninety 
minutes and provided me with a great deal of quotations and thematic observations. 
Conversations were open-ended and loosely structured, allowing respondents to focus 
on the topics most important to them. Following each interview, I asked all participants 
to complete an anonymous, closed-ended twenty-question survey concerning the same 
topics that we had discussed during the preceding interview. This provided me with a 
large volume of quantitative data as well, allowing me to aggregate participants’ 
responses for certain key questions to discern the broader trends in attitudes among my 
interview subjects. 
 My findings show that many protesters heavily considered external support 
when deciding how to act, noting that the world’s attention deepened their willingness 
to challenge leaders. Several respondents (particularly those who were on Kyiv’s Maidan 




bolstered by the fact that 1) activists in other countries were holding protests to show 
solidarity and 2) politicians were making statements to recognize and commemorate 
their cause. This boosted their spirits, and in many cases increased their determination 
to remain on the streets in the dead of winter to remove Yanukovych from power. 
Equally important was the assistance of human rights groups and the Ukrainian 
diaspora in other countries – members of the diaspora lobbied officials in their adopted 
homelands to lend the movement prominence and sent material resources and funding 
to strengthen the campaign’s durability and persistence.  
Furthermore, many of my interviews showed how protesters resented overt 
Russian support for ex-President Viktor Yanukovych and the fact that Russian state 
media attempted to discredit their movement by alternatively portraying Euromaidan as 
either hopelessly small and weak or full of right-wing fascists. These mounting 
observations of the Putin regime’s attempts to undermine their chance at success led 
many to protest in order to keep Ukraine from becoming “the next Russia,” or a state in 
which media freedoms and political competition were muzzled by a powerful state 
apparatus.  In this case, then, both external democratic intervention and autocratic 
support played a significant part in shaping activists’ decision to maintain the protests.  
I turn to my project’s second empirical component in Chapter 4, in which I 
present the design, implementation, and results of an original field survey 
experiment that I carried out in Ukraine. Whereas Chapter 3 analyzed the motivations 
and beliefs of protesters who were participating in Euromaidan, a movement that has 
already taken place, Chapter 4 extends this framework to understand when contentious 
behavior might be likely in the future. During my time in the field, I recruited nearly two 




willingness to protest. In selecting universities to approach for recruiting subjects, I 
intentionally found institutions that would have produced prominent activists during 
both the Euromaidan movement and Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution As a result, I 
established contacts at three universities with reputations for being hubs of activism 
that were also largely free of the corruption pervading much of Ukrainian higher 
education – the National Academy of Kyiv – Mohyla Academy (NaUKMA), where I 
procured an affiliation as a visiting scholar; Taras Shevchenko National University in 
Kyiv; and Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, a city that is widely regarded as one of 
Ukraine’s most pro-European places to live. 
Every subject who participated in the experiment was therefore a student – the 
vast majority of individuals were undergraduates, while a small number were Master’s 
candidates in their mid-twenties. It is important to be clear and transparent about the 
experimental sample one is using and the population about which one is making 
inferences, as the results of an analysis conducted on students clearly cannot be 
extrapolated to describe the political behavior of all Ukrainians writ large. Indeed, 
students differ from other members of society on many relevant demographic 
characteristics, including age, education, and political knowledge. Nevertheless, this 
sample pool proved to be the exact group of individuals about whom I am making 
inferences – many studies have found that university students and young people in 
general are often at the forefront of protest movements, meaning that these are the 
precise set of actors whose behavior I aim to understand in this project. 
I asked all participants to read a vignette stating that they lived in a repressive 
state where students had begun to protest against an authoritarian government that was 




first treatment group learned that democracies elsewhere were supporting the protest, 
participants in the second treatment group learned that autocracies elsewhere were 
intervening to suppress the protests, and participants in the control group received no 
information about external actors at all. Following this, all subjects rated their 
willingness on a ten-point scale to engage in three forms of protest, each of which 
represented an increasingly intense form of participation – signing a petition, 
contacting an elected official, or joining a lawful protest movement. No other difference 
between the vignettes existed other than the content regarding international factors, 
meaning that any significant variation in protest willingness among groups could be 
attributed to the experimental manipulation at hand. Participants were randomly 
assigned into each treatment, ameliorating concerns over bias or misrepresentation. 
Further, balance checks were later conducted on each group to insure that participants 
across treatments resembled one another on the most relevant traits at hand. 
T-tests comparing the average expressed rates of protest inclination between 
groups provided null results for the first two types of behavior that I was testing – there 
was no significant difference between participants in the treatment groups and those in 
the control for signing a petition or contacting an elected official. However, the results 
for the most active form of protest behavior – committing to joining a hypothetical 
movement should one arise in the future – strongly support my theory. For this third 
variable, participants in the democratic actor treatment were far more likely to protest 
than others (p < 0.001). In fact, on the ten-point range of possible responses that 
participants could have chosen, those in this group expressed an average rate that was 




that for the most dangerous form of activity tested in this study, respondents were 
heavily inclined to consider external democratic support when the stakes were highest. 
My final empirical chapter extends my analysis to contexts beyond present-day 
Ukraine. In Chapter 5, I present five comparative case studies that illustrate my 
theoretical mechanisms in action. I analyze five distinct cases in this chapter – 
Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, Bahrain’s 2011 failed uprising, an unsuccessful 
rebellion in the Uzbek city of Andijan in 2006, Lebanon’s 2005 Cedar Revolution, and 
the protests against Nicolás Maduro that have rocked Venezuela since the mid-2010s. 
These cases represent a wide variety of geographical and temporal contexts, spanning a 
range of sixteen years and representing Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, 
and Latin America. This diversity shows how my theory’s mechanisms apply to a 
number of different circumstances, extending this project’s applicability and relevance 
to other corners of the globe. 
Each of the cases that I profile illustrates a different aspect of the theory outlined 
in Chapter 2. Not every mechanism operates fully in every movement that I analyze; 
instead, I show how distinct parts of the theory operate in different contexts, depending 
on the situational factors at hand. My analysis of Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution 
highlights the significant role that can be played by external democratic support for a 
protest movement. In this case, liberal actors elsewhere were vocal in lending their 
backing to the more democratic candidate in that year’s Presidential race, Viktor 
Yushchenko. According to several scholarly reports and news sources, this international 
attention was heavily desired by protesters and played a part in bolstering their battle 




Similarly, my studies of both Lebanon’s 2005 Cedar Revolution and the 2019 
protests in Venezuela illustrate the important role played by external democratic actors. 
In Lebanon, protesters actively solicited the aid and attention of outside forces, and this 
strengthened their willingness to continue challenging authorities. Lebanese activists 
were also protesting against the autocratic Syrian regime’s decision to station troops on 
Lebanese soil for more than three decades, demonstrating a situation in which local 
domestic capacity was sufficiently open for the movement to succeed. While the events 
in Venezuela are in a much greater state of flux due to the fact that they are still ongoing, 
numerous reports indicate that protesters have intentionally tried to secure the help of 
global actors to remove Maduro from office and that international sanctions are playing 
a deterrent role in keeping the regime from repressing protesters in an overly harsh way. 
The two remaining case studies in Chapter 5 present instances in which 
repressive domestic capacity and external authoritarian intervention proved to be too 
costly for protesters to overcome, dramatically raising the perceptions of risk and 
danger should one decide to campaign against the state. In Uzbekistan, the regime’s 
imposing ability to suppress independent media coverage of the uprising was central to 
the event’s undoing – activists were stymied in their ability to transmit a message to the 
outside world, inhibiting the movement from growing. Countries such as the United 
States of America and the United Kingdom did offer some signals of support, but Uzbek 
leaders’ domestic capacity coupled with several Western forces’ decision to defer to 
authorities for geopolitical reasons kept protesters from achieving their goals.  
Bahrain’s failed 2011 uprising also shows that external autocratic intervention, 
when compounded with a resilient regime and a lack of counterbalancing democratic 




actors failed to exert any pressure on the regime, sending a signal to activists that they 
were alone in their cause. Moreover, the movement was effectively ended when 
Bahrain’s neighbors Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates deployed troops to the 
country in order to put down the rebellion. Taken together, the lack of democratic aid 
and the presence of autocratic intervention dramatically shifted protesters’ perceptions 
of threat and dissipated the movement into nothingness. 
Finally, Chapter 6 provides an effective conclusion to this dissertation. Here, I 
restate the main themes and points that were highlighted in earlier chapters, showing 
how each piece of empirical evidence connects with one another to support the claims 
that constitute the core of my theoretical framework. This underscores the fact that my 
propositions extend to multiple real-world situations and are not restricted to one 
temporal or geographical period alone. Following this, I discuss the myriad reasons why 
this topic is of critical importance from both an analytical and a normative perspective. 
Activists in authoritarian and hybrid regimes are struggling to secure respect for basic 
human rights and civil liberties, often risking their freedom or even their lives in doing 
so. Liberal external actors can affect the dynamics of these protests in multiple ways, 
and such forces should support pro-democratic movements when they arise to increase 
the chance that their campaign can succeed. It is to Chapter 2, presenting the central 




CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
As the preceding introduction has shown, anti-governmental protest is a highly 
viable form of political activity in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes around 
the world today. I begin this theoretical chapter by briefly restating the main research 
questions that comprise the core of my dissertation, demonstrating how my analysis 
focuses on this contemporary phenomenon. At a broad level, my project studies protest 
participation and political behavior by citizens in autocracies – why do citizens decide to 
protest against leaders in undemocratic regimes, despite the myriad dangers involved in 
doing so? Deciding to protest in an autocracy is a risky undertaking, as situational 
constraints and imbalances in information between leaders and the population force 
citizens to act within an environment of permanent uncertainty. While clearly an 
important area of study, this question is broad and has been analyzed by scholars from a 
wide variety of diverse theoretical and methodological perspectives.  
In differentiating my own unique contribution from this extensive area of 
research, I point specifically to my focus on the modern global context in studying 
protest behavior in authoritarian states. Recent years have seen an explosive increase in 
the number of English-language signs held by political protesters in autocracies across 
the world, signaling activists’ desire to capture the attention and interest of an 
international audience. At the same time, innovations in telecommunications make it 
easier than ever before for people in one country to know what actors elsewhere are 
doing, and to solicit their attention and assistance in an increasingly interconnected 
world. How does awareness of a global audience shape citizens’ decisions to protest in 
autocracies today? Could pro-democracy support from democratic states or 




how might intervention from other autocratic leaders aiming to bolster a flagging 
dictator’s power affect the dynamics of these social movements? Would autocratic 
intervention suppress or increase protest participation? These are the questions that I 
address in my dissertation, and I turn now to the theoretical framework through which I 
analyze these critical issues.  
At a fundamental level, domestic factors and local opportunity structures are 
important for understanding citizens’ decisions to protest in non-democracies. Focal 
points provide logical channels for centralizing discontent, making it obvious why such 
events have the power to mobilize passive segments of the population in the absence of a 
free and open media environment. I build upon this domestic explanation by proposing 
that international actors also matter heavily as well, however, as they alter protesters’ 
perceptions of success or failure in ways that have not yet been as carefully studied. I 
open this chapter by introducing and specifying the key theoretical concepts and actors 
that play a central role in my analysis, to ensure that the ways in which I utilize these 
terms are as clear as possible. 
Defining and conceptualizing the core components of my theory 
Before presenting my argument, I must first define key concepts so that my 
reasoning and logic are understandable. In the following section, I therefore explain my 
perceptions and usage of essential concepts such as protest movements, protest 
participants, and authoritarian governance.  
Protests – what events constitute this specific type of social movement? 
To begin, when I speak of protests, I refer to social movements that share several 
key features – they are wholly voluntary and participatory in nature, they operate at the 




their goals are to achieve political change and societal liberalization. I begin by stressing 
protests’ voluntary and participatory nature because I am interested in understanding 
why someone would intentionally choose to join a movement, despite the costs of doing 
so. It is true that in some cases, protest participants are covertly being provided 
financial or political compensation for their participation. This is often true in 
autocracies, when leaders coerce otherwise apathetic citizens into publicly denouncing 
anti-governmental protesters and proclaiming their support for the incumbent regime. 
A 2012 report from the Institute for War & Peace Reporting provides clear evidence of 
this, showing how the autocratic government in Uzbekistan employs a “Rent-a-Mob” 
tactic in which individual citizens are literally employed by the state to harass anti-
governmental forces while simultaneously pretending to act as private citizens in order 
to maintain some semblance of autonomy from the regime1.  
On the other side of the equation, the IWPR report indicates that the political 
opposition in Kyrgyzstan is also fond of using similar techniques to pad the size of its 
rallies as well. Radnitz (2010) provides further evidence of this phenomenon in 
Kyrgyzstan through a comparative case study with Uzbekistan, showing how 
oppositional elites in Kyrgyzstan build ties with local communities to challenge the 
regime in a way that simulates genuine opposition while simultaneously benefiting these 
“outsider” elites. In a different context, a 2011 report from the German news source Der 
Spiegel explores the accounts of several rural Egyptians who were paid by Hosni 
Mubarak’s regime to rally in Cairo in opposition to the nascent Arab Spring protesters 
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gathering there at that time2. In all of these situations, event participants were being 
directed by higher powers in their actions and were not acting autonomously. 
In many cases, this “employment” is surprisingly nuanced – the IWPR report 
indicates how different types of participation (taking part in a demonstration, heckling, 
and so on) resulted in different levels of payment from the regime depending on how 
much involvement was required. When citizens participate in social movements on 
behalf of other actors, this is a clear example of Kuran’s (1995) “preference falsification.” 
In these situations, an individual’s true feelings are essentially unknowable – instead, 
citizens are incentivized to publicly present one particular viewpoint despite the fact that 
their own true feelings might be extremely different. These situations do not fall within 
the universe of cases that I study because such participants are not protesting to achieve 
any real change. Instead, they are being paid to publicly support a position about which 
they privately might have little to no opinion. As a result, their decision-making 
strategies are driven more by considerations of patronage and resource allocation than 
by ideology, and their reasoning is unaffected by the causal mechanisms that I present 
in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
Considering my second main specification of cases, it is also important that 
protests operate at a mass level in society – that is, the movement must be large and 
significant enough so that leaders are aware of its existence and other citizens can 
monitor its development. Individual protesters can certainly sometimes have significant 
influence on their own – a Tunisian vendor’s self-immolation and its ability to spark the 
Arab Spring provide an example of this – but truly meaningful change is often more 
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likely to emerge when the movement is large enough to sustain itself and catch the eye 
of the country’s residents and possibly the global community as well3. This is 
particularly true in cases where protesters hope to generate international attention – in 
large and dynamic countries such as the United States, citizens are already often 
woefully unaware of events happening within their own borders, and do not pay much 
attention to international affairs.  
The relative importance of size is often contingent on domestic opportunity 
structures and media openness, of course, as even large protests might not gain 
international traction if activists’ local access to various forms of media (both network 
media and social media) is constrained by the regime. This might be the case in states 
with highly coercive capability such as China, for example, where authorities can block 
citizens’ access to social media accounts and censor the images that are transmitted 
online4. Still, greater size generally leads to greater visibility across cases, meaning that 
the two concepts are often linked. If a protest movement hopes to make the news in 
countries around the world, size can certainly help. 
Non-violence and peaceful tactics are often essential for generating support for a 
movement, particularly when considering the interests of outside actors. Thomas and 
Lewis (2014) show through an experimental study that perceptions of non-violence in 
collective action convey a sense of efficacy and legitimacy to those who are not currently 
protesting. Similarly, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) indicate in a cross-national 
analysis of anti-governmental movements between 1960 and 2005 that non-violent 
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movements were more than twice as likely to achieve their objectives as were violent 
campaigns5. Further, Ulfelder (2005) shows that non-violent movements are more 
effective in creating regime change because peaceful campaigns signal coordination and 
capacity. This is attractive not only to ordinary citizens, but also to regime elites who 
consider defecting and joining the push against their former colleagues6.  
Several historical examples provide evidence of this, ranging from the Velvet 
Revolution in 1989 Czechoslovakia to the Solidarity movement in Poland in the 1980s. 
Similarly, the civil rights era of the 1960s in the highly repressive racial regime of the 
United States’ Deep South is a case of this as well. Protesters (often including student-
led organizations like the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee) made civil 
disobedience a central part of their resistance to segregation, employing strategies such 
as sit-ins and boycotts rather than resorting to violence. As a result, the images and 
videos of policemen violently assaulting protesters with high-powered jets of water and 
dogs were jarring, and played a role in convincing onlookers that change was needed. 
Other examples falling within the theoretical scope of this dissertation include the 
“Color Revolutions” that spread throughout Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the 
mid-2000s. Citizens took to the streets to demand democratization and reform in cases 
ranging from Yugoslavia’s 2000 Bulldozer Revolution to Georgia’s 2003 Rose 
Revolution to Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution. Protesters largely remained non-
violent, and were successful (at least in the short term) in achieving their goals. 
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Identifying the goals of the cases which I am studying here 
Finally, in defining the cases to which my theoretical expectations apply, it is 
essential to stress that I am focusing on protests that aim to produce real and legitimate 
political change in a given country, promoting the movement of a state in a more 
democratic, less authoritarian, and increasingly politically transparent direction. This 
is of central importance because my theory is fundamentally about the political 
orientation of a regime (how authoritarian it is) as well as the political natures of outside 
countries and organizations that may affect protesters’ calculations. Protests can 
obviously take place for a variety of different reasons, and so it is essential that I clarify 
the exact type of social movements about which I am making assertions. 
I study movements in which the goal is to implement policy change in a 
democratic direction, to combat corruption, to protest electoral fraud, or to improve the 
quality of human rights and civil liberties in a country. Broad cases falling within this 
category include the 2013-2014 Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine (a case study which I 
explore more deeply in subsequent chapters), the Arab Spring of 2013, 2017 protests 
against autocratic rule in Venezuela, the aforementioned “Color Revolutions,” the 2011 
protests in Russia following Vladimir Putin’s reelection, 2018 student-led protests in 
Nicaragua, and the 2013 Geza Park protests in Turkey that aimed to combat Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan’s crackdowns on dissent. These cases all clearly differ significantly in 
their geographical locations and the specific causes that underpinned each movement’s 
development, but at a broad level, each campaign was fundamentally aimed at 
improving the quality of political discourse, life, and human rights in their country 




Utilizing this framework, I therefore do not study protests driven by religious 
fundamentalism (such as the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979 that aimed to install a 
theocratic Islamic government) or ethnic hatred (such as the 2010 riots in Kyrgyzstan 
driven by clashes between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks). These types of protests are 
spurred by religious beliefs (which can overlap with but are still distinct from ideological 
beliefs) or disagreements about resource allocation and psychological group hatred. The 
motivations underpinning those movements are far removed from the behavior that I 
am interested in, because protesters in these incidents were not motivated by concerns 
over democratic rule, human rights, or freedom in civil society. As a result, these cases 
do not belong within the scope of this theoretical framework.  
Additionally, while much of my subsequent discussion and a good deal of my 
methodological framework employs terms like “the West” in discussing the roles of 
outside actors, particularly with regards to democracy promotion, my theory is not 
geographically driven. I do not theorize that protesters’ specific views about the United 
States of America, Germany, and Sweden on the one hand or about China, Zimbabwe, 
and Cuba on the other will guide their decision to join an anti-governmental movement, 
and this is certainly not a dissertation about American foreign policy or the relationships 
between the United States and countries around the world. If this were the case, this 
theory and its implications would not be able to travel to regions of the globe in which 
American influence is less salient or popular. 
Instead, I am interested in understanding how democracy-minded protesters 
think about external forces that are pro-democratic or anti-democratic in nature – the 
ideological orientations of the outside actors is key. While this does tend to map onto 




South Korea and Japan are important democratic leaders in East Asia, for example, and 
there are several countries in the “West” such as Venezuela and Cuba that are clearly not 
liberal democracies. (This is to say nothing of increasingly illiberal regimes that operate 
within democratic organizations like the European Union, as Hungary under Viktor 
Orban is becoming far less invested in democratic norms than it once was.) As a result, 
the central consideration here is a regime’s political orientation, not its status as a 
member of the global West. 
Identifying my universe of cases – regime type and media openness 
Related to this, it is necessary to specify that I am theorizing about movements in 
regimes that are authoritarian, but not totalitarian. As scholars including Levitsky and 
Way (2010) have noted, regime types fall along a continuum from full democracy to full 
autocracy, encompassing everything from Schedler’s (2006) “electoral 
authoritarianism” to Diamond’s (2002) “hybrid regimes.” Opportunity structures and 
feasible outcomes differ significantly when one compares these types of regimes. For 
example, even if a critical mass of citizens were secretly dissatisfied with the 
machinations of the government in North Korea, it would be nearly impossible for 
anyone at the current time to coordinate a successful protest movement there. The 
regime’s complete control of social media, the Internet, and all forms of 
telecommunication make the procurement of information about developments within 
the country difficult to obtain and knowledge about support from abroad essentially 
impossible to find. Additionally, the punishment for protesting in a state like North 
Korea is much more akin to punishments meted out by totalitarian regimes like Nazi 
Germany or the Soviet Union, meaning that citizen decision-making options in these 




At the same time, it does not make sense to apply this research agenda to 
countries that are fully democratic. While countries such as the United States certainly 
have some questionable traits and histories (whether related to racial or gender issues), 
anti-governmental movements have long been a vibrant and important part of the 
political culture in modern democracies, serving as a forum for debate over policies, 
elected officials, and the direction of society. Citizens in democracies do not face the 
same types of dangers for speaking out against the government, meaning that joining a 
protest movement like Occupy Wall Street, Black Lives Matter, or Tea Party rallies is not 
as costly or threatening as it is in autocracies and hybrid regimes due to the protections 
afforded to protesters. 
Because of this, I focus on countries that are classified as authoritarian or semi-
authoritarian. These are states in which political freedoms are seriously constrained, 
and in which participating in a protest carries real implications and dangers for one’s 
well-being. At the same time, these are states in which basic political protest is still a 
fundamentally available option– leaders may be at high risk, but merely joining a 
movement is not a certain death penalty. Critically, within this universe of non-
democracies, I am specifically focusing on ones in which the media environment is 
relatively open to international sources. Because much of my analysis rests on the 
effects of international support and statements made by other countries, it is essential 
that citizens are able to know and monitor what countries elsewhere are doing and that 
they can transmit their own messages abroad.  
If a regime is so totalitarian that the government fully controls the flow of 
information into and out of the country, it would be impossible for international forces 




knowing what the international response has been. This again underscores the 
importance of excluding such totalitarian or highly authoritarian states from my 
framework because my arguments focus on protester response to external cues. In 
countries like North Korea or Somalia, the flow of information that I have described 
would be constrained by a powerful state apparatus or the presence of warlord factions 
dominating the country, and my theoretical mechanisms would all be prevented from 
operating. 
I therefore focus on non-democracies that nonetheless have some degree of 
media freedom and openness. What are some empirical tools for delineating between 
these cases and states which are more severely repressive? I follow Freedom House 
ratings in identifying the states to which my framework applies. I focus on Freedom 
House because these ratings take into consideration not only procedural and 
institutional political parameters in assessing a state’s regime type, but also substantive 
concepts such as freedom of the press (a concept that is of central importance to my 
theory), freedom of expression, freedom of civil society, and so on7. Furthermore, while 
average citizens in autocratic societies certainly care about the basic political traits of 
their country’s regime, substantive concepts related to civil society such as human rights 
and individual liberties often have a more direct and tangible impact on their day-to-day 
lives, and should be more instrumental in driving them to the streets8. 
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This selection process applies to countries that are “Partly Free” (or semi-
authoritarian), including states such as Guatemala, Mozambique, Singapore, Zambia, all 
of which received a score of 4 on the Freedom House scale. This also includes 
autocracies that are more repressive, if not totalitarian – this refers to countries such as 
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Iran, all of which received scores between 5.5 and 6.5. 
However, because this theory does not apply to states in which protests are essentially 
impossible, I do not focus on states that received a score of 7. This excludes countries 
such as the Central African Republic, Eritrea, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, 
Sudan, and Turkmenistan because the political realities and media environments there 
are too stark for the elements of this theory to apply.  
Who is protesting? Specifying my key actors of interest 
One final concept to discuss concerns the type of actor about which I am making 
inferences. Protest movements (particularly those that grow to be mass events) 
obviously have several different stages, and the costs and benefits of joining at each 
stage will vary dramatically. As studies including that of Karklins and Petersen (1993) 
make clear, the barriers to joining a movement are much lower as the protests grow – it 
becomes more difficult for individual citizens to be identified and punished by security 
forces when hundreds of thousands of people have already taken to the streets. The 
motivations and decision-making strategies that drive participants at these different 
stages of the protest will therefore vary significantly as well. 
While there is a great deal of theoretical insight that can be gained by focusing on 
protesters who join at the later stages of a movement, it is important to clarify that 
within the scope of this dissertation, I am specifically interested in understanding the 




actors are not necessarily the very first ones on the streets, but they do join at a point 
that is sufficiently early such that there is still a great deal of danger facing those who 
choose to participate, and the movement’s success is not guaranteed. These actors play 
an important role in the overall arc of a protest – they give legitimacy and added force to 
the first individuals who took to the streets, and they can bring in other citizens and 
build the movement to a tipping point where victory is more likely. Understanding their 
motivations is therefore essential for a number of important reasons. 
The preceding section has aimed to define several key concepts that play an 
important role in the framework I present here. Rather than attempting to generate an 
overarching theory that can be applied to all different types of protests and social 
movements taking place around the world, I am theorizing specifically about the 
motivations of early joiners to democracy-minded mass movements in authoritarian 
and hybrid countries today. I now turn to the core concepts and arguments of my theory 
itself, stressing the different ways in which I believe international factors can shape 
domestic anti-governmental movements aimed at attaining liberalization and 
democratic reform. 
Identifying my primary theoretical expectations 
In the following section, I first show how pro-democratic support from liberal 
states elsewhere can shape protesters’ decision-making strategies, introducing the 
causal mechanisms that influence activists’ behavior. Following this, I discuss the effects 
of intervention from autocratic allies of a dictator, presenting the key variables that 






Understanding the potential effects of democratic support from abroad 
First, it seems plausible that support from liberal democracies elsewhere – 
whether expressed tangibly through direct aid and civil society administration or 
abstractly through diplomatic statements and press conferences – would have a positive 
effect on protesters’ willingness to agitate against the regime. If citizens believe that they 
are not alone in the world and that they have attracted the attention of outside forces, 
this could persuade them that their movement stands a chance at succeeding. This can 
be useful not only for retaining key activists and preventing members of the protests’ 
inner circle from defecting, but also for persuading hesitant observers that joining the 
movement is a winning decision.  
Ample amounts of evidence show that protesters actively desire and solicit this 
support in hopes of strengthening their movement. As an example, the numerous 
English-language signs that appear throughout crowds in authoritarian regimes are a 
clear testament to the fact that protesters seek outside attention. In cases where 
English-language signs equal (or surpass) the number of signs written in the country’s 
local language, the intended audience is clearly not domestic, as it is unlikely that the 
majority of citizens there understand English. Instead, the intended audience is the 
international media – by capturing the interest of the news, protesters can broadcast 
their message to an international community in hopes of obtaining their attention and 
soliciting their support. As evidence of this, a CNBC report stresses the power that 
protesters themselves recently ascribed to international forces in Nicaragua – the report 
indicates that “[p]rotesters have been calling on international governments and 




home is being largely ignored.910” Further, Beќar (2015) notes that for many protesters, 
consciously deciding to wage a campaign in the English language can effectively 
“globalize” their movement, situating it within an international community and context 
that values political and social justice. Outside democratic support matters, and is often 
sought actively by protest participants in a direct and intentional manner. 
In what specific ways does this attention matter? I posit that external democratic 
support increases the likelihood that individuals will decide to join a protest movement 
because of four primary causal mechanisms – 1) the ability to create a psychological 
sense of purposive solidarity, 2) the possibility for transnational linkages and learning 
effects, 3) the important role of international monitoring and checking ability, and 4) 
the potential for building ties with and procuring further assistance from citizens and 
members of their state’s diaspora in other countries. In each of these cases, individuals’ 
perceptions of potential success and victory will increase, ultimately outweighing their 
fears about costs or the chance that the movement will fail. 
Creating a sense of purposive solidarity 
 The first main claim that I make here concerns protesters’ psychological, 
emotional, and mental states. Participating in a non-governmental campaign is costly. 
Not only must protesters invest the time and effort needed to occupy a space and make 
themselves visible, but this can also result in time missed from work or in some cases, 
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 Similarly, Jacobson (2009) posits that protesters participating in anti-governmental movements against 
Iranian leaders in 2009 were using English-language signs and banners in a similarly direct attempt to 
communicate with and catch the attention of an international audience. Moreover, a 2019 piece from the 
South China Morning Post recommended that protesters in Hong Kong intentionally utilize their English-
language skills to make a larger number of signs in English, as this could provide activists with many 




even the loss of one’s occupation. Additionally, protesters know that by taking to the 
streets, they are potentially putting themselves in harm’s way by facing arrest, beatings, 
or even death. This can be mentally, emotionally, and physically draining, particularly 
when the movement reaches a stage in which one’s friends or acquaintances have been 
arrested or accosted by governmental forces.  
While these factors will still exist whether or not the protest receives support 
from actors elsewhere, I propose that aid from abroad can provide a much-needed 
emotional and mental boost to individuals who are protesting, bolstering participants’ 
belief that their cause is just and that they stand a chance at success. Even if attention 
from the international community does not ultimately translate into material benefits, 
this external attention can still motivate individuals to persist in their cause. If no one in 
the international community appears to care (or even know) what the goals of the 
campaign are, conversely, this would lead protesters to feel isolated, ignored, and 
distressed, and would undermine their willingness to agitate against the regime. In 
these cases, protesters would fail to see much potential for their movement’s victory in 
the long term, and their decision-making strategies and calculations would be adjusted 
accordingly. In contrast, when people elsewhere care enough to pay attention and send 
signals of support to protesters, this can help activists feel fundamentally validated as 
human beings with inherent rights, value, and worth. As noted above, therefore, this 
mechanism is deeply rooted in emotion and feeling rather than rational choice or 
strategic calculations about costs and payoffs. 
While much of my logic rests upon the notion that solidarity from powerful 
democratic states matters to protesters in authoritarian countries, it is also important to 




autocratic states. In these cases, the outside forces are still democratically-minded, but 
they reside in countries that are heavily repressive as well. An excellent example of this 
is the “Baltic Way” of 1989. In that year, citizens in the Soviet-occupied states of Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania came together to form a human chain of two million people that 
stretched across all three territories. In this case, the term “purposive solidarity” applies 
quite well – residents of each Soviet territory had their own battle to fight against the 
central authorities in Moscow, but each movement also shared the same purpose, and 
their affirmation to one another that their causes were worthwhile and that they were 
supporting one another surely played a role in strengthening their resolve.  
According to Eglitis and Ardava (2012), this “collective ritual” played an 
important part in sending signals to the international community about protesters’ 
aspirations. Similarly, Muiznieks (1995) suggests that leaders of the three Baltic 
independence movements worked actively to make connections with reformers and civic 
activist groups in other parts of the Soviet Union, showing how democratic activists in 
one state or region can bolster the enthusiasm of protesters in autocratic territories 
elsewhere. Beissinger (2002) also shows how the spread of this nationalist uprising in 
the Soviet Union was not limited to the Baltics alone, but was in fact present in several 
different parts of the regime – this mobilization spread throughout the country and 
played a large part in causing the collapse of the Soviet state11. 
Transnational linkages and learning effects 
Closely related to the notion of psychological purposive solidarity explored above 
is a second distinct causal mechanism. In addition to providing protesters with basic 
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emotional fortitude and strength by reinforcing the notion that their cause is worthwhile 
and can succeed, international democratic actors can also influence one another by 
forming models and strategies that are intentional and strategic. Bunce and Wolchik 
(2006, 2011) show how democratic movements spread from one Central and Eastern 
European country to another in the mid-1990s and early 2000s, pointing to the role of 
transnational networks and linkages in a way that evokes the ideas of Levitsky and Way 
(2006). According to Bunce and Wolchik (2006), democratic forces supported one 
another through diffusion, or situations in which “a key factor is the existence of 
networks, wherein actors in other states confer with innovators about goals and 
strategies; innovators take on the responsibility for peddling their ideas outside their 
state; or ‘‘rooted cosmopolitans’’ based in one country travel to other countries 
promoting their pet idea, model, or policy” (288).  
This is different from mere imitation, or situations in which protesters simply co-
opt strategies from a different country – an example of imitation can be seen in a 2017 
Reuters news report stating that protesters in Venezuela watched screenings of “Winter 
on Fire,” a Netflix documentary about Ukraine’s Euromaidan revolution, to study 
techniques to use in their own movement. While this is an interesting case of 
international actors influencing one another, it also highlights the difference between 
diffusion and imitation because there were no direct links between Ukrainians and 
Venezuelans here12. 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) note that these strategic types of interactions are a 
relatively recent phenomena in their study of transnational group linkages and human 
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rights promotion in Latin America, defining these networks as “forms of organization 
characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and 
exchange” (8). These networks of activists intentionally communicate with one another, 
willingly working to aid their counterparts and help them achieve their goals. Other 
examples of the importance of transnational linkages and learning can be seen in the 
collapse of Communism throughout Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and 
1990s, when numerous protest movements galvanized at the same time and supported 
one another. Here, the support was not merely symbolic as was the case with the Baltic 
Way; instead, Oberschall (1996) notes how civic actors in different contexts 
intentionally and strategically aided and assisted one another. Additionally, Weyland 
(2012) finds that a similar processes process occurred during the Arab Spring, as 
democracy-minded activist groups in one state were helped by movements elsewhere in 
their attempts at success. From a broader perspective, Meyer and Whittier (1994) 
suggest that protest movements “spillover” from one territory into another thanks to 
four factors – 1) organizational coalitions, 2) overlapping social movement 
communities, 3) shared personnel, and 4) broader changes in the external environment. 
This is characteristic of the process taking place in the examples provided here. 
The role of international monitoring and checking ability 
The third aspect of democratic support from abroad and its ability to shape 
protesters’ perceptions is less about emotional and solidary benefits, and more about 
guaranteeing basic safety and security. Support from abroad matters because the more 
attention that the international community is paying to an anti-governmental campaign, 
the more difficult it becomes for an authoritarian regime to brutally crack down and 




pariah, and leaders know that television, the Internet, and social media can instantly 
transmit images of disturbing violence around the world. Essentially, police brutality 
and harshness can go “viral” in one moment, potentially leading to a barrage of 
international condemnation, sanctions, and other repercussions for dictators who would 
have been much less constrained in the past.   
As an example, one can consider protests that took place in Russia in 2017 – at 
the time, tens of thousands of citizens in cities across the country gathered to protest 
corruption and the extravagant wealth of Prime Minister (and former President) Dmitri 
Medvedev. Led by opposition activist Alexei Navalny, the protests never became truly 
massive. However, one notable aspect of this event was the ability of protesters on the 
ground to capture and transmit images and videos of security forces beating, detaining, 
and arresting scores of young people. Because citizens had this ability to spread first-
hand evidence of what was taking place, regime authorities knew that they could not go 
too far in their repression, potentially convincing others in Russia that meaningful 
checks existed and that joining the movement was not be as risky as would have been 
the case several decades ago. 
A clear example in which international attention towards repression caused 
actual, real-world ramifications for a dictator can be seen in Belarus in 2011. According 
to a report by the British Broadcasting Company, Western governments closely watched 
that year’s Belarusian presidential elections, in which incumbent (and ruling leader 
since 1994) Alexander Lukasheko won re-election handily. Following the announcement 
of the results, thousands took to the streets and hundreds were severely beaten, 
arrested, and detained. Western governments quickly responded by freezing 




individuals within the administration13. It is likely that this crackdown would have been 
even more brutal had no international monitors and news sources been present, echoing 
my arguments about checking and its ability to deter repression by autocrats.  
The dynamics of this international checking can also be seen in the case of 
Mexico in the 1980s. According to Maney (2001), a group of left-wing Mexicans pushing 
for indigenous rights (and, in some cases, independence from the Mexican state) began 
to wage a campaign against the country’s autocratic regime. Maney notes that when the 
world began to pay attention to the conflict, security forces decreased the intensity of 
their crackdown. As soon as the world’s engagement turned elsewhere, however, the 
security forces dramatically re-amped their repression against the Zapatistas. This 
example does not fit perfectly within the framework of my research, of course, as the 
indigenous group does not meet all of the democratic criteria that I presented earlier in 
terms of non-violence. However, the logic involved – a repressive regime checking itself 
when the world is watching – is still illustrative. 
Venezuela provides yet another example of this logic. According to the United 
States Department of State, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13692 to 
target “persons involved in or responsible for the erosion of human rights guarantees, 
persecution of political opponents, curtailment of press freedoms, use of violence and 
human rights violations and abuses in response to antigovernment protests, and 
arbitrary arrest and detention of antigovernment protestors” in Venezuela14. Here, 
Obama’s sanctions were of course driven by considerations broader than merely the 
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government’s response to protesters alone, but the clear reference to protests in the 
order still indicates a situation in which a leader’s harsh crackdown on citizens was met 
by punishment from other countries. Similarly, a 2017 Miami Herald article indicates 
that the Trump administration forced a new round of sanctions against Venezuela’s 
President Nicolás Maduro for violence against the opposition15. In this case, a dictator’s 
actions are monitored and checked when said actions become too forceful. 
Procuring support from like-minded citizens and diaspora members abroad 
Whereas the first three points stress the importance of emotional solidarity, 
strategic guidance with tactical groups and governmental organizations elsewhere, and 
the ability to check an autocrat’s security forces due to the presence of international 
media coverage, the fourth and final point presented here is about financial, material, 
and political support that protesters might receive from ordinary citizens abroad. This 
factor is particularly relevant in cases where members of a country’s diaspora have 
moved to other states, but are still able to send food, blankets, clothing, or other 
material possessions that can sustain protesters and allow them to viably remain on the 
streets for an undetermined period of time. Members of the diaspora might have access 
to a deeper pool of resources than do compatriots in their home country, and their 
support can be critical for keeping a movement from collapsing due to internal strain – 
if protesters receive aid and assistance that can alleviate the physical dangers or 
discomforts that are involved in campaigning against a regime, this can alter their 
decision-making calculations and lower their perceptions of danger. 
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The role of social media and international communication is critically important 
here. If protesters either have pre-existing links with ordinary citizens in other countries 
or are able to build connections with them online, this can increase the chance that 
people elsewhere will voluntarily contribute to the movement or lobby and pressure 
their own governments to become involved in some way. This is particularly true in 
democracies, where legislators are more apt to listen to vocal or politically influential 
segments of the population. Again, members of a state’s diaspora and their allies are 
often of central importance – several scholarly studies have shown how many 
prominent ethnic diaspora communities including Armenians16; Estonians, Latvians, 
and Lithuanians1718; Ukrainians19; Cubans20; and Ethiopians21 have all affected policy-
making in the United States in efforts to influence developments in their home 
countries. Person-to-person connections are important due to the many reasons 
presented here, and are increasingly viable to create.  
This part of my analysis underscores my earlier discussion on regime type. 
Totalitarian states such as North Korea do not allow for any type of communication 
whatsoever between citizens and the outside world – families in South Korea have 
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relatives in the North with whom they have not spoken in more than half a century. In 
semi-authoritarian and authoritarian countries like Russia or Venezuela, however, it is 
much easier to cross borders and communicate with people elsewhere, potentially 
turning to them as a way to generate political and social responsiveness in their own 
states from the bottom up. 
Tangible support and symbolic support 
I conclude this section with a brief discussion regarding two distinct types of 
support across all four mechanisms. Considering the effects of these processes, it seems 
likely that tangible and concrete measures of support would be more effective than 
abstract statements praising protesters for their resolve. For example, if the United 
States were to monitor protests and human rights abuses in Zimbabwe and decided to 
threaten sanctions against the regime, this would carry more heft than a formal 
declaration from the Secretary of State calling for leaders’ removal. As noted above, 
convincing citizens that the movement can actually win is instrumental, and concrete 
support from abroad could provide the spark for persuading a cautiously optimistic 
neighbor to finally participate in the campaign.  
This does not undermine the fundamental significance of symbolic support itself, 
of course. While statements of praise do not have as many “teeth,” supportive 
statements can still bolster protesters’ drive by indicating that tangible aid and 
assistance might follow – international actors elsewhere have noticed the movement 
and might act if the regime does not change its course. It is impossible for protesters to 
know if symbolic support will actually lead to something concrete or whether statements 
are “cheap talk,” but the fact that they exist at all is better than a complete lack of 




Further, it seems plausible that this symbolic support will most effectively received by 
citizens who are more open and trusting. In making this claim, I point to Benson and 
Rochon’s (2004) findings that citizens who trust others are more likely to join protests 
because doing so involves cooperation and working together. I test this dynamic in 
greater detail in a subsequent chapter, where I describe an original survey experiment 
that I carried out in Ukraine to test the claims that I am making in this dissertation.  
When comparing the effects of targeted and tangible support with the effects of 
more abstract forms of assistance, it is important to stress that the intensity of each 
factor also plays a role. For example, while I argue here that sanctions targeting an 
autocracy’s key imports and exports are more powerful than diplomatic calls for 
democracy, it is also possible to envision a scenario in which individual state sanctions 
are relatively weak and ineffective while a powerful multilateral condemnation of 
autocrats’ repression might be more influential. As a result, while hypothesizing that 
concrete expressions of support are more effective in shaping protest behavior, I will 
need to carefully consider intensity in subsequent parts of my analysis. Because it can be 
difficult for citizens on the ground to make objective assessments and evaluations about 
the intensity of support while crafting their mental strategies, I test this dimension of 
my theory by employing qualitative methods like interviews and process-tracing to 
understand how citizens conceptualize and measure these factors.  
Interpreting the potential role played by autocrats in other countries 
How might autocratic intervention shape citizens’ decisions to protest? While not 
necessarily as prevalent in today’s world as democracy promotion, this type of 
“autocratic promotion” does indeed exist – as an example, Tolstrup (2014) analyzes 




ways in which the regime intervenes to support autocratic allies sympathetic to Russian 
interests. Similarly, while not a textbook case of direct intervention, Yom (2016) finds 
significant evidence that the authoritarian monarchical leaders of several Middle 
Eastern and Northern African nations consciously cooperated with each another in the 
face of widespread societal uprisings, offering aid to one another and sharing strategic 
initiatives to quell the dissent that each regime was experiencing at the time2223. 
Similarly, Whitehead (2014) finds that while such autocratic interference does not 
necessarily mirror democracy promotion in a directly countering manner, numerous 
dictators do intentionally employ this strategy for political gain. Further, Chyzh and 
Labzina (2018) propose through a formal model that autocrats often have the incentive 
to intervene on behalf of allies even if their ally is ultimately forced from office by the 
masses; their logic holds that this intervention should nevertheless make future protests 
less likely, stabilizing their international influence on the region more broadly. 
I propose that in instances where this intervention occurs, there are three 
potential causal mechanisms that might affect protesters’ decision-making strategies, 
depending on the context at hand. The first two posited mechanisms make protest more 
likely – one mechanism signals the weakness and vulnerability of the incumbent 
authoritarian, while the other spurs a frustrated backlash at unwanted intrusion and 
intervention. The final mechanism that I present here produces an outcome 
diametrically opposed to the two discussed above. In this third and final mechanism, 
intervention intimidates and deters protesters from taking to the streets, making protest 
participation less likely.  
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When will these three mechanisms occur? Fundamentally, I argue here that the 
domestic capacity and power of the incumbent regime is of paramount importance. 
When the incumbent leader is weak and relatively powerless, I predict that the first two 
mechanisms will dominate. Protesters will grant more credence to the probability of 
movement success when making their calculations about the costs and benefits of 
joining the campaign, and participation will increase. When the authoritarian 
government is solidly in control and possesses an extreme capability to repress, 
however, I expect that the third mechanism will dominate – external autocratic 
intervention will deter individuals from protesting by convincing them that the dangers 
of doing so are simply too great. In this final situation, individuals update their 
assessments of costs and benefits, and conclude that the costs of repression outweigh 
the likelihood of movement victory. I expand upon each of these ideas and explore the 
logic and reasoning of these three processes below. 
Signals of incumbent weakness and vulnerability 
If rulers who struggle to contain a mass movement display signs of vulnerability 
and must turn to more capable despots in neighboring countries for help, this would 
seem to erode the remaining vestiges of legitimacy they might still enjoy among pockets 
of the population. For example, a leader who has maintained the full confidence and 
support of his or her armed forces and security troops is (on the surface, at least) still in 
command. Rational citizens know that participating in an anti-governmental campaign 
when the regime’s repressive capacity is entirely intact could pose a serious threat to 
their own safety, and will likely abstain from taking to the streets.  
This relates closely to Ginkel and Smith’s (1999) analysis of revolutions and 




challenged by dissidents must choose whether to offer concessions to their opponents. 
On the one hand, offering concessions can mollify protesters by accommodating some of 
their demands. On the other hand, concessions also indicate a sign of weakness, as the 
incumbent regime evidently must permit some changes that it otherwise would prefer 
not to – the logic holds that only weak dictators must make concessions. Ginkel and 
Smith show that concessions made by the Czechoslovak government in 1989, such as 
allowing opposition groups to form, indicated to protesters that success was possible, 
increasing their resolve and leading to the downfall of the Communist regime24. 
Extending this logic to my framework creates similar implications – while incumbents 
here are not making concessions to protesters, the argument still applies in that only 
weak incumbents must turn elsewhere for assistance. This shapes the signals that the 
regime inadvertently sends to activists, tilting their calculations and making victory 
seem more attainable.  
If a leader must admit that they are overwhelmed and in serious danger of being 
overthrown by the masses, this forces rulers to make appeals to autocratic allies 
elsewhere to provide funding, resources, weapons, or troops to quash the uprising and 
successfully avert a serious threat to his or her rule. As a result, I argue that citizens in 
these situations increasingly come to view their leaders as weak and the chance of a 
successful protest as stronger, deepening their determination to remove leaders from 
office. While it is an example of “soft” intervention rather than direct intrusion, Hong 
Kong’s 2014 “Umbrella Revolution” can provide an illustration of this mechanism. After 
students began to protest against local leaders, the mainland Chinese Communist 
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government attempted to undermine the movement, claiming that it was directed by 
Western forces. By discrediting the protests’ indigenous nature, regime authorities were 
clearly aiming to help local Hong Kong authorities maintain their tenuous hold on 
power2526. Ultimately, this portrayed a situation to protesters in which local leaders were 
too weak to suppress the protests on their own, undermining their image as capable 
rulers because they required support from more powerful forces elsewhere and 
prompting citizens to remain active and engaged in their campaign. 
Unanticipated backlash effect due to unwanted intervention 
I suggest that in the case of citizens who have long been frustrated with 
corruption within their own regime, such activists would become even angrier if their 
leader received defensive support from allies elsewhere. In these cases, autocratic 
intervention causes a backlash in which protesters resent perceptions of unwelcome 
meddling and double down against the regime. Here, intrusion backfires on the 
incumbent and makes the situation worse than if no outside assistance (whether invited 
or not) had ever been given in the first place. I propose two key processes that are at 
play in these types of situations. First, this outside intrusion essentially adds insult to 
injury for angry protesters – not only is the leader disliked, but activists become further 
incensed by the incumbent’s decision to call for help from an outside force that has no 
right to meddle in their affairs. Returning to the example of Hong Kong’s “Umbrella 
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 While the goals of the Chinese government (and the goals of autocratic regimes elsewhere that employ 
similar tactics) was likely to discredit the movement and signal to other citizens in society that the protest 
was fraudulent and inauthentic, I posit that this de-legitimizing approach would actually make activists 
even more likely to continue their campaign and work harder to recruit others to join their cause. As the 
regime spreads false information about the true nature of their efforts, I suggest that this would motivate 




Revolution,” several reporters at the time described the movement as a “major 
pushback” against the Beijing regime’s anti-democratic agenda in Hong Kong 
specifically and in China more broadly27. Protesters resented the fact that mainland 
authorities were undermining their efforts to chart their own course, producing a desire 
to push back against this external intimidation28. As another example, Delcour and 
Wolczuk (2015) agree that Russian intervention its neighbors’ affairs is significant, but 
they argue that this type of action from the Russian government instead causes 
unexpected backlash in places such as Georgia and Ukraine. As Russian manipulation 
and support for autocrats becomes ever clearer and more blatant, alarmed citizens and 
elites become more resolute in achieving their goals of liberalization and democracy. 
Second, citizen anger in these situations could stem from the fact that 
democratically-minded activists abhor the fact that their country is now closely linked 
with their leader’s autocratic allies. In these cases, support from other autocrats causes a 
phenomenon that is essentially an inverse of Weyland’s argument about 
representativeness and availability heuristics. According to Weyland (2012), citizens in 
one state are often highly aware of political conditions in neighboring states, and 
individuals use this knowledge in deciding how to act– this explains why citizens in 
Middle Eastern countries began to protest during the Arab Spring, as they imitated the 
actions of neighbors who had successfully forced leaders from office. In Weyland’s case, 
protesters in one state wanted to emulate outcomes that took place elsewhere. In my 
framework, the opposite is happening – when citizens in one state believe that an 
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autocratic ally is intervening in their affairs, this deepens their resolve not to become 
like their neighbors. The specter of similar (or worse) forms of authoritarianism could 
lead them to perceive their country as being on a precipice, or a critical juncture where 
crucial actions are needed to reverse their own state’s autocratic trajectory.   
A third competing causal mechanism – when might autocratic intervention deter 
protest? 
Finally, I present an alternative proposition regarding situations in which 
autocrats elsewhere step in to support a struggling dictator. While I have suggested in 
my discussion of the two preceding mechanisms that autocratic intervention would 
backfire and cause resentment by signaling the incumbent’s weakness and enflaming 
public anger through perceptions of unwanted intervention, I posit that this will occur 
only when the incumbent regime is weak and incapacitated due to the fact that victory 
becomes a more probable outcome to individuals. When the incumbent is strong and 
forcefully repressive, however, I hypothesize that the opposite scenario will occur 
instead – increasing security forces arriving from other countries (or, in cases of 
credible autocrats, even the threat of security forces) might deter citizens from 
protesting by intimidating them through repressive force and violence.  
From this perspective, the incumbent’s allies’ support would achieve when the 
incumbent themselves could not – stopping protest through sheer numbers and force. 
Several scholarly articles provide evidence that expectations about autocratic 
intervention can effectively preempt challenges to a dictatorial leader. As an example, 
Crabtree et al (2016) suggest that oppositional leaders in Belarus strategically lessened 
the scope of their resistance to Lukashenko in advance of the country’s 2015 Presidential 




the chaos brought about by Russian intervention in Ukraine after Euromaidan, and 
became fearful that protests in their own country could invite a similar reaction from 
Russia. Additionally, Shraibman (2018) argues that this fear of external autocratic 
intervention affected the calculations of the general Belarusian public as well – he finds 
that Belarusians’ expressed interest in protest dropped following the conflict in Ukraine, 
even as Belarus’s economic situation deteriorated, hypothetically making anti-
governmental sentiment more salient and appealing.  
As noted above, I suggest that the likelihood of any of these three mechanisms 
emerging depends fundamentally on the regime type of the incumbent autocrat – its 
repressive capacities and the extremity of its authoritarian nature. In regimes that are 
more semi-authoritarian and politically open, I expect that citizens will feel more 
comfortable taking to the streets in the first place, and that threats of intervention from 
autocrats elsewhere will have less of an effect on their calculations than in a state that is 
closer to the “totalitarian” end of the scale. In countries that are heavily authoritarian, 
the threat of severe violence or death is more valid, and intervention from leaders 
elsewhere will amplify a repressive domestic context that is already intimidating and 
threatening in nature. Additionally, media openness matters – in heavily autocratic 
states, the government is also more likely to quash the flow of images into and out of the 
country, reducing protesters’ ability to gain international attention or support. 
Deterrence is also more likely when autocratic intervention is explicitly material 
rather than simply symbolic. For cases in which autocratic support for a leader is 
symbolic or “soft,” I would expect this intervention to spur protest participation. As an 
example of this, when autocrats elsewhere attempt to sow dissent within a state’s 




would strengthen protesters’ resolve to continue their fight. If autocrats claim that the 
movement is being financed by the Central Intelligence Agency or promote conspiracy 
theories that protesters are violently attacking anyone who does not wholeheartedly 
support their views, for example, this should spur further protest behavior. When 
autocrats actually send in material troops or security forces to quell the anti-
governmental campaign, in contrast, this indicates to protesters that the stakes have 
been dramatically raised; in these situations, outside intervention should suppress 
individuals’ willingness to join a protest movement.  
While I therefore argue that both an unanticipated backlash and deterrence are 
possible reactions to outside intervention depending on the situation at hand, I posit 
that spurring an unwanted backlash will be more prevalent overall. I argue this to be the 
case because protest has become more and more common over the past several decades, 
and protesters know that increased international attention will reduce the chance that 
leaders will brutally crack down. Additionally, the number of regimes that are hybrid 
rather than fully authoritarian has risen, meaning that the space for these types of 
movements to occur has grown as well. Because of these reasons, I hypothesize that the 
first two authoritarian mechanisms above are more likely to occur.  
Presenting my theoretical framework visually 
I now present a simple summation and schematic description of my core 
theoretical components. My argument on these dimensions can be (roughly) mapped 
out as follows:  
A) International liberal support -> increases protesters’ perception that they are 
supported by the global community and that meaningful change is actually possible -> 





B1) International autocratic intervention when domestic regime is weaker and less 
repressive -> causes backlash against unwanted intrusion in domestic affairs and 
makes leader appear weak and surmountable -> more citizens will join the movement  
 
B2) International autocratic intervention when domestic regime is stronger and more 
repressive -> deters and intimidates protesters by raising threat level -> fewer citizens 
will join the movement 
 The preceding sections have shown that my theoretical framework is more 
nuanced than these simple statements, but these assertions are an effective way to 
present my ideas in a concise manner. The logic underlying both claims can be 





    
 
Citizens begin to protest against the regime International democratic forces support  Protests attract new 
     the protest, convince activists and cautious participants and grow 
     onlookers that the protest can succeed larger and larger 
 













Citizens begin to protest against the regime External autocratic forces support the  Protests attract new  
     dictator, stirring a backlash among  participants and grow  
     citizens and sending a signal of the  larger and larger 
     leader’s weakness 
 
Figure 1.2. Effects of autocratic intervention on protest participation when 









    
 
Citizens begin to protest against the regime External autocratic forces support  Protests are unable to  
     the dictator, intimidating citizens and  attract new participants   
     raising perceptions of threat and danger and grow smaller 
 
Figure 1.3. Effects of autocratic intervention on protest participation when 
the domestic regime is strong 
Conclusion 
 The preceding components of this chapter have presented the main theoretical 
arguments and logic underpinning this dissertation’s propositions. Stated briefly, I 
argue that international factors can have a great effect on the calculation and decision-
making strategies of political actors, both at the societal and at the governmental level. 
These international forces will not always trump (or even affect) domestic political 
dynamics, as conditions in one’s home country generally have the largest effects on how 
that person perceives their surroundings and then chooses how to act accordingly. 
However, I still posit that international forces matter to a much more significant degree 
now than they did half a century ago thanks to the global increases in technology and 
telecommunications, and that they must be included in any careful study of modern 
political protests. I turn now to my dissertation’s first empirical chapter, a detailed case 
study of Ukraine’s 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity, to illustrate the specific causal 




CHAPTER 3: UKRAINE’S EUROMAIDAN PROTESTS: A CASE STUDY 
On the evening of November 21, 2013, Mustafa Nayyem, an investigative 
journalist known for exposing fraud and corruption among officials in the Ukrainian 
government, posted a simple note on Facebook urging his friends and followers to join 
him at a gathering on Kyiv’s central Maidan square. The reason for gathering was 
disillusionment with President Viktor Yanukovych’s recent decision to abruptly abandon 
a planned Association Agreement with the European Union that would have deepened 
Ukraine’s European ties, integrating the country into the continent’s political and 
economic networks. Rather than charting a European path, however, Yanukovych 
focused on strengthening ties with the Russian government, sending a clear signal that 
the state was heading East rather than West. A group that initially began as a small 
congregation of journalists, students, and dissidents grew rapidly over the next three 
months into what became known as Euromaidan, or the Revolution of Dignity. By the 
time that the movement ended in February 2014, more than 100 protesters had been 
killed, hundreds more were wounded, and Yanukovych had fled the country to seek 
refuge in Russia.  
The purpose of the following chapter is to present a detailed case study of the 
Euromaidan protests, utilizing the revolution as a framework for testing the theoretical 
mechanisms concerning protest behavior and international influences that I have 
outlined above. By presenting and analyzing the results of more than 120 detailed 
interviews and surveys that I gathered over six months of fieldwork, I illustrate the ways 
in which the Euromaidan movement provides strong evidence for my claims about the 
effects of democracy promotion and autocratic intervention on protesters’ beliefs and 




propositions, focusing on the specific dynamics of one particular movement in order to 
capture a great amount of detail regarding individuals’ perceptions, and decision-
making strategies.  
This chapter proceeds in the following manner. First, I begin by explaining the 
methodological approach that I adopt in this study. It is important to be transparent 
about how my interviews and surveys were conducted, and to discuss the types of 
individuals that I contacted and the methods through which I reached them. Following 
this, I present an overview of the Euromaidan movement’s fundamental goals in order 
to contextualize the revolution and to situate the basic motivations that initially drove 
people to the streets. I then turn to the core of this chapter – a detailed analysis of the 
ways in which different components of the Euromaidan movement illustrate each of my 
theoretical claims in action. Finally, I conclude by presenting a brief discussion 
concerning substantive changes that the movement produced and the likelihood that 
Ukrainian citizens will be motivated to initiate a similar protest campaign in the future.  
Methodological Overview – Utilizing Interviews and Surveys to Gather Data 
 The majority of discussion presented here is based on in-person interviews and 
surveys that I conducted in Ukraine across two separate rounds of fieldwork – one 
lasting from March to May 2017, and another from October to December 2017. I begin 
my analysis by detailing the types of individuals whom I interviewed for this project. 
Interview subjects – whom did I reach? 
 Thanks to individuals’ remarkable willingness to meet with me, I was able to 




ranging from activists to parliamentarians to reporters1. This can therefore be described 
as an expert survey – the vast majority of my participants were either exceptionally 
knowledgeable about Ukrainian politics or were active participants in Euromaidan from 
its beginning to its end. Those in the first category are “elite” in the sense that their 
professions involved a high amount of political sophistication and specialization in 
Ukrainian affairs. Among these individuals were professors of political science at 
institutions including the National University of Kyiv – Mohyla Academy, Kiev 
Polytechnic Institute, and Ukrainian Catholic University; analysts at policy centers such 
as the Institute for World Politics, the International Renaissance Foundation, and the 
European Union Advisory Mission to Ukraine; reporters for BBC Ukraine, Hromadske 
International, and Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty; and elected officials including 
four current and one former Members of the Verkhovna Rada. As is clear from the 
preceding list, these people are not representative of Ukrainian society in general. I am 
therefore not claiming to have spoken with a representative sample of ordinary people; 
instead, I posit that this is an “expert” survey due to the specific nature of my 
respondents’ backgrounds. 
 The second category of individuals whom I contacted were not as “elite” in the 
traditional sense as those in the first group, but their insights were still very valuable 
because many were dedicated participants in the Euromaidan movement. This includes 
individuals who were on the Maidan from the first day to the last, or people that 
regularly volunteered to help sustain the protests.  These people can therefore provide 
first-hand accounts of what people at the time were thinking and feeling. Figure 3.1 
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below presents a simple descriptive overview of the professional occupations of my 
interviewees, in order to illustrate the types of people with whom I spoke2.  
Figure 3.1. Occupation of interviewees – “Which of the following categories 
best describes your current occupational status?” 
 One can see that these individuals were quite diverse in their professions. A 
plurality of respondents (20.14%) identified as academics or professors, while other 
significant groups included non-governmental organization employees (18.05%), policy 
analysts and think tank scholars (15.28%), and those who self-identified as “activists” 
(13.89%). Other groups that I interviewed included politicians and elected officials, 
consultants, students, and reporters, as well as those whose job did not fit into any of 
these categories. 
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 Similarly, one can easily see from Figure 3.2 below that my interviewees were 
more educated than the typical Ukrainian, further reinforcing the nature of my 
respondents as experts on political affairs. When asked to self-report the highest level of 
education that they had completed, 44.07% indicated that they had earned a Master’s 
degree, while another 31.58% reported earning a doctoral degree. In addition to this, 
7.89% of respondents mentioned that they had earned a Bachelor’s degree, meaning 
that 83.54% of interviewees in total earned either a university or post-graduate degree.  
Figure 3.2. Educational attainment of interviewees – “What is the highest 
level of education you have completed?” 
 Finally, it can be helpful to discuss my interviewees’ involvement in Euromaidan. 
As is clear from Figure 3.3 below, a majority of respondents (68.64%) indicated that 
they joined the protests near the beginning of the movement, while another 11.02% 
reported joining near the middle. These individuals were therefore highly relevant for 













thought at the time. By interviewing people who were physically on the ground as the 
revolution was taking place, I can gain a better sense of what protesters perceived and 
believed as they took to the streets. 
Figure 3.3. “Were you personally involved in the Euromaidan protest 
movement?” 
It is important to note that the majority of my interviewees resided in either Kyiv 
or the Western city of Lviv. This is partially due to the fact that these were the two places 
where I spent most of my time while in Ukraine. However, this was also driven by more 
than convenience – because Kyiv is the capital and the political center of Ukraine, this is 
where much of the country’s “political class” resides and where the central Euromaidan 
protests occurred. Similarly, Lviv is the one of the largest and most politically active 
cities in Ukraine’s Western region, a part of the country from which many Euromaidan 
Yes, I joined the protests near the
beginning of the movement
Yes, I joined the protests in the
middle of the movement
Yes, I joined the protets near the
end of the movement
No, I never joined the protests
but I approved of the movement
No, I never joined the protests
and I had no opinion on the
movement
No, I never joined the protests






participants came34. As a result, many of the protests’ most passionate leaders resided in 
Lviv and its surrounding villages. 
 I was also able to interview individuals from other parts of the country as well. I 
had the opportunity to speak with several individuals from Donetsk and Luhansk who 
became Internally Displaced Persons following the Russian invasion of Ukraine’s 
Donbas region, as well as several Crimean Tatars who had been forced to move to Kyiv 
after Russian forces and separatists incorporated Simferopol and other Crimean cities 
into the Russian Federation. While these people comprised a minority of my overall 
sample, their perspectives were still extremely valuable and add a great deal of detail 
and insight to my broader analysis. 
Snowballing – how did I recruit my interview subjects? 
 In general, I relied upon two strategies to contact interviewees – utilizing the 
“snowballing” approach to finding interview subjects and relying upon a simple “cold 
call” strategy in which I contacted individuals directly without any previous connection. 
 As noted by Fujii (2017), the process of snowballing typically involves the task of 
utilizing one’s existing contacts to reach other people who might be important or 
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relevant to one’s research project. This was particularly helpful in demonstrating to new 
contacts that I had already been in touch with their acquaintance (and often cross-
copying those people in the e-mail message itself), allowing me to provide deeper 
credentials than would otherwise have been possible – this gave me legitimacy and 
showed that though I was not Ukrainian, I could still be trusted to implement a secure 
and confidential conversation. 
 Taking this into consideration, I relied on snowballing in two phases. The first 
took place in July 2016, when I visited Washington, D.C. to do preliminary research for 
this project. Before beginning graduate school at the University of Illinois, I worked for 
several years as Program Manager for the Joint Baltic American National Committee, a 
non-governmental organization that advocates for increased support towards 
democracy and human rights in Central and Eastern Europe. Because much of my work 
at that time involved speaking with Congressional staffers and think tank experts on 
Russia and Ukraine, I was able to contact people at several leading foreign policy 
institutions including as the Atlantic Council, the United States Institute for Peace, the 
Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Brookings 
Institution during this first wave of snowballing.  
Additionally, I relied upon a cold call strategy in which I directly e-mailed people 
asking to meet; this allowed me to speak with individuals from Freedom House, the 
National Endowment for Democracy, and the McCain Institute. I was also fortunate to 
speak with three former Ambassadors of the United States to Ukraine whose insight into 
the country’s affairs was particularly helpful. Though this was done entirely in the 




with names and contact information for several influential activists in Ukraine whom I 
then pursued once abroad.  
The second phase during which I utilized the snowball method was actually in the 
field. I was sure to conclude each interview by asking participants for recommendations 
about others in the country who might be interested in speaking with me; this yielded 
many fruitful connections, and provided me with a larger number of other contacts. 
Finally, I relied upon the “cold call” method in Ukraine as well. After identifying relevant 
individuals through Internet searches, I contacted people via e-mail when an address 
was available. In situations with no e-mail information, I reached out to people through 
Facebook. While this might seem odd to Americans who primarily use Facebook to 
communicate with friends and family, many Ukrainians utilize the site in a more 
professional manner. Interestingly, this method was as successful as e-mail solicitations 
in terms of response rates – I was even able to secure three of my five interviews with 
Members of the Verkhovna Rada by contacting them through Facebook, pointing to the 
site as a potentially underutilized source for finding interview subjects. 
How were the interview conducted? 
 In the following section, I briefly discuss the language in which the interviews 
were held, the formatting of the questions and surveys that I asked of respondents, and 
the mechanisms of how the surveys took place. 
 Because the majority of people whom I interviewed were highly educated, many 
were fluent (or at least proficient) in English. As a result, more than ninety percent of 
my conversations took place in English. For a small number of cases, the person whom I 
was interviewing did not feel that their English-speaking ability was sufficient for 




other Ukrainians, who served as interpreters. In only one of these cases, I provided 
financial compensation to a translator; in all other situations, the individual who was 
translating did so entirely voluntarily and refused any type of payment. 
 The interview format that I chose to adopt was semi-structured and flexible. 
Within each conversation, I was sure to at least touch upon the same set of topics – very 
rarely did I omit any question entirely from a given interview5. However, I also 
recognized that each respondent brought their own particular expertise to the 
conversation. Because of this, I was flexible in terms of the order of the questions that I 
posed, emphasizing some more than others when appropriate. In this way, I was able to 
bring each of my theoretical concepts into every conversation while also adjusting the 
parameters of my questions to meet the individual respondent at hand. 
  Each conversation lasted approximately thirty to ninety minutes, dependent 
upon the interviewees’ availability. After each interview concluded, I asked respondents 
to complete an anonymous, closed-ended twenty-question survey6. I had all questions 
translated into Ukrainian by a Ukrainian law student and provided a certified copy of 
the translations to the University of Illinois Institutional Review Board. Some questions 
were demographic in nature, in order to provide me with comprehensive evidence about 
the types of people I interviewed, while others asked participants to express their 
opinions on questions that echoed the themes I raised in my conversation. By mixing 
surveys and open-ended interviews, I was able to procure simple quantitative data that 
illustrates trends across my entire pool of participants while also generating qualitative 
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findings that provide nuance and specificities. I have included a list of these questions in 
Appendices A and B at the end of this dissertation. 
 In order to follow Institutional Review Board guidelines carefully, I was sure to 
ask all participants to sign a detailed consent form before the conversation began so that 
they could understand the nature of my project. I have included a copy of this form in 
Appendix D. The vast majority of interviews were recorded, as most participants 
expressed no worries about my retaining the conversation for later transcription. For 
situations in which participants preferred to merely speak with no recorder, I wrote 
down notes on the topics that were raised instead. 
 One final topic that must be mentioned here concerns the physical spaces where 
the interviews occurred. The majority of my conversations were fairly casual, and took 
place in cafes, coffee shops, or restaurants. All participation was voluntary, and no one 
was compensated financially for their time. A smaller number of interviews took place in 
individuals’ offices – this was true for professors at different universities and a few 
analysts at think tanks. Finally, a small subset of interviews took place in more formal 
settings that actually required me to obtain clearance before I could proceed to the 
meeting. This was the case for several Members of the Verkhovna Rada with whom I 
spoke (as several of those interviews were conducted in their parliamentary offices) and 
also with a representative of the European Union delegation to Ukraine. 
Setting the Stage: What was the Euromaidan movement about? 
 The majority of this chapter will be devoted to tracing the effects of international 
factors including external democratic support and autocratic intervention on the 




introduce the fundamental causes of Euromaidan to understand why people took to the 
streets in the first place. 
 I begin by presenting a short and simplified summary of the event’s primary 
causes and turning points, before going into more detail regarding each significant 
development in subsequent sections. The following text therefore highlights the most 
important days of the protests. 
Key Moments in the Euromaidan Protests – A Summary 
November 21, 2013 
President Viktor Yanukovych announces plans to withdraw from an announced  
 Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union, changing 
 course from his administration’s earlier pronouncements.  
 
Journalist Mustafa Nayyem creates a post on his Facebook page urging concerned 
 citizens to come together in a peaceful protest based in Kyiv’s central Maidan 
 square. Over the next week, crowds of students and activists participate in calm 
 and orderly rallies largely aimed at promoting Ukraine’s European integration 
 and support for the Association Agreement. 
 
November 30, 2013 
Members of the Berkut, a special forces unit, move onto the Maidan at approximately 
 4:30 AM and violently attack students and other protest participants with batons,
 tear gas, and stun grenades. As protesters were unarmed, they were unable to 
 defend themselves and 35 individuals were wounded in the clashes. 
 
December 1, 2013 
Angered by the level of Berkut brutality aimed at protesters the morning before,   
 hundreds of thousands of citizens rally in central Kyiv to stand against  
 repression and the regime’s lack of respect for human rights. This stage of the 
 movement therefore drew large numbers of people who were no longer  
 concerned with the Association Agreement, but were instead worried about the 
 quality of life in their country. These rallies would continue regularly over the 
 next month, as protesters continued to put pressure on the regime and called for 
 international sanctions against leaders. 
 
January 16, 2014 
The Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, passes a series of so-called “dictatorship 
 laws” that aim to severely restrict the rights of assembly in an effort to suppress 
 the ongoing protests. Clashes intensify between activists and security forces, 





February 20, 2014 
Snipers – the precise identity of whom still remains unknown in 2019 – begin to fire 
 upon the protesters from a variety of locations. At least 21 activists are killed on 
 this day alone, out of a total of nearly 130 killed throughout the protests’ overall 
 duration. 
 
February 22, 2014 
Viktor Yanukovych secretly leaves Kyiv during the middle of the night; later reports 
 indicate that he then travels first to Eastern Ukraine before finally entering 
 Russia. Later that day, the Verkovna Rada formally calls for a new Presidential 
 election to be held on May 25, 2014. 
 
Phase 1: Euromaidan and participants’ orientation towards the West 
 As I interviewed more and more respondents about the protests, two themes 
repeatedly emerged that I must emphasize. The first was that protesters at any stage of 
the movement were not monolithic. Indeed, the protests at various times saw the 
presence and participation of socially liberal activists who wanted to move their country 
in a European direction7; far-right nationalist groups8; pensioners and grandparents9; 
middle-class business owners10; ethnic Ukrainians, ethnic Russians, and members of 
American and European diaspora groups11; Orthodox priests12; and scientists and health 
care professionals13. Indeed, many interviewees marveled at the fact that so many 
disparate groups were able to unify for the duration of the movement14, while others 
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pointed to the fact that this exemplified the movement’s organic, fundamentally bottom-
up nature15. 
 Also pressing is the fact that any study of the movement must carefully delineate 
it into two distinct phases, as each had different goals and triggers. Reid (2015) and 
Plokhy (2015) both discuss how the first phase, known by most Ukrainians as 
“Euromaidan,” was spurred by President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to abandon a 
proposed Association Agreement with the European Union in favor of increased ties 
with the Russia-led Customs Union16. According to these authors and the people that I 
interviewed, citizens had been gathering in Kyiv’s Maidan square while Yanukovych 
traveled to Lithuania to meet with European Union officials, congregating to watch the 
proceedings live on television. Several interviewees stated that while they were 
determined to express their support for Ukraine’s European identity at that time, many 
people initially had no sense that the movement would grow to become as large as it 
eventually did1718. 
 As noted above, Yanukovych’s decision was the early spark for this part of the 
protest, and was compounded by Mustafa Nayyem’s Facebook post calling for activists 
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and students to gather peacefully on the Maidan. As Nayyem himself informed me, the 
majority of participants at this stage were “experts, journalists, media, the so-called 
creative class. Young people” (interview with Mustafa Nayyem, conducted in Kyiv, May 
26, 2017). For them, the main reason for standing on the Maidan at that time was to 
express support for Ukraine’s Western integration. Videos and photos make this clear, 
as several participants brandished European Union flags and chanted slogans about 
Ukraine’s European identity19. Indeed, Yekelchyk (2015) notes that the Association 
Agreement itself was actually quite technical, dense, and difficult to understand; as a 
result, rather than protesting against this specific piece of legislation not being adopted, 
Ukrainians were frustrated with the broader cultural and political implications of what 
this perceived turn away from Europe would mean. 
These protests were wholly peaceful in nature, which made the events that took 
place on the night of November 30 all the more shocking for participants and 
Ukrainians at large – those who were assembled on the Maidan were brutally dispersed 
at approximately 4:30 AM, with riot police and forces known as the Berkut using batons, 
clubs, and other weapons to violently attack protesters20. Images spread through social 
media and television stations the following morning, incensing average Ukrainians and 
spurring the second phase of the movement – the so-called “Revolution of Dignity21.” In 
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this sense, the police beatings perfectly exemplify Schelling’s (1960) idea of a focal point, 
or a solution to a problem that can bring disconnected actors together in the absence of 
any strategic communication or interaction. Latent anger and discontent had been 
brewing in Ukraine for years, and the regime’s response to the Euromaidan protests was 
the spark that lit the fire of revolution. As a singer and activist who was instrumental in 
organizing a parallel Euromaidan movement in Lviv at the time succinctly put it, 
“Euromaidan was like the last drop in a full cup of hatred towards what was going on 
here in Ukraine” (Interview with singer and activist, conducted in Lviv, May 2, 2017). 
Phase 2: The Revolution of Dignity 
 According to scholarly authors and many of my respondents, the second phase 
can be conceptualized as a distinct era that lasted from December 1 until the revolution’s 
conclusion in February 2014. Appalled by the regime’s violence towards protesters, 
millions of Ukrainians took to the streets to challenge what they saw as an encroaching 
slant towards authoritarian rule22. According to Wilson (2014), there is empirical 
evidence of this – surveys conducted among protesters at different points in time found 
that while initial activists were angry about Ukraine’s pivot towards Russia, more people 
after the beatings were upset about the regime’s use of violence (70 percent) as 
compared with those who were protesting the regime’s policy decisions (54 percent). It 
was at this point that the movement began to capture the attention of the international 
media and news community as well, with telecommunications corporations eventually 
sending reporters including Anderson Cooper to cover the events on-the-ground in Kyiv. 
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Many interviewees specifically pointed to the fact that so many of those who were 
beaten were students and young people as driving them to participate – older 
Ukrainians who saw echoes of their own children in the protesters felt that this was 
simply going too far23. Indeed, as a former activist detailed to me in an interview: “Very 
emotional, very specific is that young students were beaten up by the riot police, which 
also was a demonstration of everything that was happening throughout [Yanukovych’s] 
presidency…People’s rights are not being respected. The government is kind of a regime 
that established totalitarian rule, and nobody has right to protest for their lives. So at 
that point, people understood that students are being beaten now, that tomorrow 
pensioners will be beaten up, and the next day the veterans will be beaten up, and that’s 
when the people from different environments, different communities, they stood up and 
said no, if today the students are beaten up, we have to protect them” (Interview with 
former Euromaidan activist and current project manager for the Lviv Education 
Foundation, conducted in Lviv, December 5, 2017). 
Sakwa (2015) finds that many participants during this second stage of 
Euromaidan were quite a bit older than the students who dominated the first phase – he 
notes reports that the median protester after the beatings was aged between 34 and 45 
with a full-time job. Onuch (2014) presents an illustrative study with similar 
conclusions, drawn from original surveys that she and her team conducted as the 
protests were taking place. She finds that respondents under 30 indicated that they were 
protesting for democracy, human rights, and closer ties to Europe; respondents between 
30 and 55 stressed the need to live in a “European” democracy with economic 
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opportunity and opposing the regime’s use of violence; and those over 55 were there to 
safeguard the country’s tenuous hold on democracy for future generations. 
 Numerous interviewees pointed to the notion of a Revolution of Dignity as 
emblematic of the reasons why people took to the streets between December and 
January – the sense that because of Yanukovych’s lack of respect for democratic norms 
and procedure24, his corruption25, and the notion that he and his family were benefitting 
themselves financially while the country suffered2627, the fundamental “dignity” of 
Ukrainians was at stake28. Average citizens aspired to implement a culture that, if not 
distinctly “European” in the sense of social liberalism, was still “European” in the sense 
that rule of law should apply equally to everyone regardless of social standing and 
personal wealth29. Beyond this, respondents indicated that people wished for their 
voices to be heard30, to strengthen their children’s futures31, to remove Yanukovych 
from power before he could further consolidate his rule32, to reduce the centralized 
power of oligarchs in Ukraine33, and to eradicate the bribery and corruption that 
pervades all sectors of Ukrainian life34. 
 A sociologist spoke to me about interviews that she conducted with protesters at 
the time, and she supported the common view of Euromaidan as having two distinct 
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stages. As she recalled, “After the students were beaten, it was a certain turn of 
expectations. And mainly when we were interviewing people, it was something that they 
were talking about. First we were for Europe, and later it was not so much about Europe, 
but more about us and our own state, about the political situation within it. The 
government cannot beat its own people. So it was a very general right…It was like, we 
are a citizen of this country, and our government cannot hurt us. We are humans and we 
have certain rights, so government has to protect people…At that point in time it was 
more about being against using force and violence” (Interview with sociologist at the 
Center for Urban History of East Central Europe, conducted in Lviv, December 3, 2017).  
Similarly, an activist at the non-governmental organization Reanimation Package 
for Reforms recalled interviews that she herself conducted at the time, and expressed 
similar findings: “I spoke to one hundred people and interviewed them about their 
concerns, why they are there, what they are doing, and all of them noticed that shift 
which occurred after the night of 30th of November, when students were beaten...And 
obviously, people started with the unjust character of Ukrainian political establishment. 
In particular, the Yanukovych regime. That was first. Then it was corruption – we would 
like to live with dignity, not in a country that absolutely doesn’t take into account the 
voices of its citizens. And then it radicalized to the point where they wanted not just 
improvement of some institutions, but a total removal of the Yanukovych regime” 
(Interview with activist, conducted in Kyiv, March 23, 2017). 
 While much of this second phase of the protest was characterized by a series of 
clashes between protesters and the regime, many interviewees pointed to January 16, 
2014 as a fundamental turning point. On that day, according to a 2014 article in the 




assembly and freedom of speech35. Popularly referred to as the “dictatorship laws,” the 
new provisions criminalized several activities, including the creation of a motorcade 
consisting of more than five cars designed to block traffic; gathering and disseminating 
any information about the Berkut, judges, or security forces; blocking or obstructing 
entrance into any governmental building; implementing and constructing tents, stages, 
or sound equipment; and an “anti-mask law” that restricted protesters from 
participating in peaceful gatherings while wearing any type of mask or scarf that would 
partially obstruct one’s face3637.  
According to Menon and Rumer (2015), echoing similar laws that had been 
passed in Russia and other autocratic states, non-governmental organizations receiving 
funding from external actors would be now also forced to register as “foreign agents,” a 
designation that would bring increased taxes and oversight by the government. These 
laws were particularly galling to activists who had been on the streets for more than a 
month, as their implementation would have curtailed some of the more effective and 
non-violent strategies that protesters had been employing3839. 
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 An activist and current analyst at the National Democratic Institute Ukraine recounted to me how many 
protesters refused to take these types of laws seriously; instead many began to work pots and other 
utensils on their heads as a way of circumventing the laws’ ban on head coverings or other types of facial 
protection (Interview conducted in Kyiv, March 24, 2017). 
37
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freedom of expression, the freedom of association, and the right to a fair trial.” For reference, see: OSCE 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. “OPINION ON AMENDMENTS TO CERTAIN 
LAWS  OF UKRAINE PASSED ON 16 JANUARY 2014.” Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. Published February 10, 2014. Available online at www.legislationline.org/documents/id/18720.  
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 Many protesters during this last month viewed Ukraine as being at a tipping 
point, with the country’s future hanging in the balance4041. One activist clearly agrees 
with the demarcation of the protest movement in this way, noting, “For me, Maidan is 
divided into three stages. And the first stage is about signing the agreement with 
European Union. And then after students were beaten, people said, oh hell, what 
happened just now. It’s not Moscow, it’s not Belarus for sure, and you can’t have the 
same actions that those countries have…But after 16th of January, when they had these 
ridiculous laws, it became like, we had to get rid of these authorities” (Interview with 
activist, conducted in Kyiv, December 9, 2017). Another former activist described the 
entire Euromaidan movement as being a decision between the future and the past, 
indicating the weight that participants ascribed to the event42. As the preceding quote 
indicates, several interviewees indicated that based on their perceptions at the time, 
Ukraine was on the verge of becoming another Russia – a state where political 
competition was non-existent and dissent was swiftly repressed. This was key to bring 
many people to the streets, and sustained the movement in a way that otherwise would 
not have been possible43. 
The preceding section has contextualized Euromaidan, introducing the primary 
factors that drove Ukrainians to the streets. Considering these circumstances, this 
section will now justify Ukraine as an appropriate case for testing my mechanisms of 
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interest. Following this, I turn to the core empirical evidence of the chapter to show how 
my theory’s claims apply to Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity. 
Justifying Ukraine as a relevant context for testing my theoretical claims 
Ukraine’s status as a hybrid regime 
 Ukraine is an appropriate case for testing my theoretical framework for several 
reasons. First, while Ukraine today is certainly more democratic than many of its 
neighbors, including Russia and Belarus, the country still lacks the rigorous institutions 
and the firm commitment to rule of law that are necessary for genuine and long-lasting 
democratic consolidation. Ukraine therefore falls into the category of a “hybrid,” or 
semi-autocratic, regime between the poles of full democracy and full autocracy. 
According to Freedom House, Ukraine’s rating in 2019 was classified as 3.5 out of 7, or 
“Partly Free.” The institution assigned Ukraine a score of 3 out of 7 on Political Rights 
and a score of 4 out of 7 on Civil Liberties, noting specifically that “corruption remains 
endemic, and initiatives to combat it are only partially implemented. Attacks against 
journalists, civil society activists, and members of minority groups are frequent and 
often go unpunished4445.”  
Ukraine has certainly made several important and significant strides towards 
liberalization and democratic government, but the country still has many significant 
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political obstacles that must be overcome. Figure 3.4 below provides some empirical 
evidence of this – during the entire period between 2001 and 2019, Ukraine has only 
achieved scores of 2.5 and below (indicating a largely “free” society) five times, in the 
five years immediately following the country’s 2004 Orange Revolution. Interestingly, 
one can clearly see apparent signs of the Yanukovych regime’s creeping autocracy and 
deteriorating effects on Ukrainian politics, as the country’s scores markedly began to 
decline following his election to the Presidency in 2010 before then rebounding slightly 
in 2013 and 2014. 
 
Figure 3.4. Freedom House scores for Ukraine, 2001 to 2019 
 This was therefore particularly true of Ukraine under Yanukovych; people 
indicated that protesters were highly discontented with the autocratic bent that Ukraine 
had taken, with several referring to the regime as either “unconsolidated authoritarian” 
or heading down the path towards full autocracy with meaningless elections and a 
severely constrained civil society46. A significant number of interviewees recounted ways 
in which corruption and governmental repression inundated their daily lives in nearly 
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every aspect imaginable. As an example, one former reporter for the Ukrainian 
television station 1+1 recalled how station managers directed her and her colleagues 
away from reporting critically on Yanukovych, noting, “We had a big pressure from the 
administration of President Yanukovych. There even was a moment when one of our 
reporters came to us and he told, he knows each of you personally. And you are telling 
what he doesn’t want to be told” (Interview with former television reporter, conducted 
in Kyiv, March 17, 2017).  
Still others noted the corruption that permeated Ukrainian society, with 
interviewees specifically pointing to paying bribes for everything from basic medical 
treatment47 to the ability to begin a small business48 to the ability to secure a degree 
from their university49. Yekelchyk (2015) also places special emphasis on the influence 
of corruption, pointing to beliefs that Yanukovych and his allies (dismissively 
nicknamed “the Family”) were profiting at citizens’ expense as instrumental in 
mobilizing people against the regime. These examples are not purely political; however, 
as the preceding discussion about the initial causes of Euromaidan makes clear, all of 
these problems contributed to a general dissatisfaction with life in the country that 
made protest increasingly likely over time. 
Within the context of Euromaidan specifically, interviewees recounted episodes 
of severe intimidation and repression by security forces and riot police, who often beat 
and brutally dispersed groups of activists. These recollections point to the very real 
dangers that many activists faced, further justifying Ukraine’s status as a semi-
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authoritarian regime at the time. As an example, one respondent recounted her time as 
a university student who joined the movement in its first week to challenge 
Yanukovych’s decision to abandon the European Union’s Association Agreement. As she 
recounted to me: 
“We knew that it was dangerous. We know that we were being followed. We knew 
 the people that followed us. They changed the jackets, but it’s so stupid, you 
 know, if someone has been following you…because it was so common, people 
 were just arrested on the street and then took to some police office and beaten 
 up. It kept increasing. And I just got back home and I entered the building, and I 
 saw that in the part of the building where is my apartment, I saw this big guy 
 standing near my door. And I just, I understood that he is probably waiting for 
 me, and I just passed it and went upstairs, and I called my neighbors, and I asked 
 them to go out and ask what he is doing there. And they asked him, and he said, 
 oh, you know, I got cold and I went inside to warm up. (laughs) Near my  
 apartment. And that’s when I started living not in my apartment, but in this 
 apartment that was here at the Maidan. And my parents got calls. My mom knew 
 someone in the security services, and he called her and was like, do you know 
 where [your daughter] is right now? And she said, why are you asking? And he 
 said, because I’m looking right at her and she’s OK right now. But if she continues 
 what she’s doing, she won’t be OK” (Interview with former student activist, 
 conducted in Kyiv, November 15, 2017). 
Another interviewee described the physical violence to which he was subjected by 
riot police, noting that though he was unarmed and did not initiate any violence, he was 
still captured and physically assaulted for his participation. As he recalled, “We came to 
the street, Institutska, and I was harmed. They take me to the prison, how to say, 
occupied…they imprisoned me, and then beat me. So that’s why I lose a few of my teeth, 
and broken leg, and so I was harmed. And then I stayed imprisoned for six hours there. 
It was cold…it was not really a tradition that was common with the dignity of the 
person” (Interview with activist, conducted in Lviv, December 5, 2017). 
Still another participant told me about an assault in the Western Ukrainian city of 
Ivano-Frankivsk. Because he was a prominent leader among university students at that 




before the morning when I planned to leave to Kyiv, I was beaten by three unknown 
guys, which still [haven’t been] found by police. And they beat me very strong, especially 
beat my legs, and I have no possibility to walk at all. And I moved to the hospital for a 
month and a half lying in the hospital…Because at the same time, young people were 
beaten in Kyiv, and in several smaller towns throughout Ukraine. They were beaten too, 
in the same night. So seems to me to understand that it is the work of security services 
to block the protests and to beat the most active persons” (Interview with former 
student activist and civil society organizer, conducted in Kyiv, December 8, 2017). 
Another striking example concerns the memories of a Crimean Tatar who 
participated in a Euromaidan movement in Simferopol – his situation was particularly 
fraught, as the majority of ethnic Russians residing on the Crimean peninsula were 
hostile to the movement’s success. He recalled the ways in which he was publicly 
identified and branded a fascist for his participation, noting, “It was pictures with our 
faces everywhere. With labels. City transport, and the trolley was all over the city. And 
they have TV in trolleybus, and on these TVs, they show little videos how we were bad 
and how we were paid by America…If you see it is every day, one day you wake up, and 
it is normal, where you see a picture with your face and it is written something bad. It is 
normal…I can show you my picture, which was attached to my door [in the public space 
of my apartment building]. And they write I am Nazi. I do not understand. I am Muslim. 
I am a Tatar. How can I be a Nazi? It is ridiculous” (Interview with Crimean Tatar 
activist, conducted in Kyiv, November 20, 2017). 
Three final examples illustrate just how dangerous participating in the protests 




authoritarian way, beating people to death and utilizing snipers to fire on the crowd50. A 
professor of journalism at the National University of Kyiv – Mohyla Academy recalled 
the danger of merely being in proximity to the protests, recounting hearing signs of the 
regime’s aggression during his class, as the university is located fairly close to the 
Maidan: “It was quite a terrifying experience, when we’ve all been sitting in the class and 
hearing the shooting. Actually, because it was happening on European Square, but 
actually you can hear it very well here. So it was like it was really happening just next 
door” (Interview with Professor of Journalism, conducted in Kyiv, December 6, 2017). 
Other interviewees were even closer to the violence, recalling experiences in 
which their lives were literally at stake. One activist who was monitoring the protests 
and translating reports to share through Twitter stated, “On that particular day, the day 
of shootings…we were expecting tanks, and we were expecting soldiers. But the fact that 
we had snipers shooting from unknown location? I remember that I was just standing 
and I didn’t know what to do. Should I run, should I lie down, should I hide? Because 
you don’t know where the danger is coming from. And this is a horrible feeling” 
(Interview with civil society activist and prominent Twitter user, conducted in Kyiv, 
April 19, 2017). Finally, another activist recounted the sense of violence and gore that 
pervaded the movement’s last days, stating, “Exactly in that time, riot police start to 
charge into the square. And some people were killed. And when we went back to 
Institutska Street, we saw many wounded people who came back to Maidan. Men, 
women, with wounded heads, arms, legs. Very horrifying scene. Some people were with 
broken faces. In my life I haven’t watched more blood than in that time…Near us was a 
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car with three covered, killed bodies, drove near us. One of the bodies was a woman, and 
I think that it was Antonina Dvoryanets, an old woman who was beaten by the riot 
police” (Interview with activist and doctoral candidate, conducted in Lviv, May 2, 2017). 
For these protesters, therefore, the regime’s response was clearly and unequivocally 
autocratic in nature. 
The preceding section shows that Ukraine fits well within the framework of this 
dissertation due to the dangers that protesters in the country faced, demonstrating the 
ways in which their calculations differ from of people in more open societies. In addition 
to its regime type, Ukraine is also an excellent context for testing a theory about social 
movements because of the participatory nature of Ukrainian society.  Several 
interviewees noted that in Ukraine, there is a joke that people regularly take to the 
streets every ten years, referencing protests in the early 1990s, the Orange Revolution of 
2004, and Euromaidan51. Still others suggested that Ukrainian culture is inherently 
prone to contention, with some referring to their society as anarchist and unwilling to 
tolerate monarchical rulers52. Activism and political self-expression have become highly 
viable for many Ukrainians, meaning that this is an appropriate case for exploring the 
questions posed here. For external evidence of this claim, one can also look to two news 
reports published in 2017 and 2019 indicating that activism and civilian oversight of the 
government is alive and well535455. 
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Understanding the role of external international forces in shaping Ukrainian politics 
Ukraine is also a strong fit for this study due to the competing forces of 
democracy promotion and autocratic intervention that have heavily shaped 
developments in the country. As evidence of this, many people with whom I spoke 
pointed to the effects of increased Western influence in the years since Euromaidan. For 
example, one USAID officer described the ways in which money from the United States 
is channeled into Ukraine to support the development of a vibrant civil society, noting:  
“USAID provides aid to a large portion of civil society, a lot of civil society groups 
 that we were supporting before the revolution to build their capacity, to grow as 
 organizations, also supporting them to advocate for and champion these  
 democratic reforms, which made up a large part of the platform. So after the 
 protests, on the Maidan, there was a lot of discussion about what it was that 
 people wanted, and so post-protest, what we’ve been doing is working a lot with 
 civil society groups. Like the Reanimation Package for Reforms coalition, and all 
 those members to try to articulate the policy, the demands of the revolution and 
 to help them articulate that into policy proposals, and help them build their 
 capacity to advocate those policy proposals to lawmakers in parliament and the 
 government” (Interview with American United States Agency for International 
 Development case officer, conducted in Kyiv, October 25, 2017). 
While this democratic support is notable, it is not new. According to Reid (2015) 
Western aid to Ukraine has been a significant foreign policy tool for years – as far back 
as 1994, Ukraine was actually the fourth largest recipient of aid from the United States. 
Similarly, Plokhy (2015) notes that in 1994, Ukraine became the first post-Soviet state to 
sign any kind of cooperation agreement with the European Union, indicating the depth 
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and extent of Western interest in promoting Ukraine’s economic and democratic 
development. 
Interestingly, this democratic support (particularly within the context of 
Euromaidan) has often been weaponized by the Russian state media to undermine 
protests by depicting activists as paid puppets of the West. As one political analyst 
mentioned to me, “So when all this started, and people from Ukraine started to express 
their opinions right there…Russians was not supporting – they just thought that 
Ukrainians went crazy. So they are wasting their time, standing there, doing nothing, 
they all get paid by Western governments, because – you cannot pay more than 100,000 
people. It’s really quite silly. But they do believe this stuff56” (Interview with political 
analyst, conducted in Kyiv, November 22, 2017). Kasparov (2015) suggests that this 
tactic was utilized by the Putin regime to quell any imitations of dissent that might take 
place in Russia, a consideration that I discuss at greater length in subsequent sections of 
this chapter. 
Beyond these tactics by Russian authorities, there is also strong evidence that 
many people feel that Putin and his associates were intervening in Ukrainian affairs to 
promote Russian interests. As one activist mentioned, “So if you really look at the 
broader picture, it’s obvious that Yanukovych and the oligarchs related to him, they 
were tied and they still are tied to Putin, and until today, most of the people who were 
engaged in those killings, very few were actually put to prison…It’s obvious that Putin 
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was using puppets in Ukraine who are letting everything unfold according to his 
scenario” (Interview with sociologist, conducted in Lviv, December 2, 2017).  
A different activist expressed similar thoughts, suggesting that many protesters 
resented the Russian government’s involvement in Ukrainian politics. As he recounted, 
“Yanukovych was never seen as a truly independent guy. He was always trying to be 
friends with Russia. There was a short period right before the Maidan when it was 
looking like Yanukovych was going to sign the Agreement. But what we saw during the 
Maidan was that Yanukovych clearly turned his back on Europe and was asking for 
money from Russia and was actually selling the country to secure his power. It was clear 
in December, when he went to Moscow and got a loan from Putin…Ukraine is still very 
connected to Russia in many ways. It’s a post-Soviet country that only truly gained its 
independence in 2014, from my perspective. Economically, we were totally dependent. 
Politically, from time to time more or less, but usually so…So it was always clear for 
people on Maidan that Russia is an important actor in all of this” (Interview with former 
activist and current staffer for the Ministry of Health, conducted via Skype, December 
21, 2017). 
The vast majority of people with whom I spoke were firm in stressing that pro-
Western Ukrainians are not inherently anti-Russian, as many have relatives in Russia 
and nearly everyone whom I interviewed was fluent in both languages. Instead, they 
were resentful of the Putin regime’s efforts to retain Ukraine within its sphere of 
influence. Taken together, the preceding section has shown that many citizens hold the 
perception that both democratic support from the West and autocratic intervention 
from the Russian government have helped shape much of Ukraine’s history, justifying 




Classifying the Euromaidan movement as pro-democratic 
One final point to make in justifying my focus on Euromaidan concerns the 
movement’s goals and initiatives. As outlined earlier, I posit that my broad theoretical 
claims apply to protests that are democratically-oriented and that aim to pursue and 
promote social justice, transparency, and respect for human rights. Euromaidan was not 
ethnically or religiously driven, and while frustration with poverty and depressed living 
conditions were certainly on the minds of some protesters, the fundamental driving 
force was instead to achieve a more open, free, and democratic society in which the rule 
of law applied to everyone regardless of their stature and those who propagated the 
corrupt system would be accountable for their actions. Indeed, Zelinska (2015) describes 
her analysis of local Maidans in 57 cities through Ukraine57. According to her research, 
“protesters’ primary identity emphasized their right to direct democracy, including 
influence over national and local policies. National-level factors played a key role: 
Human rights violations, deepening political crisis, total corruption and other 
institutional failures were, to the protesters, the key triggers of contention” (379). 
Similarly, Shore (2017) finds in her sociological study of Euromaidan that values and 
concerns over human rights were central to informing many activists’ decisions to 
protest. As a result, the Euromaidan movement meets the democratically aspirational 
framework within which I am operating.  
I turn now to the core empirical and analytical focus of this chapter – an 
exploration of the ways in which Ukraine’s Euromaidan protests exemplify my causal 
mechanisms in action. In order to maintain a clear focus, I proceed through my posited 
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mechanisms in a linear fashion, discussing each one separately. Different types of 
mechanisms often operated in conjunction with one another at the same time, of course, 
but dividing them in this way makes it easier to understand how each one played a role. 
I begin by providing a more holistic, broad overview about Ukrainians’ perceptions of 
democratic support before then delving into each specific mechanism in greater detail. 
Dynamics of External Democracy Promotion – Exploring My Mechanisms 
I begin this section by presenting the results of one of my closed-ended survey’s 
key questions. Though survey questions are by nature more limited and restricted in 
scope than open-ended interviews, such questions are also valuable due to their ability 
to examine patterns in beliefs among a large number of individuals58. Figure 5 below 
presents the findings of a survey question asking, “Based on your observations, did 
“Western” states or organizations (such as civil society groups based in the European 
Union member nations or the United States) have any effect on the protesters’ 
perceptions, strategies, or goals?” The purpose of this question is to determine whether 
individuals felt that activists during the Euromaidan movement were considering the 
possible influence or assistance of democratic outside actors while participating in the 
protests.  
 According to Figure 3.5, a fairly significant number of respondents felt that the 
perceptions and strategies of Euromaidan protesters were driven at least in part by the 
effects and influence of outside liberal actors. It is important to fundamentally stress 
there that I am in no way implying that protesters were directly ordered to behave a 
certain way, as many of my interviewees were intent on making this clear and requested  
                                                          
58
 Because my respondents completed the closed-ended surveys after our interviews were completed, it is 
important to note that in some cases, certain individuals might have been primed to think in a particular 
way due to the nature of the immediately preceding conversation. I do not expect that this factor shifted 





Figure 3.5. Expert belief on the effects of external democratic forces on 
protesters’ perceptions and strategies 
that I do so as well5960. This is likely because (as I explore in greater detail in subsequent 
sections), propaganda emanating from the Russian government tried to characterize 
protesters as paid lackeys of the European Union and the United States6162.  
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Nevertheless, the data above still show that many protesters were considering 
external influence in their behavior and decision-making strategies. 83.90% of the 
people whom I interviewed felt that the actions of Western forces had some impact on 
protesters’ beliefs – only 9.32% indicated that Western actors and organizations had no 
effect, while another 4.24% of respondents were unsure. Among those who felt that 
Western actors mattered in some way, the largest group was those who felt that Western 
forces had a moderate impact – this stance matched the views of 40.68% of 
respondents. Finally, an equal share of 22.89% felt that Western actors had either a 
“strong” effect or a “weak” effect. Taken together, this reinforces a notion that I argue 
elsewhere in this chapter – the fact that while protesters were primarily driven by 
domestic factors in their decision to take to the streets, considerations about external 
actors did have a notable and significant effect on their perceptions and calculations63.  
I now turn to my first mechanism of democratic support, the notion of purposive 
solidarity, to show how this affected people during the Euromaidan movement. 
Mechanism 1.1: Purposive Solidarity 
 As defined and explored in my theoretical chapter, I claim that protesters care a 
great deal about purposive solidarity – essentially, the psychological, mental, and 
emotional sense for protesters that their cause is just and that they are not alone in the 
world. Based on the results of my interviews, this appeared to be the single most 
powerful effect of external democratic support during Euromaidan. In this section, I 
focus on 1) the emotional support that members of the Ukrainian diaspora in other 
countries as well as their democratically-minded friends provided to protesters and      
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2) statements and expressions of support that were made by elected officials and 
representatives of international organizations in other countries. 
 Of primary importance for many protesters in terms of emotional attention and 
support were the actions of both the Ukrainian diaspora and regular citizens in other 
countries. More specifically, several respondents recalled the fact that ethnic Ukrainians 
and others held smaller Euromaidan movements or commemorations in their own 
home states as a way to show solidarity and to bolster the resolve of people who were 
physically protesting in Kyiv. One activist and singer in Lviv mentioned to me,    
“The very nice and pleasant part of Euromaidan, especially here, when we’ve got 
 Internet and we’ve got a big screen, it was that people from all over the world, 
 they were trying to recreate a message to Euromaidan. And we were broadcasting 
 all these messages and videos here. We had messages from the countries where 
 Ukrainians live, that’s one thing, but also we got messages, for example, from 
 South Africa, from Nairobi, from South Korea, from Japan, from China. Actually, 
 people were acting as a community, not united by some organization, but they 
 wanted to do something for Ukraine. And in this way, throughout social media, 
 they were spreading the word of what is going on” (Interview with singer and  
 activist, conducted in Lviv, May 2, 2017).  
 For this particular activist, this type of support and emotional reinforcement 
clearly played a significant role in shaping her resolve to campaign against the regime. If 
external factors had not played any part in protesters’ calculations, it is unlikely that 
they would have seized upon these expressions of solidarity. Instead, they used these 
expressions of sympathy and support to reinforce their own determination to carry on 
the fight. Interestingly, this also points to the importance of social media and 
advancements in technology that were present in this situation. Protesters and their 
supporters in other countries can reach one another instantly and transmit images with 
no difficulty whatsoever, demonstrating the necessity of a free and open flow of 




Another activist in Kyiv echoed these claims, focusing specifically on the 
emotional ties and appeals of Euromaidan and the Ukrainian diaspora elsewhere: 
“A very peculiar thing about the Ukrainian diaspora is that we have diaspora, as a 
definition, so Ukrainians who for several generations are already living abroad, 
and then we have this fourth wave of Ukrainian migration which started in late 
90s and still continues. Those are economic migrants. Those are people who in 
most cases sometimes aren’t that well-educated and they just leave Ukraine to get 
any kind of job, because it’s so bad in Ukraine…Those were people who were 
ashamed of coming from Ukraine. Because Ukraine gave them nothing. It gave 
them no good level of life. So we had millions of Ukrainians who were just not 
paying any care or attention to what is going on in Ukraine. And Maidan changed 
that. An enormous amount of people realized that they are proud of being 
Ukrainian. They are proud of coming from a country that fights for its future, that 
fights for its values. And suddenly it became cool and very proud to be Ukrainian. 
So beautiful thing that started all around the world is, we had Euromaidans 
almost in every major city of the world. In Tokyo, in Paris, in Milan, in Toronto, 
in Washington, in San Francisco. Everywhere they were Ukrainians, they were 
gathering together, they were building those communities, they were looking for 
a way to help Ukraine. In China as well. And so if we can’t be in Ukraine right 
now, maybe we can send money, maybe we can build some local support here, 
and we can spread the word. A friend of mine who was living in Shanghai, he – 
and obviously in China it’s very hard to get Twitter and Facebook – he was 
getting information from his friends, and he started a page in Chinese, where he 
was just writing the stories. So all around the world, every single Ukrainian who 
was outside Ukraine at the moment when Maidan happened was thinking, what 
can I do for the movement?” (Interview with activist and prominent Twitter user, 
conducted in Kyiv, April 19, 2017)64. 
The preceding quote contains a great deal of valuable information and explores 
the effects that people in other countries had in shaping protesters’ beliefs. This 
respondent points to the wide geographical range of the diaspora – while many reside in 
nearby Poland, others have traveled to nearly every continent on the globe. One civil 
society activist who works at Centre UA, a non-governmental organization aimed at 
promoting transparency and anti-corruption measures, expressed similar sentiments 
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when I spoke with her: “It was important for protesters when there were actions in 
support of Ukraine in different countries, organized by Ukrainian diaspora or just 
organized by locals. And I remember on our Facebook page, we had the special album of 
pictures and there were more than 100 different protest actions from different 
countries. Starting from Ecuador and finishing in Norway, all over, all over the world. 
And even just when people demonstrated the Ukrainian flag at some slogan or logo on 
the paper, it was very important. It was like, wow, great, great! They support us!” 
(Interview conducted in Kyiv, April 18, 2017). This quote again points to both the 
breadth and depth of support that Euromaidan protesters often received from people in 
other countries, and the fact that many individuals at Maidan were aware of and 
appreciative of these expressions. 
One of the most powerful motivating factors within the area of purposive 
solidarity is the belief that protesters are not alone and isolated from the rest of the 
world. By holding rallies across the globe and transmitting knowledge of these protests 
to Ukraine, democratically-minded activists send a clear signal that they are watching 
the movement, they are supportive of its goals, and they believe that it stands a strong 
chance at success. The fact that solidarity rallies elsewhere involved a broader base of 
participants than merely the Ukrainian diaspora is made clear in the statement of a 
former activist and army veteran, who recounted: 
“Yeah, actually speaking about the foreign support, it was felt as a strong one, 
 because we all saw those – not the protests – but the supportive meetings in 
 different parts around the world. Not only from the diaspora, but also from the 
 citizens of those countries who showed their solidarity, who understood the 
 problems. I don’t know whether those people and the citizens of the other 
 countries got this information from their mass media or all of them had the 
 friends who are connected with Ukrainian diaspora who are actually Ukrainians 
 who told them word of mouth about this situation, but that all created the feeling 




 because it’s very important – injustice. What is the antonym to justice? So we all 
 felt this injustice, and we felt that the world also feels this” (Interview conducted 
 in Kyiv, December 8, 2017). 
Former investigative journalist and then-current Member of the Verkhovna Rada 
Serhiy Leshchenko stressed that this international attention kept movement 
participants from feeling overly isolated or alone. As he told me:  
“People thought that European countries and America, friends of Ukraine, has to 
 stand together, to stand with Ukraine. Because we were like alone. Inside the 
 country, this was only protesters – government was against, ministers was 
 against, deputies was against, President, so. The only hope was getting Western 
 support. And that is why presence of international observers, Senators, 
 diplomats, it was really useful. And the appearance of Vice President Biden was 
 very useful too” (Interview conducted in the Rada cafeteria, May 25, 2017). 
Finally, a Professor of Political Science at Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv 
agreed with the emotional fortitude that support and attention from ordinary citizens 
elsewhere provided to protesters during Euromaidan:  
“So yeah, definitely people were trying to speak and to be heard…we can see that 
 new media played a great role in the sense that it provided these platforms for 
 people speaking, and it was very important that people started to show their own 
 ideas. It was important to share these thoughts with the international 
 community, because that was part of the internationalization of the conflict. Not 
 to make it local, but to make it international. Because it was happening. And 
 suddenly this was also the period when the Ukrainian diaspora appeared in very 
 strong force. Because they started answering all these messages, they started 
 their own protests in their local territories all over the world. They started uniting 
 themselves, presenting themselves, and showing that they are Ukrainians in 
 diaspora. And this was very important for us, both the Euromaidan and citizens 
 in general, understanding that yes, we are heard, and there are much more of 
 “we,” even not standing somewhere on the street, but we were a great force that 
 could have this change. So this understanding was really important and 
 moreover, besides just we as a force, we can have a talk with our international 
 counterparts. The authorities, at the private level, the universities, the 
 businessmen, whatever. The people are ready to hear us! They are starting from 
 the people, what is Ukraine, as something separate from Russia and the Soviet 
 Union. So this part of the internationalization of the conflict, between the people 
 and the authorities, was actually very important because it did help Ukraine to 
 recreate itself as an actor in the international arena…I am very happy that many 
 people were writing lots of papers and letters of support, and in the case of USA 




 The effects that I am discussing here are clearly emotional and psychological, as 
this type of support did not provide financial or material goods to sustain protesters in 
their struggle. Instead, the goal was to lift protesters’ spirits and buttress their resolve65. 
Another important dimension of purposive solidarity in the Ukrainian case 
concerns statements and expressions of support that were made by elected officials and 
politicians from other countries. Many respondents stressed that Euromaidan was not 
led by any political party, and that the protests consisted of average citizens666768. 
However, when politicians from other countries intentionally recognized and 
commended the movement, this indicated again that the outside world was aware of 
what was happening in Ukraine and supporting the protests’ cause. According to a 2013 
article from the Guardian, Senators John McCain and Chris Murphy visited the Maidan 
in early December 2013, with McCain standing on the square’s main stage and 
informing protesters, “We are here to support your just cause, the sovereign right of 
Ukraine to determine its own destiny freely and independently. And the destiny you 
seek lies in Europe69.” McCain was not threatening to directly intervene in Ukraine’s 
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 One activist recalled the important role played by certain European politicians in expressing their 
solidarity with the Euromaidan movement. According to his recollections, “But we had strong support 
from local people...But some members of our movement were in the Euro parliament, flying there and 
giving speeches. So I think the invitation to Euro parliament was from Brussels, so it is a big kind of 
support…We felt support of all Western world, so it was very pressing, everybody with think that whole 
world is with us except Russia” (Interview with activist at Chesno civil society organization, conducted in 
Kyiv, March 22, 2017). 
66 A former Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine, former Member of the Verkhovna Rada (1994-2007) and 
2019 Presidential candidate made this very clear in comparing Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution and the 
Euromaidan, noting to me, “In 2004, when there was a revolution which was controlled, structured, and 
organized by political people, by politicians, and it was one kind of a revolution. But in 2014, the 
Ukrainian people were leading politicians by themselves” (Interview conducted in Kyiv, December 5, 
2017). 
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 Interview with Professor of Political Science at the National University of Kyiv – Mohyla Academy, 
conducted in Kyiv, May 11, 2017. 
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 Assistant Professor of History at Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, conducted in Lviv, December 
1, 2017. 
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affairs politically or to overthrow the Yanukovych regime from outside; instead, he used 
his political capital as a well-known advocate for democracy and human rights to speak 
directly to protesters in support of their cause. 
A large number of my interviewees mentioned statements that were made by 
leading Western politicians as well, demonstrating that their statements were known 
and generally appreciate by many people on the ground70. As a Program Officer at 
Fulbright Ukraine mentioned, “I must say that the Revolution of Dignity did gain a lot of 
support from the fact that the U.S. Ambassador at that point, Geoffrey Pyatt, was very 
active. He was out there. People knew that he was there. He would call meetings with 
other ambassadors, for them to have discussions about how things should be dealt 
with…John McCain, Chris Murphy, John Kerry, Victoria Nuland – she was a big player 
in all of this – the fact that people were coming and keeping Ukraine on the front page of 
the news really helped out a lot, I think, in pushing this forward” (Interview conducted 
in Kyiv, November 24, 2017).  
Similarly, another respondent noted, “Even early on, McCain came out a week 
after it started. And that was a big deal, because it gave legitimacy to the opposition’s 
demand. If everyone’s screaming, oh, it’s bad, it’s bad, and the West agrees, then the 
opposition is de-legitimized, because it’s a battle of ideas. So the McCain visit was very 
important. It was McCain and Chris Murphy from Connecticut, so a bipartisan 
delegation. But the two of them came out, and it was a powerful message. When they 
spoke, it helped to energize and encourage people not to be afraid” (Interview with 
political analyst and consultant, conducted in Kyiv, March 29, 2017).  
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After McCain’s death in 2018, a street in Kyiv was renamed in his honor. 
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According to these interview respondents, therefore, the mechanism that I am 
discussing here was primarily one about psychology and international attention. Many 
protesters knew that actors elsewhere were recognizing and commemorating their 
efforts, granting the movement an additional burst of legitimacy and power. As one 
sociologist stated, “I think the orientation to the West, the European Union and the 
United States, was quite obvious. To their reaction. And especially when Europe said, 
wow, and Maidan participants felt encouraged. But after that, they tried to appeal to 
European Union, but in, when you could see posters in English, when we try to translate 
some, to tell people in the West in English or to translate some notes or some articles 
that we had translated into English or other languages – into German, into Czech – to 
show how what’s really going on, and not what Russian media – or even Ukrainian 
media – is talking about. And so I think that people appreciate the attention, appreciate 
the support, and we saw that from that morally, Europe is with us” (Interview conducted 
in Kyiv, May 19, 2017). Reinforcing the notion of not being alone, it is particularly 
valuable to focus on this respondent’s mention that from a moral perspective, Europe 
was with the protesters – this underscores my point about psychology and emotion 
(because his focus is on moral, rather than material, support) and also my point about 
protesters not feeling isolated and abandoned on the global stage71727374. 
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 This was further reinforced through an interview with an activist residing in Lviv. During our 
conversation, she recounted to me, “And yes, we were applying to European countries and US, because 
support was very important at that time. Because it was a shift to more democratic independent way, and 
their attention was very important. Because you are not just alone here, and the other side is just…of 
course, it’s one country, but what happened against people was putting the question bigger” (Interview 
conducted in Lviv, May 3, 2014). Again, what is interesting to note is the sense that she specifically 
referenced “not being alone” – the notion of having some type of company in the protesting space by 
means of international attention and support is quite evident. 
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 Another interviewee mentioned the moral importance of international attention as well, stating, “The 
first feeling was, a lot of media attention to this, including Western media and European media, and that 
was very important, because basically, that was meaning that this has wider importance rather than just a 




Within this section, it is important to also briefly note a trend regarding 
international support that does not fit cleanly with my argument; however, the issue was 
raised in enough interviews that it must be discussed here. According to several people 
with whom I spoke7576777879, as the Euromaidan revolution wore on and police brutality 
became more and more forceful, diplomatic expressions of support – particularly from 
the European Union – were increasingly viewed by some on the ground as rather 
toothless and ineffective. More specifically, several respondents pointed to the fact that 
European Union officials expressed that they were “deeply concerned” regarding the 
events that were taking place without actually taking much substantive 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
you know, just finished sooner, with no one watching, with no attention, which would mean nobody cares 
much. And if that attention was there, that means that yeah, people really do care” (Interview with 
Professor of Journalism at the National University of Kyiv – Mohyla Academy, conducted in Kyiv, 
December 6, 2017). The respondent stressed the importance of feeling as though people elsewhere knew 
what was taking place in Ukraine, and suggested that if this recognition had not been present, the 
movement would have burned out much sooner than it ultimately did. 
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 This was also echoed in a conversation I had with a former protester and a war veteran, who mentioned 
the importance of both official recognition of the Euromaidan movement as well as trends on social 
media. As he mentioned to me, “And also we were watching the representatives of foreign countries 
coming to Maidan, Victoria Nuland, Joe Biden, it was always the great event, and the big tone to the 
protest wall that we were trying to build. So if we were trying to send some messages to the people, yes, I 
remember, there were some Twitter storms and Facebook storms, I don’t remember the different 
hashtags, something like #supportukraine or something, but I strongly remember the hashtag 
#russiainvadedukraine, when the war started” (Interview conducted in Kyiv, December 8, 2017). 
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 One former activist with whom I spoke touched upon both the importance of support from officials and 
from activists elsewhere. As he mentioned to me, “I think Obama was very smart about not putting some 
radical steps like assisting Maidan in some kind of covert way, but he did issue a lot of statements and he 
was always saying that Maidan, was always trying to negotiate between the protesters and the Yanukovych 
regime. And I think Kerry was the Secretary of State – he was coming to Ukraine couple of times. There 
were a lot of Senators, Congressmen who were on Maidan. The Polish president was on the Maidan. There 
was a lot of international politicians who came, and they came to Maidan and spoke to the people and 
expressed their solidarity. At that time, there was also a revolution in Venezuela. So there were times 
when the people at Maidan taped some videos in support of the protests in Venezuela, and they taped 
videos in support of Ukraine” (Interview with former Euromaidan activist and current project manager 
for the Lviv Education Foundation, conducted in Lviv, December 5, 2017). This quotation is particularly 
interesting, as he points to both the actions of influential foreign politicians, as well as the fact that 
protesters in Ukraine and Venezuela managed to use technology and support to communicate with and 
support one another 
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 Interview with student, conducted in Kyiv, November 22, 2017. 
76 Interview with former student activist and civil society organizer, conducted in Kyiv, December 8, 2017. 
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 Interview with former activist and current staffer for the Ministry of Health, conducted via Skype, 
December 21, 2017. 
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 Interview with activist and assistant at the Ukrainian Embassy of Estonia, conducted in Kyiv, May 26, 
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action80818283848586. While the supportive intention behind such statements was initially 
well-received, disdain for the institution’s rather passive deep concerns became so 
widespread that protesters began sharing a meme-generating web site making fun of the 
officials’ statements. Protesters wished instead for the European Union to introduce 
sanctions against Yanukovych and his allies, indicating (for some participants) a hunger 
for more substantive forms of outside support8788. 
In an interview with a diplomatic member of the European Union Delegation to 
Ukraine that I conducted in Kyiv, the official himself recognized the protesters’ negative 
reaction to the statements, saying, “Of course, they expected much more support from 
us, and unfortunately since we are 28 member states, on external and international 
political issues, we have to have consent of all of our members. And it takes time, until a 
common position is worked out. And we are unfortunately always late, like two three 
steps behind…We were mainly issuing statements, and unfortunately, the statements 
from Brussels, they were always starting with the famous phrase, ‘We are concerned.’ 
And when the violence was escalating, we were only adding some adjectives. Like, ‘we 
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 Interview with political analyst from the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, conducted in Kyiv, 
November 21, 2017. 
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 Interview with analyst from Aktis Strategy, conducted in Kyiv, March 31, 2017. 
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 Interview with former activist at analyst at the National Democratic Institute Ukraine, conducted in 
Kyiv, March 24, 2017. 
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 Interview with noted philosopher and Professor of History at Ukrainian Catholic University, conducted 
in Lviv, May 8, 2017. 
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 Interview with analyst at the think tank Institute for World Affairs, conducted in Kyiv, May 12, 2017. 
86 Interview with Director of European Projects at Internews Ukraine and reporter at Hromadske 
International, conducted in Kyiv, May 16, 2017. 
87 Rather humorously, a Google search regarding these topics produced a Twitter account named “Is EU 
Concerned?” Started in early 2014 and initially creating several messages regarding the Russian invasion 
of Ukraine, the account periodically produces Tweets such as “Extremely,” “Gravely,” “Slightly, “ 
“Strongly,” and “Deeply, like we said earlier.” 
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 However, several other respondents were critical of protesters who held these views; this second group 
of respondents placed more emphasis on Ukrainians being self-sufficient and generating the actual 




are GRAVELY concerned,’ ‘we are GREATLY concerned,’ ‘we are DEEPLY concerned,’ 
and it was causing people to be frustrated” (Interview conducted in Kyiv, December 7, 
2017). The official followed up these remarks by correctly noting the many ways that 
European Union has helped Ukraine politically and economically since the protest 
movement ended, but his candor regarding protesters’ perceptions on the specific 
slowness with which the official organization itself responded to the movement was 
particularly striking and therefore worthy of mention. 
Still, expressions of support and solidarity from individual member states within 
the European Union were better-received by protesters. Many interviewees pointed 
specifically to statements made by the leaders of formerly Communist democracies such 
as Poland89, Latvia90, and Lithuania91 as having an impact on protesters, suggesting a 
notable East-West division in terms of how participants perceived external support for 
their movement. Many individuals felt that these countries were particularly well-suited 
to offer advice and support, as these states were considered to be Ukraine’s neighbors, 
and all have managed to successfully integrate into Western alliances such as the 
European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and have secured 
standards of democratic governance that protesters were seeking to emulate92. 
 The preceding section has shown how the dynamics of the Euromaidan 
movement illustrate the first causal mechanism of my theoretical framework – 
purposive solidarity. Individuals who were protesting received real emotional support 
and fortitude from abroad, receiving messages of encouragement and signals that the 
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 Interview with political analyst at the Ukrainian think tank Institute for World Politics, conducted in 
Kyiv, April 5, 2017. 
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 Interview with noted philosopher and Professor of History at Ukrainian Catholic University, conducted 
in Lviv, May 8, 2017. 
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world was watching and supporting their campaign. These messages were largely most 
influential when they came from members of the Ukrainian diaspora and their allies in 
other countries, though symbolic recognition and encouragement from non-Ukrainian 
political elites played a significant role as well. I now turn to an exploration of the 
second main causal mechanism that I discuss under the scope of democratic promotion 
– strategic and tactical support from democratically-minded civic forces elsewhere. 
Mechanism 1.2: Strategic and Tactical Support 
 The second key mechanism that I analyze here differs from the first in that while 
the preceding section was primarily concerned with emotion and psychological feelings, 
this second mechanism is more about strategic and tactical support from governments 
and non-governmental organizations elsewhere. It is important to note that I did not 
perceive as much of this mechanism in my interviews as I did purposive solidarity; 
nevertheless, there is still significant evidence that this type of support mattered for 
altering protesters’ calculations and decision-making strategies.  
Important to note is the fact that Ukraine is a country that receives a significant 
amount of attention from Western forces in terms of its democratic development, 
including the United States. Objective data shows clear evidence of this, as the figure 
below depicts the amount of funding provided to the Ukrainian government by the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) between the years 2001 
and 201893. The data presented here represents disbursements, or the actual amount of 
financial assistance that the United States provided to Ukraine, and the numerical data 
represent millions of dollars. 
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Figure 3.6. Disbursements from USAID to Ukraine, in millions of dollars94 
 
 Again, from an objective perspective, this makes clear that a significant amount 
of money is being funneled into Ukraine from the American government. The 
$190,246,254 that the country received in 2018 placed it well above the regional average 
for Eastern Europe – the average state in that part of the world only received 
$21,000,000 in 2018. Much of this went towards the general area of “Conflict, Peace, 
and Security” ($65,000,000), but a very large amount also went towards “Government 
and Civil Society” as well ($55,000,000). 
How did this aid and training actually manifest itself during Euromaidan, and 
how did it affect protesters’ calculations? One USAID officer described the many ways in 
which money from the United States is channeled into Ukraine to support the 
development of a vibrant civil society, noting:  
“I’d say that our support before the revolution was similar to our support today. 
 We were funding PACT and others to support Ukrainian civil society platforms, 
 the new citizen initiative. We supported different CSOs that focused on getting 
 citizens involved in the democratic process, advocating for democratic reforms, 
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 towards corruption, to try to advocate for Ukraine’s system to be closer and closer 
 to a European democracy. So in that sense, as you described it, that was the 
 extent of our support then, and that’s the extent today. These CSOs (civil   
 society organizations) that have this pro-democratic, pro-human rights, anti-
 corruption agenda, these are policy priorities for the United States. We think that 
 a democratic Ukraine that’s free of corruption, that’s stable and secure, that’s in 
 the best interests of Ukraine, it’s in the best interests of Europe, and it’s in the 
 best interests of the United States. For foreign policy, security, and other areas” 
 (Interview conducted in Kyiv, October 25, 2017). 
 Drawing clear and tangible linkages between funds invested in a country for the 
purposes of democratic development and that country’s democratization is obviously 
extremely difficult due to the many intervening factors that are involved. Nevertheless, 
my interviews provided evidence that many participants in the Euromaidan movement 
recognized the value of this type of strategic investments. One respondent noted,  
“Since Maidan, people learned how to see and how to resist and how to stop these 
 attempts to consolidate power in the hands of one person. And although Ukraine 
 is an independent state, we have to see that of course we are and we will be 
 independent from some foreign actors and powers, and it is better to be 
 dependent on the democratic European world than to be dependent on 
 dictatorship Russia. For example, this week we had a draft law in our parliament 
 that proposed some ways how to avoid these anti-corruption bodies like NABU 
 and others, but thanks to some pressure from the USA, from the EU, this draft 
 law wasn’t adopted. And this is an advantage when democratic institutions of the 
 Western governments could prevent our politicians from not democratic 
 decisions. All in all, since Maidan, a lot of new people have come to the 
 governmental bodies, and due to their initiative, they pursue progressive 
 changes. They try to achieve reforms, even though some old politicians and 
 public  servants try to sabotage them” (Interview with historian, conducted in 
 Kyiv, December 8, 2017). 
This quote demonstrates that for several activists, direct democratic assistance 
from Western governments can be useful in implementing real political changes. Such 
initiatives have operated in Ukraine for a significant period of time, and it is likely that 
they played a significant role in helping motivate protesters.  
A second topic regarding tactical support concerns not democratic training and 




in hospitals in other countries during the movement’s most intense movements. While 
not directly influential in the sense of providing tactical strategies, this support was still 
extremely important because it showed that even when protesters were badly injured, 
refuge still existed in a nearby state. One activist who later worked as a civil society 
organizer pushing for reforms expressed this situation by noting, 
“Another part is when protesters were harmed by policemen, so it was militsiya, 
 and now it’s police. When protesters were harmed by state forces, lots of EU 
 countries and also America, Canada, maybe somebody else were trying to support 
 protesters who were injured. They were transferring these protesters to hospitals 
 in other countries. There were really massive initiatives aimed to solve these 
 people, because we had this situation when all the central hospitals were 
 occupied by state forces. And basically, if you are injured and you come to the 
 official institution, you would be kidnapped or took to jail…so it was very 
 impressive back then. And I know the Czech embassy sponsored a lot of flights to 
 Czech Republic. It was really massive. And maybe you can also Google “Initiative 
 A+.” This is the initiative head by…they were insuring the safe transportation of 
 injured Maidan activists to other countries – Poland, Czech Republic, Germany – 
 and I also heard that Canadian Embassy helped a lot…So this is political support 
 and very practical support” (Interview with activist at the Reanimation Package 
 for Reforms, conducted in Kyiv, March 23, 2017). 
As this interviewee noted, the situation under Yanukovych became so dire that 
many people who were admitted to Ukrainian hospitals with injuries were rounded up 
and kidnapped by security forces. Indeed, protesters who were captured faced very real 
danger – a Catholic priest recounted the situation at the time during our conversation, 
noting, “Then a son from our colleague was arrested by police, was brutally beaten, and 
well, we tried just to bring them abroad, to Poland. The big threat was that people who 
needed medical support and were brought to hospitals, they were stolen by police. Just 
disappeared. Nobody could find them by the police, they just disappeared” (Interview 
with Catholic priest and Professor at Ukrainian Catholic University, conducted in Lviv, 
May 4, 2017). By providing an outlet for injured activists to recover without fear of 




sustain itself. This theme came up in several other conversations, with some discussing 
the fact that the Polish government waived the European Union’s visa requirements at 
the time by allowing injured protesters to be transported across state lines959697.  
The preceding discussion how shown how external democratic forces influenced 
protesters’ calculations regarding the proper ways to challenge the government and the 
dangers involved in doing so98. Tangible foreign funding specifically aimed to develop 
the country’s democratic civil society has provided several activists with the tools to 
successfully mobilize fellow citizens against the regime, while the knowledge that 
medical help would be available in countries such as Poland reduced the threat calculus 
facing protesters. I turn now to the third primary mechanism in my framework – the 
knowledge that when the outside world is watching, autocratic leaders will be less likely 
to violently crack down due to the threat of international condemnation or sanctions. 
Mechanism 1.3: Threat of International Sanctioning in the Face of Violent Repression 
 This third relevant causal mechanism within the context of the Euromaidan 
movement is about perceptions of threat and safety – more specifically, the likelihood in 
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 Interview with activist, conducted in Lviv, May 3, 2017. Ukraine is not presently part of the European 
Union, and obviously was also not a part of the organization in 2013 and 2014. While the European Union 
granted Ukrainians the ability to travel throughout E.U. members states without a visa in 2017, this 
provision did not yet exist during the time of Euromaidan. As a result, the Polish government was 
essentially disregarding the European Union’s requirements on restrictions for travel. 
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 Interestingly, this same respondent recounted the lengths that injured protesters had to pursue in order 
to evade capture by the state. As she mentioned to me, “Poland helped us a lot. They sent a Polish 
ambulance and the first night when Yanukovych was still in, we were taking these guys to hospitals here 
with fake names and fake diagnoses, because if you are diagnosed with gunshot, you have to report to 
police…And we were trying to put them to Poland, because in Poland they were safe.” 
97
 Interview with activist and doctoral candidate, conducted in Lviv, May 2, 2017. 
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 While this example does not fit neatly with the rest of my discussion on intentional and strategic 
coordination among democratic forces elsewhere and Ukrainians, this final example is still interesting 
and relevant for inclusion in this section. In my theoretical chapter, I note how protesters in one country 
are often inspired by the tactics used elsewhere. I found clear evidence of this when speaking with a 
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She noted, “I remembered the lesson of the Arab Spring, and how they used social media, Facebook, 
mainly Twitter, in order to spread the word. And in order to keep the movement together, and also to 
spread information about what is going on” (Interview with civil society activist and prominent Twitter 




protesters’ views that the regime will crack down on individuals. To be sure, the 
Yanukovych regime often did clamp down violently and aggressively – earlier discussion 
has made that clear. More than a hundred people died, while hundreds of others were 
wounded. Still, I argue here that the presence of international media attention and 
monitoring was seen by informants as playing an effective role in checking 
Yanukovych’s worst impulses and providing protesters with the sense that the world’s 
attention would prevent things from becoming too authoritarian. 
 As argued elsewhere, Ukraine under Yanukovych was sliding away from 
democratic governance, but the state itself was more a hybrid regime than a full 
autocracy. International media were free to enter the country and monitor what was 
taking place, and protesters were able to communicate with people in other countries 
through social media and portals including YouTube. While some respondents 
expressed a wish that more media sources had been present in the movement’s earlier 
days, others noted that (particularly near the conclusion of Euromaidan) the country 
was full of foreign journalists who were there to report on what was taking place99. 
Given all of this attention, I found ample evidence that Yanukovych and his allies were 
heavily aware that this attention existed, and I can conclude that this factor did have 
some effect on the ways that the regime reacted to protesters. 
 One former activist summarized the ways in which international attention 
checked Yanukovych’s reaction to protesters in some ways, noting, “In Ukraine, our 
authorities were afraid of that footage being shown on CNN. When there was violent 
crime on Maidan, and Victoria Nuland, she was in Kyiv on this night. So they didn’t like 
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to show it, but it depends on authority. Because in Russia and Belarus, they don’t care 
about those footage and images. Yanukovych cared. Because they are connected with 
West financially, so they didn’t want to have this bad coverage. They didn’t want to get 
sanctions, and they were afraid of their financial assets and property” (Interview with 
policy analyst at the Institute for World Politics, conducted in Kyiv, April 5, 2017). 
According to this logic, protesters knew that because Yanukovych was dependent on 
some Western actors for aid, he largely tried to restrain his most forceful impulses. This 
respondent’s reference to CNN in particular is interesting, as this underscores my 
broader focus on media freedom. Because Ukraine’s hybrid regime does not prevent 
foreign journalists from entering the country, protesters are afforded a level of 
protection that does not exist in more repressive states like North Korea. 
 Several other interviewees echoed this focus on the role of international media in 
providing some degree of protection simply by virtue of being present in Ukraine at that 
time. One policy analyst at Centre UA, a non-profit organization aimed at promoting 
transparency and accountability, recalled, “I think that symbolic support of 
international governments and diplomats was important, because when it became 
public that somebody supports the idea of democratic protests in Ukraine, it meant 
additional international pressure on the Ukrainian government in order to stabilize it 
somehow. And any international attention to that protest, it enhanced the chances for 
peaceful protest. So when it became public for international audience, we hoped that the 
actions of riot police would be more peaceful” (Interview conducted in Kyiv, April 18, 
2017). Examining the language of this respondent can reveal several important findings 
– again, the fact that the world was paying attention granted some Euromaidan 




violence that the Yanukovych regime did ultimately employ against activists, it is 
difficult to imagine how much worse things could have gotten without the presence of 
external media relaying images and videos to the outside world. 
One Professor of Journalism whom I interviewed made an apt comparison 
between Ukraine’s situation and the effects that lack of international media had on 
protests in states such as Belarus. As he noted,   
“The attention was always there. And this was important because again,  
 Ukrainians were always quoting the experience of Belarus. Where they had a lot 
 of protests, a lot of beatings up of protesters, but media attention was never 
 there. So basically, it was always a domestic affair, and Belarusian police can do 
 whatever they wish, nobody would be covering that, nobody would be caring 
 much. Yes, some statements from the governments saying, yeah we are deeply 
 concerned, but again, it doesn’t change the situation on the ground…Only media 
 attention and media on the ground can change the attitude, because they are 
 showing all those things...So it was almost impossible to do something without 
 everyone else knowing about it. Even if journalists were not there 24 hours a day, 
 there were streamings, and people could watch it basically from any part of the 
 world, what was happening here in real time, and that was a big 
 difference…sometimes you could have five different, seven different streams of 
 the same event, so basically it provided the opportunity to observe the situation 
 from anywhere. And that also encouraged more media attention…basically, 
 people were watching live what was happening. And that connected Ukraine to 
 many other newsrooms around the world, just ordinary people who become more 
 and more interested in what was happening in Ukraine because that was just a 
 unique experience compared to many other protests around the world”  
 (Interview conducted in Kyiv, December 6, 2017). 
Another activist also expressed a similar sentiment, stating, “Yes, we were 
streaming and trying to reach those people because we felt that if this protest became 
isolated, it could be easily vanished. So for our government, it was not actually the 
problem to stop the protest, but I think they felt that if they lose the connection with the 
foreign investments, with the programs, they won’t be for a long time. Those streams of 
money were strong source for their corruption, because although the Western investors 




experienced in putting it in their own pockets, unfortunately. And probably, I think this 
was one of the very strong reasons why they weren’t trying to vanish protest earlier. So 
this international support, for the so-called leaders of Maidan, it was sort of fundament 
for their negotiation position” (Interview with former protester and army veteran, 
conducted in Kyiv, December 8, 2017). Again, the notion of being punished by the West 
in the case of severe repression of protesters is evident – those interviewed perceived 
that Yanukovych did not want to miss out on possible sources of funding, prompting 
him to temper himself (relatively speaking) in order not to disrupt this flow. 
Here, the powerful and influential ability of the international media to harness 
the world’s attention and call foreigners to take note of what is happening in a certain 
context is clear. In comparison to Belarus, where a relative paucity of international 
media often leaves the Lukashenko regime free to abuse protesters, the fact that so 
many reporters were at Euromaidan meant that activists were aware that the world 
would know if they were brutally beaten or dispersed100. I conclude this section by 
briefly referencing an interview I had with a displaced Crimean Tatar activist who 
participated in a Euromaidan movement in Simferopol before separatists and Russian 
forces caused him to abandon his home for Kyiv. He mentioned to me that one of his 
acquaintances had been protesting while no media whatsoever were present, and that he 
was killed by forces while campaigning on the street. Following this incident, my source 
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 An American reporter living in Ukraine offered a similar perspective, noting that the Yanukovych 
regime was cautious (at least during Euromaidan’s early stages) in its efforts not to alienate potential 
Western allies. According to my interviewee, “I think that as far as a global audience, I could say maybe 
not so much the protesters, but the government…like, Poroshenko knows that the government is watching 
him, to see how Ukraine has changed, and the way he treats protesters and the opposition 
movement…that affects how much support he gets from America and the EU. And foreign investors. You 
know, Ukraine is trying to court foreign companies to come here…so the last thing Kyiv wants is images of 
protesters getting the shit beat out of them in front of the Rada, which would just make Ukraine look like 




emphasized, all pro-Ukraine rallies in Crimea were sure to invite numerous media 
sources to their events to guarantee that they would not be murdered as well (Interview 
with Crimean Tatar activist, conducted in Kyiv, November 20, 2017). When 
international attention and media coverage were absent in Crimea, anti-Maidan forces 
felt emboldened to viciously repress pro-democratic protesters. Each of the cases that I 
have detailed in this section illustrate the mechanisms laid out in my theoretical 
framework – people were acutely aware of the importance of foreign media, and they 
duly recognized its ability to provide some degree of protection for protesters. 
Taking the preceding information together, I turn now to my fourth and final 
mechanism of external democratic promotion – the sense that by connecting with 
people in other countries, whether it be diaspora members or other citizens, 
Euromaidan protesters were able to obtain certain resources and exert political pressure 
in other countries in a way that would have been impossible without these linkages. 
Mechanism 1.4: Citizens Shaping Ukrainian Politics from Outside its Borders 
This final mechanism involved in external democratic promotion concerns the 
material and political benefits that Euromaidan protesters gained by building 
connections with ordinary people in other countries and the effects these benefits had 
on their perceptions and beliefs. I begin this section by providing examples of several 
cases in which activists were intentionally trying to solicit help from abroad, before then 
showing how citizens in other countries (often members of the Ukrainian diaspora) were 
able to provide material resources and generate political pressure on their own domestic 
leaders to sustain the broader movement. 
It is important to note that many Ukrainian protesters at that time were actively 




Member of the Verkhovna Rada recounted to me how she and several of her colleagues 
(none of whom were parliamentarians at the time) traveled abroad to solicit assistance: 
“We communicated with different international organizations, different institutions. We 
visited Strasbourg, and we had a meeting with the General Secretary, with the 
Commissioner of Human Rights (Mr. Muiznieks)…And I remember his visit to Ukraine 
was planned for March, and we came in January, and we were crying, demanding to 
make his visit earlier, to stop the violation of human rights. And to save people’s lives. 
And he changed his decision, he came to Ukraine as I remember February 1, and it 
somehow influenced the decision of the power to make pressure on the activists” 
(Interview conducted in Kyiv, May 22, 2017). 
As another example, one prominent protester who became well-known for her 
usage of Twitter to garner international attention and support told me,  
“I knew that Twitter was the perfect way to spread information on social media. 
 And obviously there are a lot of politicians on there, so it’s much easier to reach 
 them with your information than on Facebook. That is why I chose Twitter, and 
 that is why I chose writing in English. Because I do remember that on the first 
 very, very big demonstration, which happened on 24th of November, it was 
 Sunday. More than 100,000 people showed up. And basically no one really 
 believed that so many people would come…Even those Ukrainian friends that I 
 had, on Facebook they were writing that, I joined Maidan, or I joined this 
 demonstration. They were writing this. Also, I support Europe, Ukraine is 
 Europe, but they were writing this in Ukrainian or Russian. And then just like the 
 very basic idea – if you want Europe to knew there is a huge nation knocking on 
 their door and saying, we are Europe as well, and we want to be part of your 
 family, it’s very natural that you let Europeans know about it. And that I why I 
 started Tweeting in English, and it’s just boom. I didn’t expect that it would get so 
 big” (Interview conducted in Kyiv, April 19, 2017). 
Interestingly, and much in the same vein, this particular interview touched upon 
a YouTube video entitled, “I Am A Ukrainian.” Filmed during the middle point of the 
protests, the video features a young, English-speaking Ukrainian woman informing 




officials and ask them to put pressure on the Yanukovych regime101. Filmed with striking 
visuals and dramatic music, the video was clearly designed and disseminated with the 
express purpose of reaching an outside audience. Similarly, another activist who was 
one of the leading organizers of and translators for an online platform known as 
Euromaidan Press explained her interest in translating news stories into English, 
stating that “at that time, there were very few outlets covering Ukraine in English. There 
are more right now, but at that time, most foreign correspondents relied on Russian 
media coverage of the protests, which obviously skewed the picture. So we wanted to 
provide our own point of view102.” For these protesters, building bridges with people in 
other countries during the revolution was clearly a significant priority. 
I now turn to a discussion of ways in which actors in other countries played a role 
in affecting the dynamics of the Euromaidan revolutions. It is important to stress here 
that this mechanism is distinct from the second theoretical mechanism identified and 
explored above – strategic aid and support from governments and non-governmental 
organizations in other countries. I argue that ordinary citizens and members of a 
country’s diaspora should be viewed as a wholly separate set of actors that exists quite 
apart from governmental forces, as their support and assistance is entirely voluntary 
and is much more organic and bottom-up than is support emanating from governments 
or strategic democratic organizations. In contrast to more explicitly political figures, 
ordinary citizens rarely need to weigh their support against broader underlying 
geopolitical considerations or tactical priorities. 
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Key among these influential civilian actors were members of the Ukrainian 
diaspora, as they were uniquely plugged into the situation and were well-aware of what 
was taking place at the time103. One of the most significant ways in which the diaspora 
played a role during Euromaidan was to provide tangible resources and donations that 
sustained protesters in their challenge against the regime104. One sociologist recounted 
to me, “It was very interesting to see how people compare Euromaidan and Orange 
Revolution. Because the Orange Revolution was funded by the party [the Our Ukraine 
Bloc, a political party closely associated with 2004 Presidential winner Viktor 
Yushchenko] and Euromaidan was not. Funding was coming from different sources. 
And one of the sources was diaspora. Diaspora was collecting money and sending 
money. So somehow people from the diaspora also provided us with financial support as 
well. Also things, clothes, food, medicine…people got, like, whole boxes of medicine, for 
example, coming from somewhere. Usually it was medicine for seasonal diseases, like 
flu, cough, vitamins” (Interview with sociologist at the Center for Urban History of East 
Central Europe, conducted in Lviv, December 3, 2017).  
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 As one interviewee mentioned to me, “During Euromaidan, the support of diaspora was very strong, as 
I know. Because even I was contacted several different times. Our diaspora in Switzerland, the Ukrainian 
diaspora in London – the so-called Euromaidan London – and also some guys from Canada. And I also 
have some friends in the United States, and they communicated with me, but they’re not diaspora – just 
simple friends” (Interview with former student activist and civil society organizer, conducted in Kyiv, 
December 8, 2017). This quotation demonstrates that while members of the diaspora were the key sources 
of support among actors in different countries, they were not the only important individuals – instead, 
many non-Ukrainian allies of the movement assisted as well. 
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 Indeed, one interviewee noted, “There was definitely a huge support of Ukrainian diaspora in Canada. I 
would say that there was this Russian propaganda information circulating that the Maidan was sponsored 
by the Department of State in the US, but it actually was sponsored by the diaspora in Canada (laughs). 
Yeah, seriously, they sent a lot of money for this. They invested a lot of resources.” The same respondent 
also noted, “It was very important to get support from Ukrainian diaspora, from Canada, United States, 
and European Union. It was very important. It was financial support, goods, it was also very important to 
get their support during invasion and so it was like the main…and also support from our friends in EU. So 
from Poland, from Lithuania, these are our main friends. Baltic states – Latvia, Estonia. So this is 
important because it is our future” (Interview with policy analyst at the think tank Institute for World 




Another interviewee echoed these claims, stating, “Our movement didn’t feel so 
much support from Western officials, but in the beginning of January, we start to get 
some help from Ukrainians abroad. From Canada, from USA, and from NGOs, from 
Western NGOs. It was warm clothes, medicine, I don’t have information about money. I 
think it was money too, but I didn’t see that” (Interview with civil society activist at 
Chesno organization, conducted in Kyiv, March 22, 2017). This type of support was 
particularly important for protesters given the fact that they were taking to the streets in 
a Ukrainian winter, a time of long, cold nights. If protesters knew that the diaspora was 
sending medicine and other resources to maintain the movement’s strength, it seems 
likely to conclude that this would alter their perceptions of the level of danger or 
discomfort that might be involved in joining the movement. 
Other respondents pointed to more tactical types of resources that the diaspora 
and allies in other countries sent to protesters. One interviewee at the Fulbright 
Program Ukraine noted, “I think the most effective was this whole notion…of global 
Ukrainians. Ukrainians from all around the world bought those thermal binoculars, 
things, heat-sensitive night-vision things. And even more for drones, and even money 
for first aid. For the war, even things like socks. That all came from donations from not 
only Ukrainians, who were very, very generous, but they don’t have the means like 
Ukrainian-Americans, Ukrainian-Canadians…I mean, everybody stepped up to the 
plate. So I think a lot of that came from feeling the support – a lot of the will to continue 
going on – came from the support of these organizations” (Interview conducted in Kyiv, 
November 24, 2017). It is important here to underscore that the Euromaidan movement 
was of course heavily supported by many average Ukrainians. Indeed, Ukrainians in 




them in their cause. In addition to this, however, the diaspora (many of whom are 
wealthier and more able to access certain goods) were influential in providing their own 
support as well105.  
Still other respondents pointed to different ways in which donations and money 
from the diaspora mattered. One former activist mentioned, “So people on Maidan felt a 
lot of support. And not just spiritual or emotional, but financial also. People in diaspora 
communities, they raised millions. They were sending money to different organizations, 
to different Maidan-related institutions who were kind of releasing the prisoners, for 
instance. At that time, a big issue was that police was arresting people and in order to 
release them, there was a lot of money involved, to pay lawyers. So yeah, in short, a lot 
of support. And not just from diaspora, but also from international governments 
supporting the revolution and understanding that Yanukovych is not the best President” 
(Interview with former Euromaidan activist and current project manager for the Lviv 
Education Foundation, conducted in Lviv, December 5, 2017). This quote is particularly 
interesting as it points to another financial aspect that would have mattered to 
protesters – the ability to pay lawyers for assistance. Again, if participants were aware 
that this type of money was available from actors elsewhere, this would bolster their 
willingness to continue agitating in the movement. 
While the preceding section has shown that members of the Ukrainian diaspora 
and their allies were important in sustaining protesters’ willingness to fight by providing 
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 Another interviewee reinforced the notion that while the diaspora did play a central role in terms of 
providing resources from the outside, non-Ukrainians elsewhere  played some role as well. According to 
my respondent, “There certainly were Ukrainian diaspora people who were bringing materials forward, 
and they were coming to participate. And they were coming from all over the place. And I imagine there 
were also friends of Ukraine who aren’t Ukrainian, don’t have Ukrainian heritage themselves, but they’re 
Poles, Lithuanians, and those kinds of people who had the time and the capacity to come and participate” 




resources to make the movement more likely to succeed, many respondents also pointed 
to the fact that Ukrainians abroad were petitioning their own governments to pay 
attention to and support Euromaidan. As one policy analyst noted, “Well, the Ukrainian 
diaspora all over the world joined and communicated their support very quickly. 
Especially the young people also who are studying all over Europe. They were joining 
and making their position very loudly and very quickly. So this happened, and it helped 
a lot. Ukrainian diaspora also played very important role of helping us get our message 
to the different countries, because they were the ones who were helping to connect with 
the foreign media, they were the ones who were helping to connect with foreign 
politicians, who were bringing foreign politicians to Ukraine to show them what was 
actually happening on the streets of Kyiv and other cities. And I think that international 
support during most of the time of Euromaidan was very important” (Interview with 
former activist and current staffer for the Ministry of Health, conducted via Skype, 
December 21, 2017). 
Another interviewee provided an interesting and unique perspective as a 
Ukrainian activist who was not present in Ukraine for much of Euromaidan, but was 
instead in Washington, D.C. at that time. As he recounted, “But from my perspective 
and my close community, we felt more than enough support from the international 
community. You have at that time, for instance, in each of the large cities everywhere 
around the world where there were at least some Ukrainians, or people from our 
friendly countries, there were videos taped in support of Maidan. There were 
fundraisers in support of Maidan. There were – I mean, when I was in D.C., at least 
three or four times a week there were protests or gatherings near the White House, kind 




And they were working” (Interview with former Euromaidan activist and current project 
manager for the Lviv Education Foundation, conducted in Lviv, December 5, 2017). 
This strategy of citizens elsewhere lobbying their own government to support 
Euromaidan was also apparent to another interviewee, who told me, “Obviously the 
primary concern was that you should make your voice heard abroad and petition foreign 
governments to exercise pressure on the Ukrainian government at the time. And what 
many of the Ukrainians did – because Ukraine has a very big diaspora across the world, 
especially Canada and also in the Czech Republic, and in Italy, and Portugal, and so 
many other countries – and they had their own smaller Euromaidans and called their 
respective governments to put sanctions on the Ukrainian officials… what we really 
hoped for, back then, was for Western governments to convince Yanukovych to go106” 
(Interview with analyst from Aktis Strategy, conducted in Kyiv, March 31, 2017). 
Indeed, one common theme underscoring much of my interviewees’ discussions 
about pressure from outside recognizes that members of the Ukrainian diaspora and 
their allies proved themselves to be effective lobbying forces in their own countries of 
residence. This is particularly true in a country like Canada, where Ukrainian-Canadians 
make up an estimated 3.95% of the state’s overall population107. While a group that 
comprises approximately 4% of the populace might initially not seem incredibly large, 
this means that nearly one in every twenty-five Canadians has some Ukrainian origin; 
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 Ultimately, from a diplomatic perspective, representatives from the governments of Poland, Germany, 
and France played a key role in negotiating a peace deal between Yanukovych and the opposition; the deal 
was never implemented because Yanukovych fled to Russia before its terms took place, but the presence 
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this is not far from the percentage of Americans who identify as Asian-American, at 
5.2%108. This is clearly a significant percentage of the population, and represents a group 
that can have serious sway over the Canadian government’s policies and priorities. 
Ukrainians were aware that this potentially influential force existed, and many 
protesters were intent on utilizing this resource in any way possible.  
Indeed, particularly with the Canadian case, there is ample journalistic evidence 
that members of the Ukrainian diaspora there regularly hold dialogues with various 
elected officials to advance their cause. A 2016 British Broadcasting Company report 
details how Ukrainian-Canadian civil society organizations such as the International 
Council in Support of Ukraine meet with Canadian parliamentarians to inform them 
about Ukraine’s war with Russia and to facilitate legislators’ travel to the country109. 
Interestingly, the same article also notes how Canadian-Ukrainian groups have been 
instrumental in sending supplies and funding to help the Ukrainian army in its battle 
against Russia-backed separatists; this is not related to Euromaidan specifically, but it is 
still evidence of transatlantic assistance. Similarly, a Reuters article written in February 
2014 (days before snipers started to shoot protesters en masse) detailed the many ways 
in which Ukrainians in Canada were assisting the protests, with many sending resources 
and financial aid and others actually traveling to Kyiv to participate themselves110. 
Taken together with my interviewees’ on-the-ground observations, this clearly shows 
that the diaspora mattered deeply in many ways. 
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The preceding section has shown the four key ways in which external democratic 
support affected the calculations, perceptions, and beliefs of participants in the 
Euromaidan movement. External democratic promotion and assistance played a role by 
1) lending an air of purposive solidarity in which Euromaidan movements held around 
the world and statements from politicians showed protesters that they were not alone; 
2) providing strategic and tactical assistance from external forces including health care 
to increase the probability that the movement would continue; 3) enhancing the 
presence of international media that maintained the ability to transmit depictions of 
repression and violence to the outside world, reducing the chance that the regime would 
brutally attack people; and 4) utilizing the existence of a large diaspora that sent 
material and financial resources to sustain the campaign and pressured their leaders for 
support, increasing participants’ certainty that they could succeed. Throughout this 
chapter, it is essential to reiterate again that I am not claiming that protesters behaved a 
certain way because Western actors were instructing them to do so. Instead, I show that 
in addition to important domestic factors, these international variables factored into 
their consideration on the viability of protest as well. 
It can be valuable to conclude this section within the context of Ukraine by 
graphically presenting the results of another closed-ended survey question which asked 
interviewees to rate the importance (in their opinion) of Western actors supporting pro- 
democratic protests in Ukraine. As displayed clearly in Figure 3.7 below, the vast 
majority of my respondents indicated that they found support extremely vital and 
necessary – 60.17% view support as “very” important and 33.05% view it as “somewhat” 





Figure 3.7. How important is it that Western states and organizations 
support democratic protests in Ukraine? 
all” important, indicating that nearly everyone with whom I spoke perceives democratic 
assistance as a valuable policy tool for Western governments working with Ukraine. 
This is likely due to the fact that many Ukrainian politicians are still seen as highly 
corrupt and as members of the old “system,” meaning that they have few incentives to 
bring about real reform through the enactment and implementation of new legislation. 
Western states have the power to pressure them in a way that local forces simply cannot, 
meaning that this support could be extremely important for promoting further 
democratization in Ukraine. This reveals that many Ukrainians do believe that foreign 
aid and assistance can make a difference – if they felt instead that their own leaders 
were unsusceptible to influence from the outside, their responses to this question would 
be quite different.   
 I turn now to the second substantive area of study in this chapter – an 
examination of protesters’ perceptions of autocratic intervention from the Russian 





















Effects of Autocratic Intervention on Protesters’ Beliefs and Perceptions 
In the following section, I detail four main contextual factors and mechanisms 
that, according to my interviews, drove protesters’ calculations about participating in 
the movement: 1) the widespread (and resentful) sense that the Russian government 
had a long history of meddling in Ukraine’s political affairs; 2) resentment over Russian 
coverage of the protests’ origins and evolution; 3) suspicions about Russian forces 
aiding Ukrainian riot police to undermine protesters’ ability to successfully challenge 
the regime; and 4) concerns about Ukraine becoming too much like Russia if a drastic 
course of action did not prevent such an outcome;  
Following my approach in the preceding section, before I delve into the 
qualitative mechanisms that my conversations identified and highlighted, I begin my 
analysis by presenting the simple statistical findings of a question on my closed-ended 
survey in order to quantitatively assess opinions about the Russian government’s role in 
the Euromaidan movement. The question read, “Based on your observations, did 
protesters’ calculations about the Russian government’s reaction to Euromaidan have 
any effect on peoples’ perceptions, strategies, or goals?” I provide a graphical overview 
of respondents’ opinions in Figure 3.8 below. 
According to my findings, while my interviewees were not as widely convinced 
that actions by the Russian government affected protesters’ calculations as they were 
that Western forces mattered in this way, a majority still felt that the reaction of the 
Russian government had some effect on protesters’ behavior. 33.89% of respondents felt 
that it was “somewhat likely” that protesters considered the actions of the Russian 
government while another 26.27% felt that it was “very likely,” for a combined total of 




Figure 3.8. Interviewees’ opinions regarding the effect of perceived Russian 
intrusion or intervention on Euromaidan protesters’ beliefs 
protesters gave much thought to Russian involvement at the time, 13.56% felt that it was 
“very unlikely,” and another 1.69% could not determine a final opinion on the matter111. 
In order to illustrate respondents’ own personal beliefs about Russian 
intervention at the time, I present the results of another closed-ended survey question in 
Figure 3.9 below. This question read, “If you feel that Russia was intervening to 
undermine Euromaidan’s success, what are some ways in which the Russian regime 
might have been acting?” Respondents had the chance to select as many of the optional 
choices as they wished – if they did not feel that the Russian government was playing a 
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felt that the Russian government was intervening to affect the Euromaidan movement’s success and 
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part at the time, they would not have selected any response, while if they felt that 
interference was multi-pronged, they could choose numerous factors. 
 Figure 3.9 provides the percentage of respondents who felt that each of the four 
possible options were in play during Euromaidan. It is interesting to note that virtually 
every interviewee selected at least one response for this question, indicating that 
everyone with whom I spoke felt that the Putin regime was intervening in at least one 
way. Narrowing the focus specifically to focus on each action individually, vast 
majorities felt that the Russian government provided financial aid to Yanukovych 
(88.46%) and that Putin was waging a propaganda campaign through the media and 
Internet to undermine the movement’s success (84.62%). Given the numerous 
revelations in recent years about armies of online Russian “trolls” and their efforts to 
weaken democratic elections in Western states, this should come as no surprise112. 
A majority of respondents (51.92%) felt that the Putin regime supplied some type 
of military aid to Viktor Yanukovych, primarily understood as tactical weapons and 
other resources rather than physical manpower, while a significantly smaller share 
(38.46%) felt that the Russian government actually sent some troops to suppress the 
protests. In the aggregate, therefore, these results indicate that most interviewees with 
whom I spoke for this dissertation felt that the Putin regime played some role in 
supporting Yanukovych, intervening to protect its ally against protesters. I turn now to a 
discussion of the first primary authoritarian mechanism highlighted in the following 
section – a widespread and resentful sense that the Russian government was constantly 
affecting Ukrainian affairs. 
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Figure 3.9. Interviewees’ perceptions of Russian intervention during the 
Euromaidan movement (% believing that each action occurred) 
Mechanism 2.1: Unwanted Russian Intrusion in Ukraine’s Political Affairs 
 This first causal mechanism concerns the fact that for years, many pro-Western 
Ukrainians were intensely aware that there were close connections between the regimes 
of Yanukovych and Putin. Indeed, as one respondent noted, “Well, in Ukraine, we knew 
that Yanukovych was mostly pro-Russian president. Even as early as 2004, when there 
was a presidential election in Ukraine and two candidates were running against each 
other. It was Yanukovych and the guy who became the president eventually, Viktor 
Yushchenko. But before that, we also had a revolution with people protesting against the 
falsification of the election. But before the results were even officially declared by the 
Ukrainian election commission, what Putin did, he called his friend Yanukovych to 
congratulate him on his victory in this election. So it was sort of a symbolic thing to see 
that a president of a bordering country congratulates a candidate who is not yet sure to 
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with analyst at the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Counseling, conducted in 
Kyiv, November 15, 2017). For numerous Ukrainians such as this individual, the clear 
and observable ties between Yanukovych and Putin ran long and deep. 
 Other respondents pointed to efforts by the Russian government to undermine 
Ukrainian identity and history in order to make the country more hospitable (or 
subservient) towards Russia, as well as the perception that Yanukovych and his allies 
willingly joined in this campaign as well. One individual recounted, “Again, it was 
understandable for each of us that Russia was trying in some way to support the 
Ukrainian government, because in that time, Yanukovych and his party were more pro-
Russian, they were trying to play very sensitive topics, history, second World War, 
culture, language, even the creation of Ukraine” (Interview with former student activist 
and civil society organizer, conducted in Kyiv, December 8, 2017). Another interviewee 
used a more colorful analogy to describe many Ukrainians’ underlying desire to firmly 
break away from domineering Russian influence, noting, “You know, we are used to 
saying…in the Soviet Union, we were taught to say that all of the countries in Soviet 
Union are sister countries. And they used to say that ‘Moscow is the elder sister of Kyiv,’ 
or something like that. And everyone was still kind of afraid of talking bad about the 
elder sister. It’s like having an elder sister who is sort of weird and violent, and you don’t 
really want to have anything to do with her, but you’re afraid because she can like go and 
slap your ass” (Interview with activist, conducted in Kyiv, December 6, 2017). 
 Serhiy Leshchenko, a former investigative reporter and then-current Member of 
the Verkhovna Rada with whom I spoke, specifically mentioned a widespread sense that 
the Putin regime was supporting Viktor Yanukovych financially. As he recounted to me, 




everybody that the President received support from Russia. It was media coverage, it 
was financial support, it was consultants, assistants, Yanukovych with Russian roots, 
and so on” (Interview conducted in Kyiv, May 25, 2017). Similarly, others noted that 
many in society resented both the Yanukovych regime’s outward support for and 
reliance on the Russian government as well as the internal composition of its Cabinet 
members. A policy analyst mentioned that “the nationalist movement was most 
importantly not willing to see Ukraine to Russia, but that was the main motivation. And 
also ideologically strongly opposing Yanukovych because in foreign policy, they were not 
so like pro-Russian as most people think, but internally, they had strongly pro-Russian 
education minister” (Interview with political analyst from the Institute for Euro-Atlantic 
Cooperation, conducted in Kyiv, November 21, 2017). For these people, therefore, the 
perception that the Russian government was playing too large a role in influencing 
Ukrainian political affairs provided adequate motivation to join the Euromaidan protest. 
 As noted in other parts of this dissertation, a significant number of protesters 
came from Lviv and other cities in Western Ukraine. This intense dislike of Russian 
influence on Ukraine appears to be stronger among citizens in this region than it is for 
individuals in other parts of the country. As an active leader of Lviv’s Euromaidan 
protest mentioned, “That is the main characteristic of Western Ukraine. We always 
perceive Russia as the main enemy. Always…Yanukovych was always called pro-Russian 
politician, and we totally understood that he is rebroadcasting Putin’s message. He was 
not acting on his own; he was too stupid to do that…There was no doubt that everything, 
like the beginning of Russian aggression, and actually, what had happened then on the 
Euromaidan, when students were beaten, when the demonstrators were beaten on the 




able to see that Ukraine is not the country when you can threaten people like he does in 
Russia” (Interview with singer and activist, conducted in Lviv, May 2, 2017). This quote 
is particularly interesting, as it suggests that many protesters actively perceived the 
presence of direct Russian intervention guiding Yanukovych’s response at the time. This 
spurred feelings of resentment and anger, making protest participation more likely. 
Indeed, as this same individual mentioned, “The more that Russia disagreed with what 
we were doing, we just did it harder!” 
 The preceding section shows that for many activists, the fact that the Russian 
government was seen as directly supported Yanukovych politically and financially was 
the final straw, driven by years of frustration over Putin’s efforts to undermine Ukraine’s 
Western path and democratic development113. Many activists viewed Yanukovych as 
weak and unintelligent, surmising that he was incapable of remaining in power without 
guidance from the Russian government. I turn now to the second mechanism presented 
in this section – resentment and anger at the way that Russian propaganda was working 
to undermine the protests by framing the movement as fascist and violent. 
Mechanism 2.2: Resentment over Russian Coverage of the Euromaidan Protests 
 An important theme that emerged in several of my interviews was a notable 
irritation over the way that Russian media depicted the protests at the time that they 
were taking place. This coverage adopted many disingenuous strategies in order to make 
the protesters seem both smaller in number and more vicious than they actually were. 
On the matter of Russian media presenting a biased image of the protest, one former 
Ukrainian reporter recalled of the time, “And at the same moment when I was making 
my report [on the Maidan], I saw the news crew of NTV, or the First Channel, I don’t 
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remember, but it was definitely a Russian channel. And they were saying they found a 
little piece of square, a technical square, where nobody was standing. Because it was not 
possible to stand there, because fences were blocking it. And they were standing there 
live, and saying, you see, we are in the square of independence, and nothing is going on. 
Impossible!” (Interview with former television reporter, conducted in Kyiv, March 17, 
2017). During this same conversation, the former reporter also discussed ways in which 
Russian state media would use footage that was nearly ten years old to convince viewers 
that the Euromaidan movement was much smaller than it actually was – “In terms of 
editing, they just took the video for instance from Euromaidan, but not from this time. 
From 2005. And they told that you see, there is nobody on that street.”  These efforts were 
clearly done to show viewers that the movement was weak and would not succeed, both 
to reduce the chance that a similar movement would emerge in Russia and to send a 
signal to Ukrainians sympathetic to the Yanukovych regime that the protests were not to 
be taken seriously114. 
 Another common strategy in the Russian media was to depict protesters as paid 
lackeys of Western governments, with a particular amount of attention being paid to the 
role of the United States of America and the Central Intelligence Agency. One activist at 
the Reanimation Package for Reforms told me, “Victoria Nuland, when she came to 
Kyiv, she took a pack of biscuits and other foods to Maidan. And obviously all the 
reporters fixed on that moment. And I remember that pro-Yanukovych media, and also 
in Russia, it was described as, you see this foreign government feeding their proxies. 
And it was so nasty, because it was just an act of good will to support protesters, but it 
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was depicted as people eating from the hands of USA. But higher officials came to 
Maidan as ordinary citizens, just to speak with citizens and to offer their help” 
(Interview with activist, conducted in Kyiv, March 23, 2017). This concept came up 
several times throughout my conversations, with numerous participants actively 
disavowing its accuracy. One respondent indicated that it was foolish to think that 
anyone would risk their lives for ten dollars a day115, while another joked that if 
participants were indeed paid for their time, she was still waiting for her check from the 
American government116. 
Kasparov (2015) discusses this in his analysis of Russia under Vladimir Putin, 
noting that Russian media played up American influence as much as it could, even going 
so far as to claim (with no evidence) that protesters were being armed and trained by 
American troops117. Further underscoring this belief among consumers of Russian 
media at the time, one ethnically mixed Ukrainian-Russian activist explained to me 
about her relatives,  
“Many European and American officials came to visit [the Maidan]. There was 
 this famous joke, cookies from the Department of State. So Victoria Nuland, an 
 official from the Department of State, she was responsible for European and 
 Eurasian Affairs. So she was a frequent guest in the region, and in Ukraine in 
 particular. So once she came to Maidan and she had some cookies with her, and 
 she started distributing cookies. She’s a high-ranking official, and she brought the 
 media with her. And then the Russian media picked it up, like, look, Maidan is 
 supported by the Americans, it’s all FBI or it’s CIA, who staged all this  
 performance, and so now the protesters are getting their salary in cookies. And 
 I’m half-Russian and the majority of my relatives are in Russia. And up until this 
 day, they do think that I got paid for protesting. By the U.S. No matter what I try, 
 it’s still there. I was paid by the U.S. This is how big support U.S. gave to  
 Euromaidan (laughs)” (Interview with reporter from the Ukraine Crisis Media 
 Centre, conducted in Kyiv, March 29, 2017). 
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Others took umbrage at the fact that Russian media depicted all Euromaidan 
participants as vicious far-right, nationalist extremists, using the actions of a few to tar 
the legitimacy and reputation of the entire group. One political analyst noted, “During 
the Euromaidan events, Russia several times spoke out for Yanukovych and against the 
protesters, and then the Russian official media – state media – released lots of lies and 
lots of confrontational argumentations about how Maidan is so fascist, and how the 
people are some guys from out of nowhere who were just paid to participate, and how 
they are being treated with drugs on Maidan. And other bullshit” (Interview with 
political analyst from the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, conducted in Kyiv, 
November 21, 2017). These types of misleading claims frustrated protesters, and made it 
more likely that they would remain on the streets. 
Similarly, a political theorist recounted to me the ways in which media coverage 
of protesters as fascists fed into a pre-existing framework that Yanukovych himself had 
previously helped develop in conjunction with Putin to criticize anyone who was 
opposed to his regime. As he recalled, “The narrative of fascists was developed long 
enough before. Yanukovych and Russia developed it together. Deploying Russian 
“political technologists.” In 2004, despite Kuchma’s problems, he never used the fascist 
card. Yanukovych did it during his campaign, when he tried to call Yushchenko a fascist. 
He can say a lot of bad things about Yushchenko, but he has nothing to do with fascists. 
So the seed was planted at that time” (Interview with Ukrainian philosopher and 
theorist, conducted in Kyiv, April 25, 2017). Unsurprisingly, this depiction of pro-
Western actors as “fascists” is a relatively common strategy employed by the Russian 




countries such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as fascists118 119, attempting to use the 
Soviet Union’s pride in defeating Nazi Germany in World War II as a way to frame 
Russia as a credible character witness on identifying fascism today. 
Many participants at Euromaidan understandably resented this depiction, 
particularly as this portrayal became increasingly widespread among their family 
members or contacts in Russia120121122123. As one student noted, “And two other people 
that I had conversations with from Russia, they had quite another point of view. They 
thought that NATO gave weapons to the Maidan protesters, and these weapons – 
policemen were killed and so forth, and also there are a lot of CIA spies there, and 
maybe there are even some NATO agents, and when it really started to killing people 
like with snipers, they also said that maybe it’s not SBU, our national security agency, 
they thought that it’s not them who are doing it, but there may be some unknown killers 
who were hired by NATO or the United States. That most of the people that participated 
were nationalists, and evil Ukrainian fascists, Nazis, who were against Russians, who 
wanted to kill Russian population in Ukraine, to make it genocide, and other irrelevant 
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stuff124” (Interview with student, conducted in Kyiv, November 22, 2017). Still others 
noted that the coverage was likely designed to make the protests look bad in the eyes of 
Western governments, a tactic that was perceived as attempting to undermine the 
West’s burgeoning support for protesters’ demands125. 
One American reporter made the compelling argument that Russian coverage of 
the protests was likely shaped not only by a desire to shape Ukraine’s politics, but 
Russia’s as well. As he mentioned, “The way that Russia reacted to the Maidan was 
obviously a reaction to the protests that happened in Russia a few years prior to that. 
And I think Russia didn’t want the revolution here to work, because they knew it would 
inspire another one in Russia. So I think Russia did everything it could to discredit the 
revolution here, at least in least in the eyes of the Russian people. A CIA-sponsored 
coup, put in place by the fascist government” (Interview conducted in Kyiv, November 
16, 2017). 
This section has shown that the Russian government’s depiction of the 
Euromaidan protests as 1) smaller and weaker than they truly were, 2) directed and paid 
by the Central Intelligence Agency, and 3) more violent, less tolerant, and intensely 
“fascist” was adopted by the Putin regime to discredit the movement and weaken its 
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effectiveness. Protesters at the time were very aware of how they were being portrayed 
on Russian state media – if this were not the case, I would not have had so many 
respondents mention this media coverage as an issue that bothered them at the time. 
For many people, they therefore became more devoted to protesting than they otherwise 
would have been. I now turn to the third mechanism presented in this section – 
frustration over perceptions that the Russian government was sending military aid to 
keep Yanukovych in power. 
Mechanism 2.3: Frustration at the Fact that Putin was Sending Forces for Help 
Many protesters were therefore aware that the Russian government was 
monitoring the movement and that there would potentially be some type of pushback to 
support Yanukovych. As one interviewee mentioned, “Yanukovych and his lies have 
always been perceived as a pro-Russian force. So we understood that if Maidan went too 
far, there would be some backlash from Russia” (Interview with lawyer, conducted in 
Kyiv, May 19, 2017). Information about direct Russian involvement in terms of sending 
troops or military tools is still highly ambiguous, and much uncertainty remains about 
the extent to which the Russian government actually sent direct assistance. 
Nevertheless, a large share of my interviewees indicated some belief that this took place 
– more than forty percent believed that Russia sent some type of security troops, while 
more than fifty percent believed that Russia sent military aid without actually providing 
manpower. 
One American reporter who spent a significant amount of time at the Maidan 
recounted how he interacted extensively with security forces sent by the Yanukovych 
regime to quell the protesters. Though he could not independently verify that several 




“I think that people believed, and they would tell you that they knew – and I say it 
 that way because Russia operates in such a way that makes it very difficult to 
 ascertain whether they’re directly involved. But, people would have told you then 
 and you could see it in some ways at the time, that Russia was aiding 
 Yanukovych. There would be buses full of thuggish-looking titushki [unidentified 
 and anonymous men wearing civilian clothing who would routinely beat 
 demonstrators and kidnap them from rallies], you know, the guys that would 
 come across the border into Novgorod into Ukraine through  the Kharkiv region 
 and come to Maidan. The Kharkiv Maidan and the Kyiv Maidan. The security 
 forces, you know, were believed to have help, and I actually had some very 
 interesting and strange days when I got stuff with the Berkut and other armed 
 guys in January and February…I was speaking Russian with them, and I noticed 
 that, like, their accents strongly resembled those of a Moscow accent or a St. 
 Petersburg accent. Like a very thick, true Russian accent, not the kind of Russian 
 that I was used to in Kyiv or Donetsk. And a lot of the security forces did come 
 from Donetsk and Luhansk, and I could tell those guys right  away, having been 
 out there. That’s actually the place where I studied Russian…the accent was very 
 different. And I asked some of the guys, and they would jokingly tell me that they 
 were from one place or the other, and I’d try to  get more specific. You know, “Oh, 
 you’re from Donbas? I lived out there too for two years! Where are you from?” 
 And they’d say, “Oh, a little town. You wouldn’t know it.” You know, that kind of 
 stuff. Like, all right…and, you know, there were reports at that time of buses 
 coming across the border with police and people with shields, and even just 
 thugs, hired goons, the titushki characters who hang out in Marinsky Park near 
 Parliament. So there was this type of security support  coming from Russia. At 
 the same time, there were tons and tons of rumors that Russia was also sending 
 people to mix with the Maidan crowd in order to provoke clashes…To make it 
 look like it was a violent crowd. That the violence was coming from inside the 
 protesters and not from the security forces. (Interview conducted in Kyiv, 
 November 15, 2017). 
  
While this evidence is anecdotal, it provides a strong implication that many 
people at the time were perceiving that riot police did in fact come from Russia to 
dampen the protests’ chance at success. It seems eminently reasonable to assume that if 
an American reporter who had been living in Ukraine for several years was able to 
determine that many police had a distinctively Russian accent, it would be even more 
obvious to native Ukrainians. 
Other respondents with whom I spoke pointed to their own beliefs that the 




regime’s ability to withstand protesters’ demands. One activist who remained at 
Euromaidan until the movement’s last days recalled his first-hand experience: “About 
Russian involvement in Euromaidan – I knew some facts. First of these, Russia 
supported Yanukovych and supported riot police units with Russian stun grenades. It 
was some facts that journalists published – that two military planes from Russia , they 
carried these stun grenades. And these flights were in February 2014, exactly before the 
bloodiest clashes. And I know that they used because I heard stun grenades that were 
used on Hroshevskovo Street in January, and in February. They were used because they 
were more powerful. The explosion was louder. So some people, also journalists, they 
thought that this anti-terrorist operation was planned by some advisors from the 
Russian security services” (Interview with doctoral student and former Euromaidan 
protester, conducted in Lviv, December 4, 2017).  
Another former protester with whom I spoke echoed these claims, stating, “So 
basically, there was quite a strong reason to believe that Russia would intervene, and 
with time, for the activization of the police beatings in January, there were reports – and 
later, I think they were even proven documentally true – that Yanukovych regime did 
receive some support in arms from Russia. Like, I think it was hand grenades and guns, 
stuff like that for the police” (Interview with political analyst from the Institute for Euro-
Atlantic Cooperation, conducted in Kyiv, November 21, 2017). Similarly, another 
respondent pointed specifically to the fact that many of the tools that security forces 
were using at the time must have come from Russia because they simply were not 
available in Ukraine when the protests began – as he mentioned, “people had some not 
reliable myths at that time about Russian troops coming to support the President. What 




near Kyiv and brought special equipment like grenades. Because according to Ukrainian 
law, cannot strike grenade closer than 6 meters from person. But government forces did 
this INTO your face directly” (Interview with political theorist, conducted in Kyiv, April 
6, 2017). Again, the implication is that many Ukrainians believed that Putin was sending 
military resources in order to potentially dissuade people from protesting. 
According to these individuals, many protesters felt that Putin was providing 
tactical training and material resources to Yanukovych to increase the chance that he 
could stay in office. Other respondents indicated the belief that Putin provided 
Yanukovych with sharpshooters and snipers to shoot protesters126, while still others 
pointed to the fact that Ukraine’s security institutions had been broadly infiltrated by 
actors from within Russia127. Many of my interviewees deeply resented the fact that 
Russia was intervening to directly weaken their efforts to remove Yanukovych from 
power. This in turn motivated them to take to the streets, deepening their resolve to 
protest until their movement achieved its goals. I turn now to the fourth and final 
mechanisms presented in this section – a growing fear that Ukraine was becoming too 
much like its authoritarian neighbor, Russia. 
Mechanism 2.4: Fear of Ukraine Becoming Too Similar to Authoritarian Russia 
 The final mechanism presented here can be seen as a culmination of sorts into 
which the three preceding mechanisms connect and flow. In this section, I detail the 
ways in which protesters’ belief that Ukraine under Yanukovych was coming 
dangerously close to becoming a fully authoritarian state resembling its autocratic 
border state of Russia. Activists knew that Yanukovych was financially and politically 
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reliant upon Putin, and this made them feel that Ukraine stood at a critical juncture 
requiring immediate action. At the same time, their observance of Russian interference 
in their affairs and the disingenuous in which the movement was depicted on Russian 
television increased their fears of Ukraine following a similar trajectory unless 
immediate steps were taken to reverse this trend. 
 One activist whose involvement was noteworthy due to the fact that she was a 
leader of an all-female sotnia (a self-organized group of 100 people) recounted 
observations from a trip to Russia, and how this knowledge inspired her decision to join 
Euromaidan: “I was in Russia few years ago. St. Petersburg. And I just walked on 
Nevsky Prospekt and I saw that every kvartal, a lot of police. And close to metro, I saw 
people with this blockade. And a sign that said, “Putin to prison,” and I saw how police 
started to beat the people and pack them in little cars. And from that point, I thought 
that it’s unbelievable, it cannot be, especially in my country! But then when the police 
beat the students on Maidan, I understand, hmm, I saw this before in Russia. I don’t 
want to live in a police country. And I go to my friends and on social media, it was a very 
tough conversation, and next day a lot of people was on Sophia Square, near the 
monastery” (Interview with activist and Euromaidan protester, conducted in Kyiv, May 
16, 2017). This respondent observed growing (and disturbing) parallels between Russia 
and Ukraine, and her tangible fear that Ukraine would become a “police state” was a key 
motivating factor in her decision to protest. 
 A reporter with whom I spoke offered similar feelings based on conversations 
with Ukrainians in the years since Euromaidan movement; as he noted, “But then when 
Yanukovych, you know, beat the crap out of those students that one night, it changed 




foreign message they’re sending, I think that message is probably more geared towards 
Moscow in some ways. Like, we don’t want to be a part of your world anymore” 
(Interview with American journalist, conducted in Kyiv, November 16, 2017). In this 
case, my interviewee directly suggests that for a subset of protesters, one of their main 
motivational factors for joining the movement was the chance to send a clear signal to 
Vladimir Putin that they rejected any situation in which Ukraine would come to mimic 
Russia in its heavily authoritarian nature. 
 Another reporter shared this sentiment, particularly regarding younger 
Ukrainians. As he recounted, “I think that the Ukrainian millennial generation has a real 
appreciation for how duped the Russian people are by propaganda. They interact with 
Russians, and one of the really common things that you hear is, I talked to my friends in 
Russia, or my family, and they don’t believe me when I tell them that Ukraine isn’t a 
fascist country. That you can walk down the streets of Kyiv and most people speak 
Russian, and you’re not gonna get beat up by the Banderas running around128…And I 
feel like that awareness, that portal that Ukrainians have to life in Russia, it in some 
ways inspired – I believe – this very fervent desire among the young people to not end 
up like that. You know, they don’t want to be like that anymore” (Interview conducted in 
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Kyiv, November 15, 2017). Again, protesters’ awareness of parallels between Russia and 
Yanukovych’s Ukraine is stark and clear. 
 One doctor whom I interviewed had never been politically active before 
Euromaidan, but he was driven to take to the streets because he viewed Ukraine under 
Yanukovych as becoming far too similar to Russia. In his own words, “And after this 
initial stage, when Yanukovch say, no to Euro integration. After this, we understand that 
it’s final. It’s only Russia, only the rebuilding of USSR…And Putin and government of 
Russia support Yanukovych to take money, and it’s not good for us. We all understand 
why our vector, our direction to Europe – not only to Europe, but to civilization, was in 
danger” (Interview conducted in Kyiv, May 24, 2017). Echoing statements that have 
been presented above, intervention from the Russian government sent a clear signal to 
protesters that if they did not act, Ukraine would cooperate more with Putin’s Russia, 
becoming more authoritarian in the process.  
The preceding section has demonstrated the four key ways in which direct and 
indirect Russian efforts to dampen the Euromaidan movement spurred protesters to 
take action, illustrating the mechanisms presented in earlier sections of this 
dissertation. I now present a brief section containing findings from my interviews 
regarding interviewees’ beliefs about the positive effects that the protests have had on 
Ukrainian society, as well as areas in which the protests’ goals have not been met. 
What has changed in Ukraine since the Euromaidan Movement? 
First, I present in Figure 10 below the results of another question that I asked 
respondents to complete. Within the scope of evaluating Euromaidan’s success, the 




Figure 3.10. Interviewees’ Assessments of Euromaidan’s Success 
As the figure makes clear, a majority of respondents (60.17%) felt that 
Euromaidan had been “somewhat successful” in achieving its primary goals. An equal 
14.41% of respondents felt that the movement was either “very successful” or “neither 
successful nor unsuccessful,” while only 11.02% rated the protests’ outcome as either 
“somewhat unsuccessful” or “very unsuccessful.” In the aggregate, therefore, my 
respondents clearly feel that the Euromaidan movement had at least some type of 
beneficial effects on Ukrainian society and politics, even if there were some goals that 
activists failed to completely attain. 
Which types of positive changes in Ukraine can be attributed to the Euromaidan 
movement? One of the most common themes raised in my interviews was the sense that 
Ukrainian citizens had come to see themselves as legitimately influential political actors 
since the protests took place129. Whereas several people indicated that the average 
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Ukrainian was rather passive before Euromaidan, preferring to take a hands-off 
approach and to allow the government to simply provide for them, other indicted that 
this has changed dramatically. Indeed, the awareness that mass participation on the 
streets engendered real political transformation helped people realize that they could 
help guide their country’s political development130, indicating that widespread civic 
activism was likely to become a fundamental part of Ukraine’s political culture in the 
future131132. As one former activist and current Member of the Verkhovna Rada 
mentioned to me, “I think that we are coming from a vertical society, in a way, where 
you have decision-makers that are sacred, untouchable, but now I think that society 
becomes much more horizontal, where decision-making is more horizontal, where social 
groups are much more involved, or at least have the leverage to influence – through 
media, through protest, through public discussion, through different kind of activities” 
(Interview conducted in Kyiv, November 10, 2017). 
 Other respondents adopted a more philosophical perspective, noting that since 
Euromaidan, many people came to view themselves as truly “Ukrainian” for the first 
time in their country’s independent history. Indeed, as the modern state of Ukraine has 
only existed with its current borders since 1991, many citizens never felt a deep sense of 
attachment to the nation – instead, people have often traditionally felt a stronger tie to 
their local city or region than they do to the country as a whole133134135. Since 
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Euromaidan, however, many interviewees noted a significant shift in terms of how 
average people identify with one another and the state, indicating a profound evolution 
in political identity and attachment136137138. 
 Other positive effects from the Euromaidan movement that interviewees raised 
were more practical and tangible in nature. One particularly significant effect was the 
introduction of visa-free travel for Ukrainian citizens to the European Union139. Prior to 
the revolution and the introduction of the Poroshenko government, Ukrainians could 
not travel to any European Union country without securing a complex and costly visa140. 
Many respondents indicated that travel in the Schengen Zone had therefore been too 
expensive for most Ukrainians, and that the procurement of this new form of travel was 
deeply important to many of their countrymen141142. The fact that Ukrainians can now 
travel more freely within Europe made respondents that they had more personal and 
professional options than before (particularly for younger people searching for 
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economic opportunities)143, and the development strengthened many individuals’ ties to 
the broader European continent144145. 
 Another significant development to note here was the introduction of “E-
reforms” for public officials in Ukraine. Following sustained pressure from activists and 
members of civil society, a law was passed in 2017 requiring all governmental officials 
and public employees to publicly make available a comprehensive list of their assets and 
personal properties. Designed to combat corruption and illicit profiteering, this 
legislation represented an important first step for many interviewees towards a more 
open, democratic, and fair society than had existed in Ukraine before146147148149150. 
 What are some areas in which the Euromaidan movement unfortunately failed to 
create much change? Unsurprisingly for anyone familiar with Ukraine, the largest 
complaint that interviewees continued to express in the post-Euromaidan era concerned 
the country’s endemic struggle to eradicate (or even remotely manage) 
corruption151152153. Many pointed to the creation of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau 
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of Ukraine (NABU) as an important tool for keeping officials accountable154, but several 
others noted that corruption still exists de facto as a central part of life in Ukraine, both 
in day-to-day activities and in the ways in which politics (and particularly members of 
the government’s legislature and judiciary) operates155156157158. As several people noted, 
this is because the majority of legislators who were in the Verkhovna Rada before the 
Euromaidan movement were still there at the time that these interviews were 
conducted159 – they simply regrouped and reformulated themselves under the labels of 
new political parties in order to create the appearance, rather than the reality, of 
political change160161162. 
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As one former investigative journalist and current Member of Parliament 
mentioned to me, fighting corruption in Ukraine has proven to be extremely difficult 
due to the fact that those within the system who benefit most are therefore the least 
willing to make true reforms. As he recounted, “Tradition here has not finished. So this 
is in some sense very dramatic dynamics because we have achievement, but next month, 
some sliding back decisions. So as for today, there is very unstable achievement because 
within the area of anti-corruption, we build some institutions, but corrupt politicians 
looking for different ways to demolish them, to limit their capacity, to discredit them, to 
fire management for these institutions. Because of the fear that the institutions go after 
them” (Interview conducted in the Rada, May 25, 2017). This quote shows that while 
civil society and even some recently elected politicians are working to change Ukraine’s 
culture of corruption, doing so proves to be a very arduous task. 
Mustafa Nayyem, another activist-turned-Member of the Verkhovna Rada, 
expressed a similar sentiment when I spoke with him in his office: “We are aware and 
conscious about resistance, because it is aware that we cannot, you know, change 
country overnight. And it was obvious that they would try to save status quo. Because 
many people who are now in the power were in the power before that. So we feel that 
they are putting pressure on us, they are attacking us. Trying to scare or trying to 
punish, but it’s not successful yet, and I think that the more they will do, the more free 
will be media…Maybe in the future, we will unite many forces in one big block, and then 
we will go farther, because now we don’t feel that we can build up something new in this 
crutch, and the biggest problem is not even the organization of resources, but the 
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resource itself –money. Because in our country, money is very concentrated in hands of 
three, five, seven people. So it is very difficult to go through these obstacles” (Interview 
conducted in Kyiv, May 26, 2017). 
 The preceding section has shown that the Euromaidan movement achieved many 
of its goals in certain areas – Ukrainians participate in politics at higher rates now than 
before, citizens can travel to the European Union without a visa, and important steps 
have been taken towards promoting transparency among officials. At the same time, 
much work remains to be done in other sectors, including the continued fight to remove 
corruption from Ukrainian life and politics163. I now present a brief discussion about 
Ukraine’s political future before concluding the chapter by reviewing my main findings 
and their implications. 
How likely is it that Ukrainians will participate in another mass protest? 
 While much of this chapter is concerned with the motivating factors that led 
Ukrainians to take to the streets in 2013 and 2014, it is also helpful to consider the 
likelihood that such a movement might take place again in the future. In order to test 
interviewees’ opinions on this matter, I asked my respondents to answer a question 
asking, “How likely is it that a similar movement would emerge in the future?” The 
distribution of responses is presented graphically in Figure 3.11 below. 
As the figure shows, respondents were quite split in their opinions on this topic. 
41.3% felt that it was “somewhat likely,” while another 12.93% felt that it was “very 
likely.” Many participants pointed to the aforementioned joke about Ukrainians taking  
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Figure 3.11. How likely is it that another Euromaidan movement will occur? 
to the streets every ten years, suggesting that this type of behavior had become 
institutionalized among Ukrainian activists164165. Another respondent indicated that to 
her, it was not a matter of if Ukrainians would take to the streets again, but instead a 
matter of when166. Similarly, a separate individual mentioned that another mass 
movement in the style of Euromaidan would be likely to happen, but only under 
circumstances in which human rights and civil liberties were so violated that all types of 
socioeconomic groups would be able to overcome their numerous differences and work 
together for one common cause167. 
 On the other hand, numerous respondents were much less confident that 
Ukrainians would create such a large movement again, particularly in the near future. 
Among my respondents, 33.62% felt that it was “not very likely” that another 
Euromaidan would occur, while 3.45% ruled it out altogether. Among interviewees who 
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felt that another Euromaidan was unlikely, by far the most common theme behind their 
reasoning was that this type of protest would severely destabilize and weaken Ukraine at 
a time when the country was challenged by Russian invasion and a struggling 
economy168. As one individual noted, “You can’t have a revolution every other year. If 
people are becoming too reliant on revolutions as a way to create political change, you 
cannot build a country if you’re always having a revolution” (Interview with activist, 
conducted in Kyiv, December 6, 2017)169. 
 Similarly, as one reporter noted, “When I go out to the war zone, I talk to the 
soldiers. They DO NOT like Poroshenko. An overwhelming majority of them don’t like 
Poroshenko very much. They don’t believe in their government…but what they tell me is 
that if we went back to Kyiv and protested, Russia would simply invade behind us. So 
there is…one influence moderating that diminishes the prospect of another Maidan, and 
it’s the fact that many Ukrainians understand their country is in a de facto state of war 
with Russia. And that government instability that would come from protests would be to 
Russia’s advantage” (Interview with American reporter, conducted in Kyiv, November 
16, 2017). The possibility that the Russian government would use another protest to 
further undermine Ukraine’s democratization and international reputation was 
mentioned by several other people as well – one individual mentioned that another 
protest could turn Ukraine into a “failed state” due to the country’s fragile wartime 
status170, while another noted that widespread participation in another protest would 
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destabilize Ukraine and make Russian aggression more effective171. Interestingly, a 
separate respondent noted that a new widespread protest would further empower the 
Russian government’s invasion in the East by allowing Putin to frame all of Ukraine’s 
conflicts as wholly domestic civil wars involving Ukrainians only, reducing any Russian 
responsibility for fostering the conflicts in the Donbas region172. 
 Many individuals in this second camp also felt that another mass movement 
would be much more violent than the previous protests173. Several individuals noted that 
firearms had become much more prevalent in Ukraine now than before the war with 
Russia began, meaning that activists (particularly far-right nationalists) would be more 
likely to use violence against the regime174175. Taken together, the wide variety of 
opinions expressed by interviewees in this area points to the fundamentally uncertain 
nature of both Ukrainian politics and the dynamics of protest movements more broadly. 
 Presenting one final piece of evidence regarding the chance for another 
Euromaidan movement in the future, I present in Figure 3.12 below the results of a 
survey question that asked, “If a mass protest movement such as Euromaidan arose 
again in the future, how likely is it that you would join the movement?” As is evident 
from the figure, the elite respondents whom I surveyed express a significant amount of 
willingness to take to the streets should a new wave of protests in the style of 
Euromaidan take place. From a dichotomous perspective, 78.57% of interviewees chose 
a response between 6 and 10, placing them on the protest-ready side of the scale.  
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Figure 3.12. Interviewees’ likelihood of joining a future protest movement 
Moreover, 31.25% of individuals selected a response of 10, indicating that they were 
“very likely” to join a future Euromaidan. Altogether, the responses to this question 
indicate that if another mass movement emphasizing democracy and human rights were 
to take place, most of the people with whom I spoke would join the cause. 
Will Ukraine go West? 
 One final discussion regarding Ukraine’s future concerns interviewees’ beliefs 
about the geopolitical direction that the country will take in years to come. I present in 
Figure 3.13 responses to a survey question asking, “Do you ultimately think that Ukraine 
will join Western organizations like the European Union?176 
 The results are striking – 81.20% of respondents expressed a firm belief that 
Ukraine is likely to move towards integration with the West in the future. 11.11% 
believed that the country would remain somewhat situated between the West and 
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Figure 3.13. Interviewees’ responses about Ukraine’s geopolitical future 
Russia, while an infinitesimal 0.85% of respondents felt that Ukraine was more likely to 
move towards Russia. These sentiments were echoed in my qualitative interviews, with 
many people explicitly stating that Ukraine today has only two feasible paths. One path 
appeared to be integration with Western countries and institutions, and a clear and 
marked turn away from cooperation with Russia – one person told me that the current 
Ukrainian government was the most pro-Western of any in Ukraine’s history, and that 
Russia had become completely untenable as a partner for the country177178. Another 
individual echoed this, emphasizing that support and assistance from the United States 
and the European Union was important for championing this development179.  
 A second path that a smaller number of respondents mentioned proposed an 
independent Ukraine that focused solely on developing itself as a strong, powerful, and 
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autonomous nation, without any meaningful ties to either the West or Russia. One 
veteran of the war explicitly stressed the conflict with Russia here, noting that the 
country’s strategies and military campaigns were constrained by leaders’ fears about 
what Western forces would think180. However, another respondent cautioned against 
the wisdom of thinking in this way, noting that in his opinion, Ukraine as not strong 
enough to chart a completely independent geopolitical path for itself181. 
 I conclude by noting that due to Ukraine’s volatility and constantly shifting 
political dynamics, several respondents suggested that no one could truly know what the 
future holds. One think tank analyst noted, “Protecting the future in Ukraine is probably 
the last profession I would take” (Interview with think tank analyst at East Europe 
Foundation, conducted in Kyiv, March 29, 2017). Similarly, a former activist said with a 
laugh, “This is Ukraine. The ‘near future’ here is like the next two weeks” (Interview with 
activist and assistant at the Ukrainian Embassy of Estonia, conducted in Kyiv, May 26, 
2017). Many Ukrainians do not operate with a very long time horizon in their personal 
lives or their expectations about the future, indicating that the country could still 
undergo several changes before its long-term geopolitical path has been charted. 
Conclusion & Implications 
 In this chapter, I have presented a detailed case study of Ukraine’s 2013-2014 
Euromaidan movement (or Revolution of Dignity), illustrating the many ways in which 
the qualitative and quantitative data that I gleaned from my interviews and surveys 
illustrate the theoretical mechanisms outlined earlier in this dissertation. As I state 
emphatically elsewhere, I am not claiming that protesters at Euromaidan were directly 
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instructed to protest by outside forces, or that such activists were compensated in any 
way for their participation by nefarious Western states and organizations such as the 
Central Intelligence Agency. Such narratives are dangerous and harmful, and merely 
serve the purpose of feeding into a framework of false information that has been 
promoted by the Russian government to discredit the movement’s legitimacy. 
 It is also important to briefly consider any biases (conscious or unconscious) that 
my respondents might have held in offering their views of what transpired during the 
revolution. As noted throughout this chapter, I spoke primarily with Ukrainian elites to 
gather the findings that I have presented here – people who are either experts in 
Ukrainian politics, elected officials and journalists for major media corporations, and 
high-level activists involved in the movement from the beginning. The years since 
Euromaidan have seen the protests assume a rather revered role in Ukrainian society, 
due to the fact that so many people lost their lives in pursuit of a better world. As a 
result, it is possible that a small number of people might be implicitly framing the 
movement in a certain manner in order to support this framework. 
 Despite this possibility, however, I do claim firmly here that the vast majority of 
my interviewees’ responses were genuine and accurate and that many of the protesters’ 
decision-making strategies and calculations about costs and benefits were affected by 
considerations regarding the actions of external actors. On the side of democracy 
promotion, I have illustrated four key causal mechanisms in this chapter. First, many 
activists recounted to me the ways in which they felt a sense of purposive solidarity with 
the rest of the world – this took the form of both emotional support from members of 
the diaspora who held their own Euromaidan movements abroad and symbolic support 




training and tactical support from countries including the United States and Poland that 
alleviated some of the dangers involved in protesting, making it more likely that the 
movement could sustain itself. Third, many protesters knew that because the world was 
watching the events that were taking place, this limited the amount of violent repression 
that the Yanukovych regime was initially willing to use because of the threat of 
international checking and sanctioning. Fourth, many people that I interviewed 
described how the Ukrainian diaspora provided funds to sustain the movement and 
lobbied officials in their own countries to support Euromaidan. These factors were not 
solely influential in shaping protesters’ decision to take to the streets, of course; the 
main motivating factors were frustration with issues like corruption and police brutality. 
Still, I conclude that they played an important part in turning people out, making 
protest behavior more likely and easier to sustain. 
 What effects did perceptions of autocratic intervention from the Russian 
government have on protesters’ beliefs, according to my interviews? Based on the data 
that I collected, I have found evidence of four mechanisms through which beliefs about 
Russian intervention made citizens more likely to protest. First, many participants were 
driven by the notion that Yanukovych’s decision to turn away from the European 
Union’s Association Agreement was simply another sign of unwanted Russian 
interference following a long series of intrusive acts. Activists were increasingly 
frustrated with this intervention, and intentionally pushed back against it. Second, 
protesters resented the fact that Russian media depicted them as fascists and violent 
aggressors towards Russian-speaking individuals. Third, the perceptions of protesters 
that the Putin regime was providing Yanukovych with military-style weapons and 




dynamics combined to culminate in a negative learning effect through which 
interviewees’ awareness of Russian politics and the government’s efforts to transform 
Ukraine into a Russian-style dictatorship made them challenge the Yanukovych regime 
out of desperation to avoid such a fate. Individuals were intent on preserving Ukraine’s 
democratic characteristics distinct from Russia, where dissent is silenced and repressed, 
and their activism at the Maidan was indicative of this fundamental goal.  
 While the preceding chapter has focused on the dynamics of a singular social 
movement that took place in one country, the findings that I present here carry a 
significant amount of relevance and weight for a number of reasons. There is ample 
evidence that mechanisms involving both democratic promotion and autocratic 
intervention were at play in Ukraine during the Euromaidan movement, providing an 
excellent testing ground for assessing the ways in which my theoretical claims operated 
in practice. Ukraine is a large and geopolitically important country sitting on the cusp 
between democratic and autocratic governance, and my findings can be extended to 
social movements taking place in other authoritarian and hybrid regimes. 
 Moreover, studying the Euromaidan movement matters precisely because so 
much was at stake for so many people. Many of the individuals who were open and 
gracious enough to speak with me recounted memories of physical abuse and potential 
death at the hands of security forces; witnessing people being killed directly in front of 
them; the threat of arrest or loss of employment as reprisal for their participation; and 
the fear that their country was sinking into an authoritarian abyss from which it would 
never return. Protesters in Ukraine were fighting for liberal and humane values that 
citizens in full democracies often (and woefully) take for granted, and were in many 




have a normative duty to monitor and learn about these movements as they take place 
around the world, and to offer meaningful expressions of support when possible. 
 People protest in authoritarian and hybrid regimes today for many different 
reasons, and international considerations do not always play a role in shaping whether 
people decide to join a particular movement. According to the findings that I have 
presented here, however, considerations of external democratic support or autocratic 
intervention can indeed shape how people act in certain situations and contexts. This 
has important implications in many areas – from an academic perspective, this suggests 
that scholars focusing on social movements and contentious politics would be wise to 
avoid studying such processes in a purely domestic lens absent of any international 
context. From a policy perspective, this suggests that statements of support and political 
assistance to democratically-minded protesters in hybrid states can have real and 
important effects on their decision to continue fighting for democracy, reforms, and 
human rights. Supporting activists in their quest to improve the quality of life in their 
countries such as those in Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity is a pressing task, and should 






CHAPTER 4: UTILIZING A SURVEY EXPERIMENT IN UKRAINE TO 
UNDERSTAND THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS ON PROTEST 
BEHAVIOR 
 
 The in-depth case study of Ukraine’s 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity presented 
in the preceding chapter provided a qualitative illustration of the inner workings and 
mechanisms at play in a protest movement that has already taken place. While my 
analysis explored the factors that motivated protesters at that particular time, it is also 
important to extend my framework to other temporal periods as well. In this chapter, I 
therefore utilize an original survey experiment involving nearly two hundred Ukrainian 
undergraduates that I conducted in the field across two sessions in 2017 to understand 
what makes people likely to join protest movements in the future. Anti-governmental 
campaigns are constantly emerging around the world with little to no warning, and it is 
imperative to understand what might make potential participants likely to join when 
such movements do arise.  
 I present the findings of my survey experiment in the following way. I begin by 
discussing my experiment’s research design, describing the ways in which survey 
experiments can be valuable for understanding political behavior and presenting the 
experimental manipulations and questionnaire that comprised the survey’s core. 
Following this, I introduce the human subjects who completed the survey, providing 
information on the individuals themselves and the methods through which I recruited 
them. I then present a series of hypotheses about protest behavior before finally 
introducing and describing the key results and findings of my survey experiment. 
Because I am interested in testing many different trends in my data through a variety of 
methods, I first present the findings of t-tests comparing means between my treatment 




models employing Ordinary Least Squares regression and logit regression to understand 
the individual-level beliefs that are most highly associated with protest behavior. 
Finally, I conclude this chapter by reviewing my main findings and interpreting their 
value for future work in this area. 
Research Design – what does the survey experiment entail?  
As noted in Gaines, Kuklinski, and Quirk (2007), experiments (and survey 
experiments in particular) have much to add to studies of political behavior provided 
that careful guidelines are followed, including the need to include control groups as a 
reference category, ensuring that multiple treatments are not affecting one another and 
biasing the experiment’s dependent variable of interest, and guaranteeing that 
assignment into treatment and control categories is fully randomized. While survey 
experiments have been relatively popular in American political behavior for years, they 
have recently become increasingly common in analyses of comparative political 
behavior as well. Examples include Winters and Weitz-Shapiro’s (2013) analysis of voter 
perceptions and assessments of corruption in Brazil; Frye’s (2015) study of voter 
perceptions of candidates’ ethnic identity in Ukraine; Meng, Pen, and Yang’s (2014) 
study of authoritarians’ response to citizen participation in China; Samuels and Zucco, 
Jr.’s (2013) project analyzing the effects of in-group and out-group partisan cues on 
individuals in Brazil; Naoe and Kumi’s (2011) study of citizen preferences about 
agricultural policy in Japan; Johnston’s (1992) analysis of Canadian voters’ expressed 
rates of party identification; Horiuchi, Imai, and Taniguchi’s (2007) analysis of voter 
knowledge about political parties in a Japanese election; Anduiza, Gallego, and Munoz’s 
(2013) study of voter attitudes towards corruption in Spain; Tilley and Hobolt’s (2011) 




project on partisanship and party brands in Argentina. These examples show that when 
conducted carefully, experiments (particular survey experiments) can successfully travel 
from a controlled laboratory setting to the field. 
 In designing my survey experiment, I aimed to understand the factors that make 
potential protest participants more (or less) likely to join anti-governmental movements 
that might emerge. Because of this, it was imperative to ask subjects not only about 
protest behavior they may have exhibited in the past, but also to express the likelihood 
that they might join a movement in the future. I began by recruiting a number of 
undergraduate and Master’s students at three different Ukrainian universities, a process 
that I describe in further detail later in this chapter. I focused on recruiting students 
specifically because as noted in preceding chapters, young people are often at the 
forefront of anti-governmental campaigns, particularly when the protests concern 
democratic governance and human rights. It therefore makes sense to survey students 
directly to measure their opinions, as they represent the exact type of citizen whose 
motivations I hope to understand. 
 The basic research design of my experiment consisted of a vignette, followed by a 
series of survey questions related to its content. I began by asking all experimental 
participants to read a short hypothetical vignette before then asking them to express 
their views on a series of topics concerning protests and political behavior. I randomly 
divided participants into three groups – two treatment groups and one control group. 
Students in all three groups read a short text asking them to imagine life in a repressive 
state, and were told that although the government described in the vignette had been 
making strides towards political liberalization and democracy, these nascent 




reformist policies, these hypothetical leaders decided instead to change course, 
abandoning their democratization agenda and entrenching their hold on power. This 
was done to simulate many situations in the real world, where progress towards 
democratization follows a halting path filled with many obstacles. In all three groups, 
subjects learned that a small student-led anti-governmental campaign had recently 
emerged, and participants were asked to indicate the likelihood that they would 1) sign a 
petition against the government, 2) contact an elected official to express their views 
about the situation, and 3) actually join the nascent protest movement itself.  
Protest behavior is an extremely multifaceted concept that can assume a variety 
of forms depending on the situation at hand, and I therefore chose to test respondents’ 
attitudes about three increasingly active types of protest participation. Signing a petition 
is a fairly conventional form of protest, as it does not require a large amount of agency 
on behalf of the individual. However, actually committing to joining a movement 
requires a different and more intensive set of decision-making strategies, and I aim to 
study these differing types of calculations by including both in my research design1. 
Once they indicated their willingness to participate in these forms of protest, subjects 
were asked to express their views about politics and current events, and to answer a 
series of control questions measuring age, gender, and other demographic traits. I 
designed the experiment so that students would read the vignettes first, before they 
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were exposed to any following questions, in order to reduce the chance that their 
responses would be primed by concepts I tested elsewhere in my questionnaire.  
 It is important to note that because my subjects generally ranged in age from 18 
to 22 in 2017, all participants would have been at least 14 years old when the 
Euromaidan movement began in November 2013. Even if they themselves did not 
participate in (or even approve of) the protests, they would certainly have been aware of 
the extreme and brutal acts of repression carried out by governmental forces as the 
campaign escalated in late 2013 and early 2014. The Maidan where the protests were 
centered still bears countless markers of the regime’s violence today, and the movement 
is very much a part of the country’s cultural and political fabric2. As a result, it is actually 
feasible for these students to accurately imagine a situation involving repressive forces 
and semi-autocratic leaders, because they lived under such a regime in the recent past. 
This lends the experiment external validity, and produces more confidence in the results 
than would have been attainable had I run the experiment solely with students in 
consolidated democracies where protest is a comparatively safe form of expression. 
Two Treatment Groups and One Control Group – Experimental 
Manipulation 
As noted above, participants across all three groups learned from their vignettes 
that an anti-governmental movement was beginning to grow. The experimental 
manipulation in my design concerned information that some groups received but others 
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 In addition to bullet holes left behind as reminders of the regime’s violence, the Maidan and the 
surrounding area in central Kyiv have become memorialized to consciously remind people of what took 
place there. Spots on the ground depict outlines of bodies where protesters fell when they were shot by the 
regime in February 2014, and the main monument in the center of Maidan Nezalezhnosti (“Independence 
Square”) is regularly surrounded by posters with the faces and names of those who were killed. 
Furthermore, a segment of Instytutska Street (a road running uphill from the Maidan to the 
Parliamentary building) has been renamed “Heavenly Hundred Heroes Avenue” to commemorate the 
dead. Finally, the entire stretch of road bears photographs, artistic depictions, and the names of those who 
were killed, along with places where citizens can light candles or leave bundles of flowers to 




did not. The first treatment group, labeled the “Liberal International Actor” group, also 
learned that Western states and international organizations were actively monitoring 
and supporting the protests. This was designed to mimic real-world situations in which 
Western democracies, non-governmental organizations, and diaspora communities 
provide on-the-ground assistance or other forms of support to a democratic movement 
in order to increase its chance at success. The second treatment group, labeled the 
“Authoritarian International Actor” group, received no information about support from 
democracies abroad. Instead, participants in this second group were told that autocratic 
leaders in other states were intervening to suppress the movement, sending forces to 
bolster the chance that the embattled dictator would remain in power. Finally, those in 
the control group did not receive any information about international actors 
whatsoever. Instead, they merely read the vignette’s description of domestic, localized 
circumstances before being asked about their willingness to protest.  
 In the following section, I present the actual text of the three vignettes themselves 
so that the dependent variables of this experiment – participants’ willingness to 
participate in different forms of protest against leaders – are clear. I explicitly aimed to 
minimize the differences between vignettes given to the three separate groups in order 
to keep the treatment as simple and streamlined as possible. Changing too many 
different parts of the experimental vignettes would introduce too many potentially 
influential variables and interactions, and would likely have required a larger sample of 
participants than was possible for me to obtain. I therefore consciously choose to vary 
only one sentence out of the entire paragraph between groups, and I have bolded it in 




between the two treatment groups to be as parsimonious as I could3. I begin by 
presenting the vignette given to the “Liberal International Actor” group. 
1.  Imagine that you live in an authoritarian country in which elections are 
neither free nor fair. Freedom of speech and expression are limited by harsh laws 
and restrictions, the economy has been suffering, and corruption is pervasive. 
While your leaders began to liberalize recently, this progress abruptly ended a 
month ago when security forces aggressively clamped down on pro-democracy 
rallies. Increasing numbers of students have started to demonstrate against the 
government. These protests have been praised by democratic Western 
states, which are providing funding and manpower to help sustain the 
movement.  
 
 Participants in the “Authoritarian International Actor” learned about autocratic, 
rather than democratic intervention, and they therefore read the following vignette 
instead. Here, “praised” is replaced with “criticized,” “democratic Western” is replaced 
with “other authoritarian,” and “sustain” is replaced with “contain”: 
1.  Imagine that you live in an authoritarian country in which elections are 
neither free nor fair. Freedom of speech and expression are limited by harsh laws 
and restrictions, the economy has been suffering, and corruption is pervasive. 
While your leaders began to liberalize recently, this progress abruptly ended a 
month ago when security forces aggressively clamped down on pro-democracy 
rallies. Increasing numbers of students have started to demonstrate against the 
government. These protests have been criticized by other authoritarian 
states, which are providing funding and manpower to help contain the 
movement. 
 Finally, as noted above, participants in the control group received no information 
about outside intervention at all, and read the following vignette: 
1.  Imagine that you live in an authoritarian country in which elections are 
neither free nor fair. Freedom of speech and expression are limited by harsh laws 
and restrictions, the economy has been suffering, and corruption is pervasive. 
While your leaders began to liberalize recently, this progress abruptly ended a 
month ago when security forces aggressively clamped down on pro-democracy 
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 In adopting this strategy, I am closely following what Findor (2017) refers to as the ceteris paribus rule, 
or the need to make vignettes in experiments as parsimonious as possible to avoid confounding treatment 
effects from other modifications or independent variables. According to Findor, keeping vignettes as equal 
as possible (with the exception of the central treatment) minimizes the chance that some unanticipated 
interaction between other manipulations might be taking place, obscuring the true effects of the 
experimental design. By minimizing differences between my treatment and control vignettes, I can be 




rallies. Increasing numbers of students have started to demonstrate against the 
government. 
 
Three dependent variables – willingness to protest in different ways 
 As noted above, I am interested in understanding the motivations and decision-
making strategies that drive people to participate in various forms of protest behavior. 
Because of this, I measure respondents’ willingness to participate in three increasingly 
intense and contentious activities – 1) signing a petition to express their views, 2) 
contacting an elected official about the situation, and 3) actually joining a protest 
movement. I am also studying the intensity and extent to which participants would 
commit to these activities, and so for each of my three dependent variables, I provided 
respondents with a sliding scale to show how strongly (or weakly) they would dedicate 
themselves to each behavior. This adds more depth and complexity to their response, 
and provides more nuanced data than would have been available if the dependent 
variables were instead strictly binary in nature.  
 The three questions below portray the exact text that survey participants saw as 
they finished reading the vignettes above. There was no variation in these questions 
across treatments – members of all three groups read the same wording.  
Dependent variable #1: Willingness to sign a petition 
 Given the dangers that might be involved in the situation above, how likely is it 
that you would sign a petition against the government’s actions? 
a.  10 – Very likely  
b.  9 
c.  8 
d.  7 
e.  6 
f.  5 
g.  4 
h.  3 
i.  2 





As noted above, the intensity of the different forms of protest grew in subsequent 
questions to reflect the increasingly contentious means of challenging the regime. 
Dependent variable #2: Willingness to contact an elected official 
Given the dangers that might be involved in the situation above, how likely is it 
that you would contact an elected official to express your views on the issue? 
a. 10 – Very likely  
b.  9 
c.  8 
d.  7 
e.  6 
f.  5 
g.  4 
h.  3 
i.  2 
j.  1 – Not at all likely 
 
Dependent variable #3: Willingness to join a protest movement 
Given the dangers that might be involved in the situation above, how likely is it 
that you would join the protesters’ lawful demonstrations in their calls for democracy? 
a.  10 – Very likely  
b.  9 
c.  8 
d.  7 
e.  6 
f.  5 
g.  4 
h.  3 
i.  2 
j.  1 – Not at all likely 
I also provided a blank space after each question to give participants the 
opportunity to explain their response, if they wished to do so. Additionally, I asked 
participants to share their thoughts on the likelihood that external forces could affect 
domestic politics to see whether students’ views on this topic were correlated with their 
willingness to protest. As noted in later sections, I include this response as a control in 
my models to quantitatively determine whether this perception shapes protest behavior.  
Comparing the mean response rates of willingness to protest across the treatment 




respondents in either treatment group are significantly more (or less) likely to protest 
than those in the control, this would indicate that the one single sentence referring to 
international factors in the vignettes matters substantially, and that external variables 
have a direct effect on students’  decisions to protest should the opportunity arise. 
(Again, because everything else is held wholly constant across vignettes, any significant 
differences between groups can be attributed to the experimental sentence alone.) 
Conversely, if there is no difference between responses from the treatment groups and 
those from the control, this would indicate that the presence of international support 
did not play much of a role in respondents’ calculations. 
 Because I also ask respondents to answer a series of questions about prior 
protests, views about Ukraine’s geopolitical future, Western support for pro-democracy 
protests, and other topics, I run linear models in subsequent sections to determine 
whether these treatment effects still hold once other attributes are addressed. If the 
treatment still has an effect and does not dissipate once individual-level beliefs are 
accounted for, this would provide solid evidence that international factors matter. I 
explore these models and their implications later in this chapter4. 
 It is also important to state that I carried out my survey experiment in two waves. 
For the first wave, conducted between March and May 2017, I gave participants survey 
questions written in the English language. As I explain in my section on participant 
recruitment below, this was not a problem because the institutions where I distributed 
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 I note here that in designing and implementing this project, I complied fully with all human subject 
requirements given by the University of Illinois Institutional Review Board. I recognize that asking 
Ukrainian students about their willingness to engage in anti-governmental protests mere years after their 
country actually was racked by an extremely contentious movement could, if handled improperly, spur 
painful memories in students who might have participated or been directly affected. I therefore secured 
complete Institutional Review Board approval of all my questions well in advance of carrying out the 
experiment, and I made it clear to all participants that completing the survey was voluntary and 




my survey heavily promoted English language knowledge and instruction, and students 
were entirely capable of processing the survey’s questions without the aid of a translator. 
During my second wave of fieldwork, conducted between October and December 2017, I 
recruited a native Ukrainian speaker in Kyiv to translate my questions into Ukrainian 
and sent a certified translation to the Institutional Review Board at the University of 
Illinois to ensure full transparency before then distributing the Ukrainian-language 
survey to students instead. 
Recruiting subjects – who participated in the survey experiment? 
 I am principally interested in understanding the beliefs, perceptions, and 
attitudes of individuals who are likely to join a nascent protest movement at its 
beginning. These citizens are not necessarily those who start the protest, but they are 
individuals whose support at an early stage is an essential signal for recruiting others 
and helping the campaign grow to a point at which it can attain critical mass for success. 
As noted throughout many examples in preceding sections of this dissertation, 
university students and other young people are often at the forefront of a variety of 
emergent rallies and movements around the world. 
 This was particularly true in the case of Ukraine’s Euromaidan revolution. 
According to a number of different interviews that I conducted in the field, many of the 
first individuals at the Maidan were Western-oriented university students who were 
protesting the Yanukovych regime’s decision to abandon an agreement with the 
European Union in favor of renewed ties with the Russian government. Wilson (2014) 
and Diuk (2014) both show how in addition to several Western-oriented journalists and 
members of the country’s intelligentsia, these students were determined to pursue a 




makes clear in her comprehensive study of Ukraine’s historical and political 
development, it was not until security forces brutally beat students on the ground that 
ordinary Ukrainians began to protest and the broader revolution began. Students and 
young activists would certainly be at the forefront of a similar protest in the future, and 
it is for these reasons that Ukrainian university students are an excellent population 
from which to draw a sample for my analysis.  
To be sure, this method of recruitment does produce a type of convenience 
sample in that I am running an experiment on a group largely consisting of one type of 
person. Students are certainly younger than the average Ukrainian, and are likely better-
educated and more tuned into political developments, meaning that they differ from 
their fellow countrymen on several dimensions. However, my goal is to make inferences 
about this exact population of individuals – university students and other young people 
in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian countries who are willing to challenge leaders 
on the streets. I am not claiming to make inferences about very different types of groups 
in Ukrainian society – elderly retirees, middle-aged laborers, or high-ranking 
government officials, for example. Instead, I recruited precisely the type of individual 
whose behavior I am most interested in understanding, procuring a population that is 
wholly appropriate for testing my theoretical claims. 
Of course, it is also true that even within the population of Ukrainian university 
students, some will be much more inclined to join a protest than others. Attitudes about 
protests and Ukrainian politics vary quite widely across the country, with respondents in 
the Western and Central parts of Ukraine holding views that are often diametrically 
opposed to those in the East. Furthermore, according to a number of interviews that I 




encouraged students to participate in the Euromaidan movement, cancelling lectures 
and permitting professors to lead groups of students to the Maidan to join the 
campaign. In stark contrast, other universities (often those with political or economic 
ties to the state) adopted a harsher stance; at those institutions, professors and other 
instructors were ordered to monitor student attendance during Euromaidan and to 
punish those who were clearly skipping class to protest. 
 It stands to reason that students who are prone to protest, particularly in a post-
Euromaidan era in Ukraine, might be more likely to self-select into attending certain 
institutions based on their political or ideological reputations. Ukrainian society is also 
often characterized to some extent by a division between those seeking closer ties with 
“the West” and those seeking to maintain a historically entwined relationship with 
Russia. Before beginning my fieldwork, I therefore asked several contacts in 
Washington, D.C. including former American Ambassadors to Ukraine and numerous 
policy experts about the universities that would be more Western-oriented and that 
would be amenable to working with a graduate student from the United States.  
 Taking all of this into consideration, I ultimately recruited participants from 
three universities. During my six months of fieldwork in Ukraine, I was able to secure an 
affiliation as an International Research Student with the National University of Kyiv – 
Mohyla Academy (NaUKMA). Originally founded in 1615 and based in Kyiv, NaUKMA 
re-opened in the early 1990s following years of closure during the Soviet era, and it has 
rapidly re-established itself as one of the preeminent and most influential institutions of 
higher learning in Ukraine. Notably, the university also has a strong reputation for 
academic honesty and transparency in a country where corruption still pervades many 




as politically liberal, transparent, and oriented towards the West5. Many scholars have 
noted the strong role that it played in fostering both the Euromaidan movement and 
Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, a stance that the university has clearly endorsed as 
well6. As evidence of this, Reid (2015) reports that during the early stages of 
Euromaidan, many lecturers from NaUKMA (referred to in her text as “the most 
progressive of Kyiv’s universities” (262)) opened an “Open University” in the city’s 
Trades Union Building to provide media training and to hold seminars on constitutional 
and economic reforms. Additionally, a 2010 article from the Kyiv Post (Ukraine’s 
leading English-language newspaper) refers to NaUKMA as a “pro-Ukrainian 
revolutionary hub of knowledge” that served as a headquarters for many Orange 
Revolution activists7. Once I began working at NaUKMA, I established professional 
connections with several professors who allowed me to visit their seminars, introduce 
myself, and recruit survey participants for my project.   
 In addition to NaUKMA, I was also able to survey several groups of students at 
Taras Shevchenko National University, located in Kyiv. Taras Shevchenko National 
University is one of the largest universities in Ukraine at approximately 30,000 
students, and is also well-regarded for the quality of its education. Finally, I recognized 
the need to survey students elsewhere in Ukraine as well, in order to give voice to the 
valuable perspective of individuals outside of Kyiv. (This is particularly true given that 
Ukraine is quite large, and is in fact the largest country located entirely in Europe by 
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 During my fieldwork, I observed that NaUKMA maintains an “American library” on its main campus. 
The library contains only English-language books, and often promotes English-language lessons, 
discussions, and cultural opportunities. 
6 Kvit, Sergey,  rector of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. “Kyiv Mohyla Academy Leads 
Students in Support of EU Association and Democratic Rights.”, Kyiv Mohyla Foundation of America. 
Published December 11, 2013.Available online at http://kmfoundation.org/2013/6858.  





geographical area.) As a result, I traveled to the Western Ukrainian city of Lviv several 
times to survey students at the Ukrainian Catholic University, another institution of 
higher learning with a strong reputation for transparency and pro-Western values8. 
Working with students there was highly valuable for me because as Shore (2017) makes 
clear, Western Ukraine is a region that has historically had a strong political and 
cultural affinity for Europe rather than Russia. Because of this, many Euromaidan 
participants regularly traveled back and forth to Kyiv from Western Ukraine, giving up 
their jobs in order to devote themselves to the movement. Between these three 
institutions, I recruited 62 students for each group, for an overall sample size of 186 
individuals. All participants were randomized into the group to which they were 
assigned – it is important in experimental research to ensure that samples are randomly 
drawn to avoid bias, and I was sure to follow that procedure carefully in my own work9.  
Primary theoretical hypotheses –what do I expect to find? 
 Gathering 186 student responses to my survey experiment provided me with a 
large amount of original data on which I can conduct statistical analysis, searching for 
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 A 2014 article in the New Yorker magazine, “The Radical Skepticism of Ukraine’s Students” by Peter 
Pomerantsev, specifically pointed to Ukrainian Catholic University as a “bastion of liberalism” and notes 
that everyone interviewed by the author supported the Euromaidan movement. It is accessible online at 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-radical-skepticism-of-ukraines-students.  
9
 I must briefly address the fact that all three of the Ukrainian universities from which I recruited 
participants from my survey experiment were largely pro-Western in nature, and were located in the 
Central and Western parts of Ukraine. As noted above, this was in large part an intentional decision, as 
those universities are the exact types of institutions at which I expect to find students who would be more 
prone to joining large-scale movements championing human rights and democracy. From a geographical 
perspective, this conclusion is also supported by studies including Onuch’s (2014) on-the-ground survey 
of participants during Euromaidan itself. After surveying more than 1,000 protesters, Onuch and her 
team conclude that roughly eighty percent of the respondents were from the Central or Western regions of 
Ukraine, with only one in five coming from the East or the South. I therefore would not expect students at 
universities in the traditionally Russia-friendly East or South to respond to my vignette in the same way 
because those are not the types of students about whom I am claiming to make inferences. Furthermore, 
there were simply too many logistical boundaries that prevented me as an independent researcher with a 
graduate student’s budget from adding more institutions to my list of sites to visit. Nevertheless, testing 
the opinions of students at less Western-friendly institutions is an interesting notion, as determining the 
ways in which their attitudes might (or might not) vary from the students that I surveyed in this 




trends and making meaningful comparisons across models. I now present a series of 
hypotheses concerning the results of my experiment, linking each to the theoretical 
framework outlined earlier. I begin by discussing three primary hypotheses explicitly 
related to the treatment effects of my experimental design, before then turning to a set 
of supplementary hypotheses that test correlations between individual-level attitudes 
and willingness to protest. 
 First, I expect research subjects who were assigned into the “Liberal International 
Actor” group to express significantly higher rates of protest willingness than those in the 
control group. Echoing the claims made in my theoretical chapter, I hypothesize that 
individuals who believe that democratic states and organizations elsewhere are 
supporting them in their mission should be more likely to protest than those who are 
unaware of such factors. Awareness of external support can strengthen participants’ 
moral and psychological resolve, assuring them that their campaign has not been 
forgotten and bolstering their belief that the movement can succeed. This produces my 
first hypothesis, H6-1: 
H6-1: Subjects in the “Liberal International Actor” treatment group will be 
 significantly more likely to protest than will subjects in the control group. 
 Second, I also believe that it is likely that individuals in the “Authoritarian 
International Actor” treatment group should be more likely to protest than those in the 
control group. I predict the presence of autocratic intervention to spur a backlash in 
which protest becomes more likely, prompting people to take to the streets against a 
weak and unpopular ruler. This leads to hypothesis H6-2: 
H6-2: Subjects in the “Authoritarian International Actor” treatment group will 




 In terms of comparing my two treatment groups, I believe that interest in 
protesting will be larger among individuals in the “Liberal International Actor” group 
than among individuals in the “Authoritarian International Actor” group. While I still 
predict that individuals in both groups will be more likely to protest than those in the 
control overall, it seems plausible that the positive effects of democratic support will be 
more uniformly powerful than the potentially intimidating effects of authoritarian 
intervention across respondents.  
H6-3: Subjects in the “Liberal International Actor” treatment group will be 
 significantly more likely to protest than will subjects in the “Authoritarian 
 International Actor” treatment group. 
Supplementary hypotheses to test the effects of individual-level attitudes 
through linear models – what do I expect to find?  
 I now introduce a series of supplementary hypotheses related to six linear models 
that analyze my data to determine the beliefs and attitudes that are most predictive of 
protest behavior. I begin by discussing the survey questions that I included in my 
questionnaire in order to capture different aspects of political beliefs, before then 
presenting hypotheses about attitudinal correlations that I expect to find. The primary 
theoretical foundations and analysis of this empirical chapter concern hypotheses H6-1, 
H6-2, and H6-3 above, as they directly test the claims that I have made elsewhere in this 
dissertation. The hypotheses described and tested in this following section are instead 
supplements to the more central questions tested above. 
 Because I designed and distributed my own original survey to Ukrainian 
university students in the field, I was somewhat constrained in the number of questions 




much larger-scale undertakings such as the World Values Survey, the Eurobarometer, 
and so on. Those mass-scale surveys often contain more than one hundred questions to 
ascertain respondents’ thoughts on a wide-ranging battery of topics, and involve 
dispersing numerous teams of researchers throughout an entire country to distribute 
their questionnaires. Despite this structural limitation, however, I was still able to 
obtain respondents’ thoughts on a wide variety of topics that can help explain their 
thoughts on protest behavior today.  
 First, I believe that individuals who have been politically aware and active in the 
past should be concurrently more likely to protest in the future. Several studies, 
including the works of Kricheli, Livne, and Magaloni (2011) and O’Brien and Li (2005) 
suggest that activists with prior participation in successful social movements are 
subsequently more likely to join similar movements in the future. For these authors, this 
demonstrates a benevolent learning effect in which positive participation engendered 
feelings of efficacy and political power, encouraging repeated participation in later 
movements. If university students have already joined some type of anti-governmental 
movement in recent years, this points to a high level of political engagement, and an 
expectation that these individuals would be more politically active in the present as well. 
I capture this dimension in my survey through four questions measuring political 
awareness and prior political behavior. Question 2 asks respondents to indicate their 
interest in politics (on a five-point scale ranging from “very interested” to “not at all 
interested”), producing a wholly subjective measure about political interest that relies 
solely on respondents’ opinions about themselves.  
Additionally, I included three questions in my survey that objectively ask about 




have ever (or would ever) sign a political petition, while question 4 asks participants if 
they have ever (or would ever) join a lawful protest movement. (I chose to emphasize the 
term “lawful” in my question to keep participants from potentially incriminating 
themselves by admitting to non-lawful behavior.) Finally, question 5 asks whether 
participants have ever (or would ever) contact an elected official to express their views10. 
Because it is possible that many of these behaviors might be correlated within 
individuals (for example, those who have protested are perhaps also more likely to have 
signed a petition), it will be important to check for multicollinearity to ensure that my 
models’ results are unbiased. These expectations produce my next hypotheses below: 
H6-4: Subjects who are highly interested in politics will be more likely to protest 
 than those who are not interested in politics. 
H6-5: Subjects who have signed a petition in the past will be more likely to 
 protest than those who have not signed a petition. 
 H6-6: Subjects who have joined a protest movement in the past will be more 
 likely to join a protest movement than those who have not protested in the past. 
 I also include questions measuring attitudes about international variables in my 
models, as I believe that an individual’s thoughts about their state’s geopolitical 
orientation shape their behavior as well. To this end, I asked respondents questions 
about Ukraine’s future as a democracy and about the potential role played by Western 
forces in supporting the country’s democratic development. Question 14 asks subjects 
whether they believe Ukraine will eventually move towards the (democratic) global 
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 While I did include this question in my survey and I initially intended to use it as an independent 
variable in my models, I ultimately was forced to drop it from my analysis. This is because a surprisingly 
large number of participants indicated “don’t know” in their responses to this particular question, forcing 
me to drop all of these observations from my analysis as missing data. This could be because Ukrainian 
students are unaware of what “contacting an elected official” might involve. In any case, I chose to retain 




West, whether it will move closer towards Russia, or whether it will remain situated in 
the middle between the two. In the same line of reasoning, question 15 asks subjects 
how important it is in their opinion that Western states and organizations support pro-
democratic protests in Ukraine. For both questions, I expect that those who place a 
greater emphasis on integration with and support from the West will be more likely to 
protest: 
H6-7: Subjects who predict that Ukraine will integrate with the West and who 
 believe that Western support for democracy matters will be more likely to 
 protest than those who are unsure that Western integration will take place. 
 Finally, I include three domestic politics questions and one question related to 
personality. First, question 11 asks respondents to report their ideological orientation on 
a scale ranging from 10 (very liberal) to 1 (very conservative). I expect that respondents 
who are more liberal will be more prone to challenge autocratic rule in pursuit of 
democracy and human rights. Second, question 16 asks respondents how satisfied they 
are with the way that democracy is working in their country (ranging from “very 
satisfied” to “not at all satisfied”). I predict that those who are highly dissatisfied with 
their government’s performance will be more likely to protest than those who are not, as 
individuals who are content with the status quo would see less reason to challenge 
leaders. Finally, question 7 measures respondents’ levels of trust in others. While not 
expressly political, trust has been shown by several studies including Benson and 
Rochon (2004) to be an important predictor of protest behavior, and I therefore include 
this variable here to test its influence. Theoretically, those who are willing to risk their 
well-being to join a collective movement should be more trusting than those who are 




H6-8: Subjects who are more politically liberal will be more likely to protest 
 than those who are more politically conservative.   
H6-9: Subjects who are dissatisfied with their government’s democratic 
 performance will be more likely to protest than those who are satisfied. 
H6-10: Subjects who express higher levels of trust in other individuals will be 
 more likely to protest than those who are less trusting. 
Results  – Comparing means through t-tests 
 I begin the results section of this chapter by presenting and interpreting the core 
findings of my survey experiment – a test to determine whether there is a significant 
difference in willingness to protest between respondents in my two treatment groups 
and respondents in my control group. I begin by presenting simple descriptive statistics 
for all groups on my dependent variables of interest (signing a petition, contacting an 
elected official, and joining a protest movement) before conducting a series of paired t-
tests to show whether these differences are significant. 
 Table 4.1 below presents the mean willingness to participate in three forms of 
protest behavior, self-expressed on a scale ranging from 10 (very likely) to 1 (not at all 
likely) for participants in the “Liberal International Actor” treatment group, the 
“Authoritarian International Actor” treatment group, and the control group. 
Several interesting facts about the group averages are immediately apparent. 
First, before any sorts of significance tests are conducted, one can clearly see that 
participants in all three groups were notably less likely to contact an elected official than 
they were to sign a petition or participate in a protest. Across all three groups, the 
highest average willingness to contact an elected official was 5.53 out of 10, as compared 




TABLE 4.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH TREATMENT/CONTROL 
GROUP, BY DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Question: On a scale from 1 (not at all likely) to 10 (very likely), how likely is it that you 
would……? 


















7.97 5.53 7.92 62 
 Standard 
Deviation 
2.32 2.79 2.02  







7.68 5.23 6.95 62 
 Standard 
Deviation 
2.51 2.43 2.84  







7.67 5.21 6.32 62 
 Standard 
Deviation 
2.61 2.48 2.94  
scale that only ranges from 1 to 10, a difference of more than two points is quite unusual 
and indicates a widespread reluctance towards contacting elected officials among 
participants in my study. 
What might explain this? While it is impossible to prove through statistical 
analysis, it seems likely that respondents would be unenthusiastic about contacting 
officials for two reasons. First, in Ukraine, half of the parliamentarians in the Verkhovna 
Rada are elected on closed-list party lists through proportional representation. The 
other half are elected to represent constituents through first-past-the –post voting, but 
this second form of elections has only been in place since 2012, meaning that it is not yet 
fully institutionalized.  Because of this, Ukraine lacks the deep-seated and direct linkage 




American citizens commonly call Congressional offices and demand that they vote a 
certain way in order to stay in office, such situations are rare in Ukraine. Instead, 
parliamentarians in Ukraine are not directly accountable to voters, and citizens might 
not think to contact an individual legislator about an issue because of this reason. 
Secondly, and more cynically, it is possible that Ukrainians (particularly young people 
pursuing higher education) simply might not trust members of government to take any 
meaningful action on the public’s behalf.  
Public support for and trust in the Verkhovna Rada is largely quite dismal – as 
evidence of this, an October 2017 study by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives 
Foundation found that an overwhelming eighty-two percent of Ukrainians viewed the 
Verkhovna Rada as corrupt11. Furthermore, the 2011 World Values Survey reports that 
79.3% of Ukrainians expressed “not very much” confidence in their parliament or “none 
at all.12” Finally, a June 2016 report from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 
notes that only 4.1% of adults evaluate the Verkhovna Rada “positively,” as opposed to a 
striking 86.9% who view the institution “negatively” and another 9.1% who offered no 
opinion13. Overall, Ukrainian citizens’ orientations towards the Verkhovna Rada are 
markedly negative and pessimistic. If voters view officials as unreliable and 
unresponsive, this could explain why contacting an official is not seen as an effective 
form of behavior in Ukraine today.  
                                                          
11 Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation. “Корупція у повсякденному житті українців: За що 
даємо хабарі? Кому і чому?” Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation. Published October 31, 
2017. Available online at https://dif.org.ua/article/koruptsiya-u-povsyakdennomu-zhitti-ukraintsiv-za-
shcho-daemo-khabari-komu-i-chomu345654. 
12
 Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. 
Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.). 2014. World Values Survey: Round Six - Country-Pooled Datafile 
Version: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp. Madrid: JD Systems Institute. 
13 Kiev International Institute of Sociology.“PRESS RELEASES AND REPORTS: SOCIO-POLITICAL 
ATTITUDES OF THE RESIDENTS OF UKRAINE AND SUPPORT RATING FOR PARTIES AND 
POLITICAL LEADERS: MAY- JUNE, 2016.” Kiev International Institute of Sociology. Published June 9, 




I now present a 3 X 3 t-test comparison of means between my treatment and 
control groups on the three dependent variables identified above. I first present 
comparisons between the three groups on my first protest behavior in Tables 4.2, 4.3, 
and 4.4 below– signing a petition. It is immediately apparent that for this form of 
protest, there is no statistically significant difference between my three groups. Instead, 
comparing the mean responses from individuals in the “Liberal International Actor” 
treatment and respondents in the “Authoritarian International Actor” treatment 
produces a p-value of 0.505; comparing the means of respondents in the “Liberal 
International Actor” treatment and respondents in the control group produces a p-value 
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P = 0.972 
of 0.490; and comparing the means from participants in the “Authoritarian 
International Actor” treatment and those in the control group produces a p-value of 
0.972. As far as willingness to sign a petition, knowledge of international factors did not 
alter participants’ calculations – instead, the two treatments have very little effect when 
compared with the control vignette.  
How do the other forms of protest participation that I am studying fare when the 
group means are compared here? Below, Tables 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7, display the results of a 
t-test comparing group means on my second dependent variable of note – willingness to 
contact an elected official. Again, the results do not indicate any real statistical 
differences between groups. Comparing the mean rates of respondents in the “Liberal 
International Actor” treatment and respondents in the “Authoritarian International 
Actor” treatment produces a p-value of 0.516; comparing the mean answers of 
respondents in the “Liberal International Actor” treatment and respondents in the 
control group produces a p-value of 0.497; and comparing the mean responses from 
participants in the “Authoritarian International Actor” treatment and the control group 
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that the treatments affected respondents’ calculations and decision-making strategies. 
In interpreting these results, it is possible that there is no large difference 
between the groups simply because participants were not very eager to engage in this 
form of behavior at a basic level and that no international variable would ever matter 
that much. If individuals are never likely to contact elected officials in the first place, 
perhaps this fact would ameliorate any potentially influential effects of international 
intervention or support because the hypothetical ceiling has already been reached. It is 
also possible that respondents would view elected officials as relatively powerless actors 
in the rather dramatic scenario described in the vignette, and perhaps participants made 
the judgment that reaching out to a parliamentarian with concerns about governmental 
crackdowns in such a dangerous and repressive context would be a general waste of 
one’s time. 
To conclude my comparisons of means, I finally turn to the results of t-tests 
analyzing my third and most powerful form of protest behavior – joining a protest itself. 
Here, the results of my statistical analysis in Tables 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 are remarkably 
different from the conclusions reviewed above. Rather than producing null results, these 
tables show that knowledge of international support in fact has a very strong statistical 
effect on respondents’ decision to protest. This is evident when one compares the mean 
protest rate in the “Liberal International Actor” treatment with the mean protest rate in 
the control group – as illustrated in Table 4.9, the P-value for that comparison is 
0.0006. This is extremely significant (p<0.001), indicating that the means are much 
more different than they would be if no treatment effect existed. This finding can also be 
seen simply by looking at the data – the “Liberal International Actor” group’s mean was 
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ranges from 1 to 10. Though this experiment is a simulation asking participants to 
imagine a hypothetical scenario, it is evident that participants who learn that democratic 
forces elsewhere support them are much more likely to protest than those who are 
unaware of international aid. This provides conclusive support for one of the main 
theoretical expectations of this project. 
What can be learned from the two other comparisons here? While it is not quite 
as large as the observed difference in mean responses between the “Liberal 
International Actor” group and the control group, there is indeed still a very notable 
difference between the “Liberal International Actor” group and the “Authoritarian 
International Actor” group. Comparing the mean responses of these two groups 
provides a highly significant P-value of 0.031. This shows that providing people with 
positive information about support from abroad is more likely to drive them to the 
streets than giving them negative information about autocratic intervention that might 
instead dampen their enthusiasm and keep them from protesting.  
 Finally, comparing the “Authoritarian International Actor” treatment group and 
the control group finds no statistical difference between them, with a P-value of 0.228. 
Though interpreting these results is not entirely straightforward, it seems plausible that 
the two competing effects of autocratic intervention outlined in my theory could both 
conceivably be operating here in tandem, effectively cancelling each other out. Perhaps 
this intervention is spurring a backlash in some respondents, making them more likely 
to protest, while at the same time it simultaneously intimidates others, deterring them 
from taking to the streets. If both effects are taking place at once, this would mean that 




 It is interesting that the international treatments are clearly most effective for 
only specific type of behavior – the act of actually joining a protest, a process that 
requires much more time commitment and dedication than signing a petition or 
contacting an elected official. Why might this be? Why are international variables less 
influential in low-risk, low-cost situations but more influential in high-risk, high-cost 
situations? Perhaps this stems from the fact that choosing to participate in low-risk 
activities does not really involve that much of a commitment. It is certainly possible that 
one might face some recrimination for adding their name to a petition, of course, but 
actually taking to the streets carries much higher levels of personal danger and asks 
much more of an individual in terms of lost time, missing work, withheld wages, and so 
on. When an individual is willing to commit to an intensive and involved type of political 
participation, they have more to lose, and it seems that they are more likely to be 
influenced by external support than when their participation is much more fleeting or 
short-term.  
  The preceding section has shown that for signing a petition or contacting an 
official, my two treatments had no statistical effect on willingness to protest. However, 
there was a strong and statistically significant effect of the “Liberal International Actor” 
treatment on a person’s decision to join a movement – those in the liberal treatment 
group were much more likely to protest than those in the authoritarian treatment or the 
control. What other factors matter in explaining an individual’s decision to protest? The 
following section uses two linear models to answer this question. 
Linear models – checking for balance 
 Before presenting the results of my Ordinary Least Squares and logit regression 




variables. Scholars including Hansen and Bowers (2008) show that balance is essential 
in experiments to insure that the results are not biased, and that subjects in one group 
are not fundamentally different from those in another group. If participants in the 
“Liberal International Actor” treatment group are all older than participants in the 
control group, for example, this could mean that it is their ages (and not the treatment 
itself) that explains their divergent opinions. It is possible to check for balance by 
comparing mean characteristics across groups on certain variables – if this shows that 
subjects in all three groups are similar, this would point to balanced random 
assignment, increasing the certainty of the models’ statistical findings. 
 I test for balance on respondents’ age, gender, and ethnicity, as these could be 
relevant for shaping political behavior. I expect these groups to be balanced because all 
subjects were randomly assigned, meaning that there should be no bias. Furthermore, 
the sample consists almost entirely of Ukrainian undergraduates, meaning that age and 
ethnicity should be fairly homogenous. (I did survey one Master’s level graduate class, 
but those participants were distributed randomly and equally across groups.) Table 4.11 
below presents the average responses for age, gender, and ethnicity. Here, age was 
recorded numerically, and gender is represented by “1” for male and “2” for female. For 
ethnicity, respondents were able to choose “1” for Ukrainian, “2” for Russian, “3” for 
equally Ukrainian and Russian, and “4” for other.  
The results are clear – the three groups are balanced on all three traits. This is 
particularly true for age – the mean age of respondents does not differ by more than 
three months across groups. Gender is similarly balanced; each group skews a bit 
towards a female majority, but not to the point of biasing results. Finally, while there is a 




TABLE 4.11. COMPARING BALANCE ACROSS GROUPS 








19.51 1.53 1.35 
Control Group 
 
19.51 1.55 1.60 
overall. I am confident that the three groups do not differ dramatically from one another 
on any of these dimensions, and that I can be certain in interpreting my results.  
Linear model #1 – Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
 The following models test the effects of individual-level beliefs on willingness to 
protest in order to identify the variables most strongly correlated with protest behavior. 
In interpreting the model, a positive coefficient indicates that an attribute is positively 
associated with protest, while statistical significance demonstrates that that variable has 
truly meaningful power in explaining the dependent variable. Additionally, these models 
produce R-squared values that indicate the aggregate amount of variation in the 
dependent variable that is explained by the independent variables in the model. 
 I first provide a methodological note regarding my survey questions and ways to 
interpret their effects on protest. When students completed the questionnaire, the 
response options that they read trended from a more “positive” option to a more 
“negative” option. As an example of this, when asked to express their level of interest in 
politics, students were able to select from the following choices: “very interested,” 
“somewhat interested,” “neither interested nor uninterested” “not very interested,” or 
“not at all interested.” When quantifying these responses, I re-coded them such that 




interested” is coded as a “1.” Similarly, I coded responses to questions like “Have you 
ever signed a petition?” so that “yes” is coded as a “3,” “have not, but might” is coded as 
a “2,” and “would never do” is coded as a “1.” This makes it easier to interpret the results 
of my models – a positive coefficient indicates that the more likely someone is to express 
a particular type of belief or attitude, the more willing they are to protest as well.  
 I also check the independent variables in my model for multicollinearity. This is 
necessary because if two or more independent variables have a strong and statistically 
significant relationship with one another, this could bias the results of the model and 
obscure the true nature of their effect on the dependent variable. I conducted a series of 
tests to address this. First, I determined the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each 
variable in my model. Doing so produces a numerical value for each, with values of 4 or 
above regarded as problematic. This test did not produce any troubling results – all 
variables produced VIF scores of 2.42 or below. Following this, I conducted a series of 
paired Pearson correlation tests to produce correlation coefficients for different pairs of 
independent variables. In general, the vast majority of paired correlation coefficients 
were 0.25 or below. The main exception was a correlation between respondents’ interest 
in domestic news and their interest in international news – the correlation coefficient 
here was 0.658, demonstrating that individuals who partake in one activity are very 
likely to partake in the other as well. Because of this, I dropped individuals’ interest in 
international news from my models to ensure that the results were unbiased.  
I also included a series of controls in my models – first and foremost, I obviously 
must account for the treatments that each respondent did (or did not) receive, as I 
expect their knowledge about international actors to have a powerful effect on their 




both the “Liberal International Actor” treatment and the “Authoritarian International 
Actor” treatment. Additionally, I include dichotomous dummy controls for ethnicity 
(Ukrainians are coded as 1 and all other ethnicities are coded as 0) and gender. This is to 
determine whether these factors have an effect on my dependent variable, though they 
do not factor prominently into my theoretical framework. 
Finally, I have included a control to account for respondents’ views on the ability 
of external actors to assess a state’s domestic politics. As noted earlier, at the very end of 
the vignette that respondents read before expressing their willingness to protest, I asked 
them to share their opinion as to how much external actors could shape a country’s 
domestic politics, with options ranging from 10 (very much) to 1 (not at all). As it is 
possible that subjects’ opinions here might interact with the treatment vignettes, I 
include this as a control to address variance that might be introduced by this variable. 
 The results of my primary Ordinary Least Squares model are presented in Table 
4.12 below. The dependent variable in this first model is the central concept with which I 
am concerned – an individual’s willingness to join a protest movement. I begin by 
identifying significant individual-level attributes before then assessing the effects that 
my experimental vignettes had on respondents, accounting for other factors. First, the 
most significant predictor of future protest behavior by far is prior protest behavior.  
Indeed, respondents who indicated that they had already joined some type of protest 
movement in the past were markedly more willing to protest again than were 
individuals who never joined any movement – this is clear by the coefficient’s positive 
sign and the high level of significance this variable attains. Evidently, students who took 
to the streets before saw some real value in doing so, making them easier to mobilize in 




TABLE 4.12. OLS MODEL ON DECISION TO JOIN A PROTEST MOVEMENT 
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Residual standard error: 2.114 on 142 degrees of freedom 
N = 186 
Multiple R-squared value: 0.4285 
Adjusted R-squared value: 0.3722 
* p < 0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 Other significant variables include measures testing whether an individual has 
signed a petition in the past, a respondent’s level of trust in others, and a respondent’s 




signed a petition in the past were more likely to protest in the future. Similarly, students 
who felt that most other people could be trusted were also more likely to protest. This 
shows that people who are less suspicious than others are willing to believe that fellow 
citizens will stand by them in the face of repression. Finally, individuals with liberal 
beliefs were also more prone to join an anti-governmental movement. It is important to 
briefly qualify this finding on ideology, because several students responded during the 
survey that Ukrainians do not view the term “liberal” in the same way as do scholars in 
the United States or Canada – instead, Ukrainians tend to think of classical, “small-L” 
liberalism. This was remedied by instructing participants to think of the 10-1 ideological 
scale as one ranging from the left to the right, using terminology that was more familiar 
and understandable for a European context. 
 This section has shown that certain attributes clearly make some people more 
likely to protest than others. However, what effects did the two international treatment 
vignettes have? If either treatment produces a significant result despite the fact that 
individual-level attitudes are being accounted for, this would demonstrate that they 
possess an influence above and beyond the effects of ideology and interest in politics. 
Table 4.12 shows that the “Liberal International Actor” treatment is still highly 
significant (p < 0.001), despite the presence of many other explanatory variables in the 
model. This shows that even when one takes into consideration respondents’ political 
ideologies, prior protest participation, interest in politics, and so on, the liberal 
treatment still possesses a great deal of influential power.  
 I conclude my discussion of this model by noting the independent variables that 
did not attain significance. Individuals’ beliefs about other countries’ effect on domestic 




politics. Also interestingly, respondents’ opinions about Ukraine’s geopolitical future 
and Western support for democratic protests in Ukraine did not factor into 
considerations either. Perhaps this is because the response options for these questions 
were truncated in comparison with the dependent variable’s scale – it seems likely that 
including a wider range of options would have better captured the intensity with which 
respondents felt that Ukraine should orient itself towards the West. Finally, neither 
satisfaction with democracy nor gender were significant predictors of protest behavior. 
 I now turn to a presentation of two Ordinary Least Squares Linear models that 
test the same framework on the two remaining dependent variables. Table 4.13 below 
presents the results of a regression analysis on respondents’ willingness to sign a 
petition, and the results are quite different from Table 4.12. First, and most noticeably, 
prior real-world protest participation has no predictive power here – whether someone 
joined an anti-governmental campaign in the past has no bearing on their willingness to 
sign a petition in the future. Similarly, trust loses its power in this second model as well. 
Despite this, two predictive variables from Table 4.12 manage to maintain their 
significance in Table 4.13. First, respondents who have signed petitions in the past are 
more likely to undertake that action again than are respondents with no such 
experience. This likely indicates both a strong interest in expressing one’s self and 
engaging in politics in this way, and also a belief that the earlier experience was valuable 
and worth repeating. Second, ideology matters, with those who are more liberal being 
significantly more likely to sign a petition. Additionally, gender plays a role, with women 
(the reference category) being statistically less likely to sign a petition than men. Finally, 
the two international experimental treatment variables fail to produce any statistical 




TABLE 4.13. OLS MODEL ON DECISION TO SIGN A PETITION 
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Residual standard error: 2.255 on 142 degrees of freedom 
N = 186 
Multiple R-squared value: 0.1834 
Adjusted R-squared value: 0.1028 
* p < 0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p < 0.01 
group was statistically distinct from the control group in the earlier comparison-of-
means analysis on signing a petition – instead this form of protest behavior is largely 




What variables determine individuals’ willingness to contact elected officials? 
Table 4.14 below shows that the set of attitudes tested in this survey experiment are 
largely inconsequential in explaining this behavior. (Indeed, the model’s dismal  
TABLE 4.14. OLS MODEL ON DECISION TO CONTACT ELECTED OFFICIAL 
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Residual standard error: 2.538 on 142 degrees of freedom 
N = 186 
Multiple R-squared value: 0.1173 
Adjusted R-squared value: 0.030 




R-squared value of 0.030 makes this clear, particularly when compared with the higher 
adjusted R-squared value of 0.3722 in Table 4.12.)  Only three independent variables 
have any predictive power in this model – interest in politics, ideology, and prior 
willingness to sign a petition. Those who report themselves as paying more attention to 
politics are more likely to contact an official, as are those who are more politically 
liberal. However, and a bit surprisingly, individuals who signed  a petition in the past 
were concurrently less likely to contact an elected official in the future. As with the 
second Ordinary Least Squares model above, the two international treatment variables 
here have no predictive power. Taken together, this decisively illustrates that the 
treatment variables were most effective for one specific kind of protest behavior alone – 
actually joining a movement. 
Linear models #2 – Logit Regression 
Having presented the main findings of my Ordinary Least Squares regressions, I 
now turn to the final method employed in this chapter – logit regression. Whereas 
Ordinary Least Squares regressions employ a dependent variable with a range of 
possible values, logit regressions are appropriate when the dependent variable is 
dichotomous and consists of only two possible values. Because of this, I collapsed my 
10-1 range for the three forms of protest into two discrete categories to see if my findings 
hold when analyzed in this way. I chose the halfway point of the scale to be the point at 
which I distinguish between “likely” and “not likely” to protest, and responses with 
values from 10 to 6 are therefore categorized as “likely” while all responses with values 
from 5 to 1 are categorized as “not likely.” This is somewhat arbitrary, as the cut-off 
point could hypothetically be 4 or 6 instead. Nevertheless, I believe that dividing 




findings hold even when willingness to protest is operationalized in a more simplified 
way14.  
 I now present the results of the first logit model in Table 4.15 below. Here, the 
dependent variable is willingness to join a protest movement. In general, the results are 
consistent with the findings from the Ordinary Least Squares model above. Again, prior 
protest participation is the strongest predictor of willingness to protest in the future, in 
line with my earlier expectations. Similarly, prior willingness to sign a petition and 
higher levels of trust in other individuals are statistically significant as well. 
Interestingly, ideology loses its predictive power in this logit model, indicating that one’s 
orientation on the left-right scale might be more influential in determining the intensity 
to which one is committed to protesting (measured on a relatively fluid and wide-
ranging scale from 10 to 1) than in determining whether one is fundamentally willing to 
protest at all (measured on a more simplified and restricted binary scale from 1 to 0). 
 The “Liberal International Actor” treatment variable is again positive and 
significant, indicating that its power is not diluted by the dichotomous 
reconceptualization of the model’s dependent variable. From a broader perspective 
across regressions and cross-group treatments, it is quite encouraging to see that this 
effect proves to be positive and significant across every test included in this chapter –  
                                                          
14
 In doing both Ordinary Least Squares regression models and logit regression models, I am therefore 
able to study two different aspects of protest behavior here. First, with my logit models, I am able to test 
whether respondents are or are not willing to protest. This is a rather simple dependent variable, as it 
only possesses one of two potential values, but it provides a useful benchmark for measuring overall 
protest willingness in my sample. Beyond this my Ordinary Least Squares models add a much deeper 
dimension of detail to my analysis because protesters are able to express not only whether or not they 
choose to protest, but also to what extent they would be willing to do so. If certain respondents indicate a 
“10” on the willingness scale while others indicate a “6,” for example, this captures a difference in 
intensity that is missed when both are collapsed into one category in my logit models. Testing the same 
set of variables through both Ordinary Least Squares and logit can also indicate whether the treatments or 
other individual-level variables are useful for predicting whether people will protest and also how 




TABLE 4.15. LOGIT MODEL ON JOINING A PROTEST MOVEMENT 
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N = 186 
* p < 0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p < 0.01 
inserting one single sentence about democratic support from abroad into my vignettes 
produces a durable effect that holds across t-test mean comparisons, Ordinary Least 
Squares regression, and logit regression.  
I turn now to my second logit model to test the model’s effects on willingness to 




TABLE 4.16. LOGIT MODEL ON SIGNING A PETITION 
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N = 186 
* p < 0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p < 0.01 
above, the logit model in Table 16 shows that an individual’s prior experience signing a 
petition is again significant and positive. This indicates a benevolent learning effect, 
demonstrating that those who partook in that form of political participation in the past 
saw some utility in doing so again. Ideology and gender both matter, with those to the 




in doing so than women. Also similar to Table 4.13, neither international treatment had 
any effect on the dependent variable here – both the “Liberal International Actor” and 
the “Authoritarian International Actor” variables produced null results. This suggests 
that while knowledge of assistance from external actors might be instrumental in 
guiding someone to undertake the high-risk activity of joining a movement, this might 
not affect the decision to undertake a low-impact action like signing a petition. 
What findings are produced by the final regression analysis in this chapter? I 
present the results of a logit regression measuring willingness to contact an elected 
official in Table 4.17 below. As was the case with the final Ordinary Least Squares model 
in Table 4.14, this third logit contains the least predictive power of the three logit models 
in this chapter.  Only two variables obtain any level of statistical significance at all, and 
one of those is orientated in the opposite direction from what was expected. Ideology 
again has a positive effect on willingness to contact an elected official with all other 
individual- level beliefs accounted for. Surprisingly, however, prior willingness to sign a 
petition actually has a significant and negative relationship with contacting an official in 
the future. Stated differently, individuals who signed a petition at some point in the past 
are markedly less likely to contact an official than citizens who never signed a petition.  
Why might this be? Perhaps the results stem from Ukraine’s semi-authoritarian 
and highly corrupt political system – it seems plausible that concerned citizens who 
were willing to monitor a political development to the point where they signed a petition 
might be more cynical about the chance that an elected official will create any 
meaningful change. If this is true, then taking prior willingness to sign a petition as a 
proxy for political activity suggests that people who are more involved in Ukrainian 




TABLE 4.17. LOGIT MODEL ON CONTACTING AN ELECTED OFFICIAL 
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N = 186 
* p < 0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p < 0.01 
any case, the results are interesting, presenting unexpected findings that must be 
explored in future research. Finally, neither international treatments had much effect 
here – out of the three forms of protest studied in this experiment, their influence was 




Discussion – what do the results show about my primary hypotheses? 
 This chapter has tested a number of different hypotheses through a variety of 
methodological approaches, meaning that identifying a few key findings is essential. 
First, what effects did the two international treatments have across experiments and 
regressions? Participants in the “Liberal International Actor” treatment were 
significantly more likely to join a hypothetical protest movement than were participants 
in the “Authoritarian International Actor” treatment and the control group. This was 
first seen through a t-test comparison of group means on that variable – the “Liberal 
International Actor” group mean was more than 1.5 points higher than the control on a 
scale that only ranged from 1 to 10. Furthermore, this remained consistent across both 
Ordinary Least Squares and logit regression models, demonstrating that the treatment’s 
effect remained durable and could still be seen even the dependent variable was 
measured in different ways and when other important individual-level beliefs were 
accounted for. This shows that my hypothesis 1, predicting that the liberal treatment’s 
outcome would be significantly more positive than the control, is strongly supported. 
 The effects of the “Authoritarian International Actor” treatment were 
unfortunately not significant in the mean comparisons or linear models on any of the 
forms of protest tested here. While it is difficult to determine why this might be the case 
without in-depth qualitative analysis, it seems plausible that if the two posited 
mechanisms of autocratic intervention (unwanted backlash and intentional deterrence) 
are operating simultaneously for different subsets of the sample, perhaps they are 
balancing out when assessed across the group and nullifying the aggregate effect. This 
means that the chapter’s hypothesis 2 is not supported – there is no difference between 




treatment is significantly higher than the authoritarian treatment, meaning that the 
chapter’s hypothesis 3 is supported – positive news about democratic support from 
abroad is more influential than negative news about autocratic intervention.  
Further results – what do the findings show about my supplementary 
hypotheses? 
 The preceding section has established that at least in terms of liberal democratic 
support, assistance from abroad matters in shaping protesters’ decision to join a 
movement. It is important to qualify this by noting that these findings apply strictly to 
actually protesting itself, and not to lower-risk activities such as signing a petition or 
contacting an official. Given these findings, how do the supplementary hypotheses that I 
proposed earlier in this text bear out in light of the analysis? What do the six linear 
models in the latter part of this chapter reveal about other behaviors that make protest 
likely? First, experience matters. Respondents who protested in the past were more 
likely to protest in the future, while respondents who signed a petition in the past were 
also more likely to do so again. This suggests that anyone hoping to identify segments of 
the population to mobilize should look first at those who have been active in the past, as 
they should be easiest to energize.   
More broadly, this also presents a positive situation in which participating in 
these activities in the past did not have a deterrent effect on individuals. One can easily 
imagine a situation, for example, in which people who were politically active before 
(particularly in a semi-autocratic state such as Ukraine) would become disillusioned, 
viewing their activities as having little effect and becoming apathetic towards politics. 
The fact that prior participation encourages future activity is a very good sign, and 




come. Moreover, it also shows that hypothesis 5 and hypothesis 6 are supported – prior 
protest participation and signing of petitions indicates an orientation to do so again15. 
 Finally, I consider the other individual-level attributes that I predicted would 
matter in explaining protest behavior. I proposed in hypothesis 4 that individuals who 
were more interested in politics would be more likely to protest, but this was not 
supported. While surprising, it seems possible that this is the result of a large number of 
political science students being included in my sample. The students I surveyed were 
not all in political science, of course, as I also visited history and computer science 
courses depending on availability at each university. There were still more political 
science students than other disciplines, though, so perhaps the average effect of interest 
in politics is simply so high overall that it obscures variations in this area. I predicted in 
hypothesis 7 that students who were more oriented towards the West would be more 
likely to protest, but this was also not supported. Perhaps other questions on a longer 
and more detailed survey could have better captured this particular set of attitudes – 
asking about favorability towards certain Western organizations, for example – and can 
be tested in future research.  
Turning to my final three hypotheses, I predicted first in hypothesis 8 that 
politically liberal participants would be more likely to protest. In general, this 
hypothesis was supported – more politically liberal respondents were consistently more 
likely to protest than were conservative participants. Second, I predicted in hypothesis 9 
that that those who are dissatisfied with democracy would be more likely to protest. 
However, this was not supported – this attitude never attained significance in any 
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model, indicating its lack of relative importance here. Finally, I predicted in hypothesis 
10 that trusting individuals would be more likely to protest because of the communal 
nature the activity inspires. This was generally supported across models, as trust 
repeatedly proved to have a significant and positive relationship with protest behavior.  
Conclusions & Implications 
Taken together, what do these findings show us? First, at least within the context 
of Ukraine today, political protest and participation remain extremely viable and 
attractive forms of political behavior for students and other activists. The average rates 
of willingness to protest and to sign petitions were high across all three groups, and 
indicate that there is a notable pool of individuals who might be mobilized to take to the 
streets in the face of future autocratic reversals, scandals with corruption, or pervasive 
human rights abuses. This is perhaps a bit surprising given that the country is still 
recovering in many senses from the instability of the Euromaidan movement, but it 
certainly demonstrates some evidence that another movement might be more likely 
than some anticipate – the readiness among students is evident.  
 Second, certain types of individuals are more likely to join protest movements 
than others. According to the findings of the linear models, participants who were 
politically active in the past were more likely to be politically active in the future – rather 
than becoming jaded or weary, these people can instead be more easily mobilized should 
future social movements arise. Furthermore, activists attempting to recruit protesters 
would be well-advised to focus on politically liberal (or left) individuals who might be 
willing to challenge the government, as well as those who place high levels of trust in 




 Third, and most pressingly for the purposes of this dissertation project, 
international factors matter, but their influence (at least in this survey experiment) is 
slightly tempered in two ways. Liberal assistance from democracies abroad was 
consistently more influential in shaping protest behavior than was authoritarian 
intervention, suggesting that while the effects of the authoritarian treatment were 
somewhat muted, the effects of the liberal treatment were unequivocally strong and 
clear – participants who believe that democratic forces elsewhere support them are 
much more likely to take to the street than are those who otherwise lack this type of 
knowledge.  
Furthermore, this effect was strongest not on relatively commonplace forms of 
political behavior such as contacting officials and signing petitions, but instead on the 
most involved and intense form of  behavior tested here – actually joining a movement. 
Heading to the streets and protesting against a government is a much more involved, 
costly, and dangerous activity than other forms of protest activity, and individuals’ 
decision-making strategies in this final sphere (a sphere with perhaps the most potential 
for real political change) are ultimately the most influenced by international factors.  
Protests have become a viable tool for creating change in authoritarian and semi-
authoritarian regimes today. At the same time, states have come to intervene in each 
other’s affairs at greater and greater rates, supporting or challenging segments of the 
population to make certain types of political outcomes more likely. This chapter has 
shown that according to the results of a six-month field survey experiment conducted in 
two  waves at three Ukrainian universities, potential protesters are far more likely to 
take to the streets when they believe that liberal forces elsewhere are aware of their 




beliefs and values are accounted for in a series of linear models. These findings 
demonstrate that democracy promotion  still has a valuable and very real role to play in 
the world today, and that the current worldwide trend towards “strongman rule” and 
illiberalism might mask the potential for a significant resurgence of liberal democratic 




CHAPTER 5: COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES: EXPANDING CONTEXTS 
 
 The two preceding chapters demonstrate the ways in which my project’s 
assertions apply to Ukraine’s 2013-2014 Euromaidan revolution and to studies of 
protest behavior in the country since that time. While Chapter 3’s emphasis on process-
tracing and in-depth interviews showed how international factors influenced protesters’ 
decision-making strategies during the Revolution of Dignity, Chapter 4 utilized an 
experimental approach to illustrate the ways in which such variables might affect 
Ukrainian activists in the future. It is also essential to present cases in which my theory 
operates in different spatial and temporal dimensions, of course – for a proposition to 
“travel,” it is important to show how its mechanisms are not limited to one case alone.  
 In order to demonstrate my theory’s relevance for other contexts, I turn in the 
following chapter to a series of comparative analyses that show how different 
components of my framework operate in a variety of settings. By demonstrating that my 
theory applies to a number of divergent cases, I show that my ideas are generalizable, 
extending the range of situations to which my propositions apply. Political protests and 
external influences matter in all corners of the globe, and my approach in this chapter is 
to turn my focus outwards to capture this important dimension. 
 This chapter proceeds in the following way. I begin by introducing and 
previewing the comparative case studies that I include here, showing why each is an 
important context for testing my theory. It is critical to select cases that differ from one 
another on important dimensions to ensure that I am not simply analyzing similar 
situations, and I justify this process in greater detail below. Following this, I present the 
methodological approach that I adopt in this chapter, demonstrating the ways in which 




then turn to the core of the chapter – a close examination of my five cases, highlighting 
the relevance of each for illustrating my theoretical mechanisms in action. Finally, I 
conclude by synthesizing my main conclusions and their implications. It is to the first 
task above that I now turn. 
Justifying my case selections – which contexts am I comparing and why? 
 In any comparative study, it is of utmost importance to select cases that are 
fundamentally logical to compare. If I test my theoretical framework in contexts where 
my expectations would not reasonably apply, this would undermine the usefulness of 
my analysis. Similarly, if I compare cases that are either too similar or too divergent, this 
would also weaken my ability to test whether my mechanisms are operating as I expect 
For this reason, I present five cases that exhibit both important contextual similarities 
and also critical variations for testing competing aspects of my theory. These cases – 
Ukraine in 2004, Bahrain in 2011, Uzbekistan in 2005, Lebanon in 2005, and Venezuela 
in 2019 – are listed in Table 5.1 below.  
 As outlined in previous sections of this dissertation, I am primarily interested in 
understanding the influences of two external forces on the calculations of protesters in 
autocracies today – external democratic support aimed to bolster the protests’ strength 
and external authoritarian intervention designed to keep the protests from succeeding. 
Because of this, I have selected one case that largely exemplifies each of four different 
situations in the two-by-two matrix below – 1) a protest movement in a hybrid regime 
where democratic support outweighed the role of autocratic intervention (Ukraine’s 
2004 Orange Revolution); 2) a movement in which democratic support was relatively 
weak and domestic state capacity was too strong for it to have much effect (Uzbekistan 















actors in a 
given protest 
movement 






























protesters’ determination and ultimate success (Lebanon’s 2005 Cedar Revolution); and 
4) an uprising in an autocratic state that was crushed by intervention from outside 
authoritarian forces (Bahrain in 2011).  
 It is important to note, of course, that none of these cases are true “ideal types” in 
the sense that one type of intervention was wholly present while the other was wholly 
absent. It would be preferable from a scholarly perspective if one truly could study a 
case with full democratic support but absolutely no external autocratic presence, for 
example, but such a case is unrealistic – disentangling the competing effects of countless 
international variables is impossible, particularly given the relatively truncated length of 
each case study. Nevertheless, as I show in subsequent sections, empirical evidence 
demonstrates that one type of support was more predominant and influential at the 
time than the other, creating a series of cases that differ on both the important factor of 




 In addition to these cases, I present an analysis of the protests that have been 
taking place in Venezuela since the mid-2010s. This event differs from the others on two 
important dimensions. First, and most obviously, its outcome has not yet been 
determined – whereas each of the other cases was decisively successful or unsuccessful, 
it is still unclear whether embattled President Nicolás Maduro will be forced from office. 
Second, it is a case in which both external democratic support and autocratic 
intervention have been clear and present throughout the duration of the event. This 
therefore represents a test of competing mechanisms within one context. By selecting 
these cases, all of which fall within my emphasis on non-violent campaigns pursuing 
democratic reform and combatting corruption, I study a wider range of movements that 
show how my theory travels beyond Ukraine in the early twenty-first century.  
Utilizing a comparative approach and maintaining a consistent method 
 In this section, I briefly describe the comparative approach that I adopt in this 
chapter. This demonstrates how my approach is consistent from context to context, and 
will make it easier to compare the cases on the important dimensions explored here. 
 I begin each case study by presenting the movement’s triggers and goals as 
well as the most common tactics that were utilized by participants. While this part of 
my discussion might not focus on the international variables that are central to my 
broader analysis, it is important to focus on these topics to demonstrate that each anti-
governmental campaign falls within the pro-democratic and peaceful realm that 
comprises my framework. It does not make sense to apply my theory to cases of violent 
ethnic conflict or brutal religious extremism, and the information detailed here will 
show that this step is met. In doing so, I rely upon qualitative scholarly and journalistic 




 Following this, I analyze the ways in which either external democratic 
promotion designed to bolster the protests or external authoritarian 
intervention designed to suppress the protests was present. As noted above, 
there are few cases in which one type of external intervention was present while the 
other was absent – states do not exist entirely in isolation of one another, and larger 
countries often try to influence their neighbors. Further, it is important to recognize that 
a significant amount of assistance (both democratic and anti-democratic) takes place 
“behind the scenes,” and cannot be easily traced by average citizens or analysts studying 
this subject. Nevertheless, I will rely upon research and news reports to present 
evidence that in the cases I have selected, strong signals of either type of support were 
made and protesters would have known of their existence. These are objective indicators 
of the types of support that were being signaled at the international level – expressions 
of aid that did in fact exist in a highly visible manner. Additionally, I use these sources to 
assess a state’s domestic capacity and regime strength. Much of my argument rests on 
the importance of an autocracy’s repressive capacity, and it will be essential to show how 
this factors into the analysis as well.  
 Critically, I then highlight the mechanisms of my theory that were operating 
in each case. Certain mechanisms were much more present in some states than others, 
and I show how different components of my claims did or did not operate in each 
context to either spur or deflate protest participation. This section of each case study is 
most concerned with what protesters thought and felt – individual-level evidence that 
people on the ground were aware of and acting upon democratic support or autocratic 
intervention. In addition to qualitative evidence, I also present empirical data 




and size is unfortunately difficult to obtain and study within the parameters of this 
dissertation, as many data sets in this field are too static (meaning that they do not trace 
changes in size from one period of time to another and focus instead on estimating 
crowd mass at one point only); too limited in their temporal or geographical scope 
(meaning that they do not provide variation in their coverage); or do not contain 
information on the actions of external actors towards a protest’s development. Further, 
depending on the source at hand, estimates of crowd size themselves can be unreliably 
inflated or deflated for political purposes – a 2012 Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty 
piece shows how the Russian government constantly and intentionally under-estimates 
crowd size at opposition rallies1, while a 2018 Washington Post article reports that over-
inflating crowd size of administration supporters has been a staple of the Trump regime 
since the President’s inaugural address2. Despite these inherent drawbacks, data sources 
on crowd size are still valuable when available and will be used as supplementary 
content within my broader analysis. 
For three of the five cases included here, I report data on external actions and 
changes in crowd size drawn from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes 
(NAVCO) 3.0 dataset, one of the most comprehensive within this area of research3. 
NAVCO 3.0 scholars selected twenty-six countries around the world and coded data 
regarding social movement goals, changes in crowd size from day to day, and statements 
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Published February 6, 2012. Available online at 
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and other actions taken by actors within and outside of the country at hand4. This 
includes condemnations or commemorations made by Presidents and Prime Ministers 
around the world, calls for sanctions, and statements issued by representatives from 
international organizations like the United Nations or the European Union5. It is 
important to remember that changes in crowd size cannot be directly attributed to 
statements or actions from external actors, of course, as many other factors are 
simultaneously taking place. Nevertheless, by demonstrating that protests either grew or 
shrank dramatically in the days following an external action, I show that there is an 
apparent link and that these factors affected peoples’ willingness to take to the streets. 
 Finally, I conclude with a brief overview of the outcome of each movement – 
were the protesters successful in achieving their goals? Was policy or regime change 
attained, or did politics remain the same as before? Concluding each case study in this 
way will provide a helpful overview of each movement’s overall effectiveness. I now turn 
to the first point of analysis in this chapter – Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution. 
Case study #1: Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution 
 While preceding chapters have focused extensively on Ukraine’s 2013-2014 
Euromaidan movement and trends in political behavior throughout the country since 
that time, it is also valuable to test the mechanisms of my theory within the context of 
the country’s 2004 Orange Revolution. This campaign was sufficiently distinct and 
temporally separate from Euromaidan to be assessed as its own unique event, 
particularly as the Orange Revolution provides another important example of the ways 
in which external democracy promotion can drive people to the streets against leaders. 
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 In terms of its origins, the Orange Revolution certainly did not appear out of 
nowhere – as White and McAllister (2009) make clear, public discontent with 
authorities in Ukraine had been growing for years, precipitated by events including the 
murder and subsequent cover-up of investigate journalist Heorhiy Gongadze, evidence 
of illegal weapons sales to foreign governments, and potential proof of fraud in the 
Presidential election of Leonid Kuchma in 2000. Much as Euromaidan saw years of 
discontent mobilize into concrete action following the focal point of students being 
beaten by regime forces, the trigger for the Orange Revolution was one singular event 
– the fraudulent election of Viktor Yanukovych as President in November 2004.  
Yanukovych’s campaign against former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko for 
the office was marked by controversy, even nearly resulting in the death of one of the 
candidates. As Plokhy (2015) notes, Yushchenko was poisoned in September 2014 by an 
unknown assailant; after he was safely hospitalized abroad and began to recover, 
doctors determined that he had been nearly killed by a dioxin of  a strain of a poison 
produced in Russia but not in Ukraine. Karatnycky (2005) and Reid (2015) emphasize 
that this was hardly the first evidence of covert Russian interference in the 2004 election 
– Vladimir Putin had already sent a team of Kremlin “political technologists6” to advise 
Yanukovych in his electoral strategy and in fact visited Ukraine several times to appear 
as a visible supporter for the Yanukovych campaign7. Further, Fraser (2008) suggests 
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 Interestingly, Wilson (2014) suggests that these technologists – actors who work as strategic advisers to 
candidates and campaigns, often in a way that lacks any kind of transparency or openness – were also 
effective in mobilizing some radical nationalists that rallied behind the Yushchenko campaign at the time. 
Their goal was evidently to tar Yushchenko supporters as national fascists; if they were able to work this 
particular demographic of supporter into enough of a frenzy, this would make it appears as though all 
Yushchenko supporters were similarly aggressive. This in turn would feed into the Putin regime’s 
common tactic of using fascism as a label to discredit and delegitimize a given political opposition. 
7
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that Putin provided roughly half of the campaign expenses for Yanukovych in his quest 
for the Presidency, covering campaign materials, advertisements, and investments. 
 While these developments set the stage for widespread anger at corruption and 
Russian interference in Ukraine’s electoral process, the true spark of the Revolution 
itself came in late November 2004 following the initial results of the election. Both 
Yushchenko and Yanukovych advanced to a second round of voting as the top two 
candidates from the first round on roughly equal footing. Upon the conclusion of the 
second round on November 21, independent exit polls showed Yushchenko receiving 
approximately 53% of the vote and Yanukovych receiving approximately 44%. However, 
when official governmental agencies revealed their formal tallies, Yanukovych was 
declared the winner with 49.5% of the vote to Yushchenko’s 46.9%. 
In addition to this suspicious reversal from the outcome expected based on exit 
polling, Myagkov, Ordeshook, and Shakin (2009) point to the fact that supposed 
turnout in regions of Ukraine supporting Yanukovych increased at much higher rates in 
the second round than would be reasonably expected. Widespread discontent was 
further exacerbated by telephone interceptions from Yanukovych’s campaign staff 
indicating that they had falsified local election results later submitted to Kyiv, 
demonstrating incontrovertible proof of electoral fraud. Karatnycky (2005) suggests 
that the blatant disregard for democracy in this situation was drastic enough to unite 
disparate groups in Ukrainian society, including civic reformists, politicians, and 
members of the educated middle class. Fournier (2010) agrees, reporting that the 
results of interviews she conducted on-the-ground with Yushchenko supporters showed 
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that for many, the election was the “last drop” that they were willing to tolerate. Further, 
Hatton (2010) suggests that the Revolution’s emphasis on democracy had a pro-
Western character, as Yushchenko repeatedly evinced the notion of moving Ukraine 
towards the European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the future. 
As more and more people took to the streets, the movement grew to be massive in 
scope. While no exact figures on crowd size exist, Beissinger (2011) points to the results 
of the 2004 wave of the European Social Survey (ESS), which asked Ukrainians whether 
they had participated in a demonstration in the past twelve months. According to the 
survey, 22% of Ukrainians answered in the affirmative, a number that was dramatically 
higher than the 6% who reported similar protest behavior in the 2002 ESS. Relying 
upon survey data issued by the Institute of Sociology at the National Academy of 
Sciences of Ukraine, Beissinger further notes that respondents who self-reported as 
having been participants on Maidan during the Orange Revolution were asked to 
identify the main causes prompting people to join at that time. 44.8% felt that protesters 
were there to reject one of the election’s candidates, 39.1% reported activists’ hope for 
attaining better living standards, 36.8% noted individuals’ fear for their children’s 
future, and 34.5% felt that people were inspired by an emotional protest against 
injustice. Interestingly, despite the Russian media’s efforts to paint protesters as paid 
shills carrying out the covert plans of the West, only 1.1% of people felt that the cause of 
the Orange Revolution was “a choice of geopolitical orientation between the West and 
Russia.” Instead, the motivation was to restructure political life in their country. 
 As Yekelchyk (2015) notes, the Orange Revolution was not as organic or 
“grassroots” in its origins as was the Euromaidan movement. Instead, politicians played 




Rumer (2015) stress that the movement’s name was derived from Yushchenko’s “Our 
Ukraine” party and its orange coloring and emphasize that many people were inspired 
by his candidacy8. While the opposition was therefore influenced by politicians, some of 
whom might have possessed their own ulterior motives9, participants’ tactics remained 
calm and civil. Indeed, as Wilson (2006) notes, protesters adopted a framework of 
strategic non-violence, or one that was “neither passive nor a means of avoiding conflict, 
but a means of identifying and engaging the weak points that any regime will have, and 
of avoiding giving semiauthoritarian regimes an excuse to crack down” (30). In doing 
so, protesters hoped to discredit any type of repression that security forces might 
employ. In stark contrast to bloody revolutions that overthrew dictators in places such 
as Qaddafi’s Libya, the Orange Revolution was notable for the overall lack of violence 
utilized by either protesters or the government – no single individual died directly as a 
result of the conflict. Karatynycky (2005) reports that though Yanukovych initially 
demanded that force be used to remove the protesters, the Ukrainian security apparatus 
took no action due to divisions between the military and the Ukrainian security services 
(or SBU) as to whether or not this was necessary.   
 Reid (2015) notes that participants did often conduct activities that were deemed 
illegal, occupying large public structures such as the Trade Union Building, but that 
protesters were also wholly peaceful in doing so and used the buildings as centers for 
distributing donated mattresses, clothing and food. Further, she points to the overall 
celebratory nature of the Revolution, stressing that participants were forbidden from 
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drinking alcohol on the square to prevent rowdiness and that organizers recruited 
musicians to perform for crowds nightly. Taken together, these findings indicate that the 
movement fits within the non-violent scope of cases to which my theory applies. 
 Scholars have shown that there was a significant amount of objective external 
democratic support towards the Orange Revolution. According to Wilson (2006), 
significant Western funds aimed at promoting democratic development had been 
actively involved in Ukraine for years – hundreds of millions of dollars entered the 
country through organizations including United States Agency for International 
Development; George Soros’s International Renaissance Foundation; Freedom House; 
and the National Endowment for Democracy10. Similarly, McFaul (2007) finds that the 
United States government spent eighteen million dollars specifically on election funding 
and training in the two years before the 2004 Presidential election, and Kuzio (2006) 
reports that training from Western civil society groups intensified in the early 2000s, 
indicating that activists were quite aware that external forces supported their mission11. 
 What have scholars found about Western support during the Orange Revolution 
itself? Wilson (2006) argues that external organizations’ financial support for protesters 
played an important role, but that from a purely monetary perspective, their power was 
overshadowed by domestic and Russian forces supporting Yanukovych – his backers 
spent more than four hundred million dollars to help him win office. For liberal outside 
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actors, therefore, their influence flowed more through a combination of civil society 
training and symbolic support made by politicians’ statements and gestures.  
As an example of this, McFaul (2007) shows that the United States Department 
of State invited the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s legislature) to visit 
Washington, D.C. five days before the election. This was heavily political in nature, as 
State Department officials informed Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn that the United States 
intended to “to underscore [its] support for a legislative body committed to ensuring an 
outcome that reflected the will of the people” (68). McFaul argues that this allowed 
Western forces to position certain members of the Rada as oppositional actors who 
would later challenge Yanukovych, strengthening the chances of a divided government 
while sending a signal to Ukrainians that the West was watching the election closely. 
The most prominent form of support offered by democratic governments towards 
the protesters during the Revolution came in the form of official statements challenging 
the election’s results and proclamations demanding a free and fair vote. These actions 
included the United States immediately threatening sanctions should the fraudulent 
vote stand; the parliamentary deputy head of the European parliament claiming that the 
vote was rigged; and the chief of NATO calling for a rigorous investigation into the 
election’s outcome. Pifer (2007) mentions that Secretary of State Colin Powell refused to 
accept the outcome as “legitimate,” and sitting President Leonid Kuchma quickly sought 
the advice of outside forces in generating a dialogue between Yanukovych and 
Yushchenko to address this international criticism1213.  
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Additionally, several foreign officials traveled to Kyiv to negotiate and offer tacit 
support to the opposition’s calls for a re-vote, including Polish President Aleksander 
Kwasniewski, former Polish President Lech Walesa, Lithuanian President Valdas 
Adamkus, and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Javier Solana. At the same time, leaders across Europe were in constant 
communication about the crisis, leading Kwasniewski to believe that he had a critical 
amount of backing from European Union leaders to step in as a mediator. 
Several scholars point to this international mediation as critical in guiding the 
movement to a resolution. Pifer (2007) posits that while Ukrainians themselves were 
ultimately responsible for helping the Revolution come to a peaceful end, outside actors 
– particularly Kwasniewski and Adamkus – were highly influential in resolving the crisis 
due to several reasons: 1) their presence and engagement dis-incentivized the use of 
force against protesters, making it easier for people to remain on the streets; 2) the 
threat of their return in the future should a stable compromise not be reached forced 
Ukrainians to come to a workable compromise; and 3) their engagement in the 
proceedings kept the negotiations from being mired down in disagreements. From a 
broader perspective, according to Kosc-Harmatiy (2011), while Solana was not as 
actively involved as his Polish and Lithuanian counterparts due to his diplomatic role as 
a representative of the entire European Union, his presence was still significant as it 
demonstrated that the crisis had captured Europe’s attention. 
This attention from Western forces continued throughout the duration of the 
movement, culminating in a visit from Secretary of State Colin Powell to commemorate 
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Yushchenko’s inauguration as President of Ukraine in January 200514. It is evident from 
the preceding analysis that in addition to laying the groundwork for a democratic 
revolution through years of training and millions of dollars invested in civil society, 
democratic states helped sustain the protests by showing that they were standing with 
the participants and promoting a sense of purposive solidarity with activists. 
 Another important component of Western support that must be discussed here is 
the role of international media. Earlier sections of this dissertation point to the fact that 
dictatorial leaders – particularly those whose states that are more hybrid than fully 
authoritarian – are often constrained in the violence they can use against protesters 
because the eyes of the world are upon them. According to several scholars, this was true 
in 2004 Ukraine as well – Wilson (2005) points to reports that while Kuchma was 
considering using force against protesters near the start of the Revolution, officials 
decided quickly against such a plan due to the fact that images being transmitted around 
the world would undermine the regime’s international standing. Moreover, United 
States Ambassador John Herbst and Secretary of State Colin Powell both warned 
Kuchma against the usage of force after hearing that the regime was considering a 
crackdown on activists, again reminding leaders that they were being watched closely15. 
 It is interesting to note that as was the case with Euromaidan, certain segments of 
the Ukrainian population came to believe a narrative that the West orchestrated the 
entire revolution. White and McAllister (2009) report that according to an original 
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survey that they conducted in Ukraine from November to December 2017, forty-seven 
percent of respondents in Eastern Ukraine and fifty-three percent of ethnic Russians 
throughout the country characterized the Revolution as a Western-designed and backed 
coup1617. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, these are also the geographical and demographic 
groups that are most likely to consume media from Russia – in contrast, among 
respondents living in Kyiv, only thirteen percent felt the same way. 
 What role did external authoritarian forces objectively play in attempting to 
help Yanukovych win the election and then weather the ensuring protests against him? 
Much of the autocratic influence on Ukraine had been building and developing before 
the Revolution took place. According to McFaul (2007), the Putin administration had 
been selling Russian gas to the Kuchma regime at reduced rates for many years in an 
effort to keep Ukraine tied closely to Russia and its undemocratic form of government.   
 Perhaps the most influential action taken by Putin during the protests themselves 
was the Russian government’s continued recognition of Yanukovych as the rightful 
victor and its demands that the results of the first election hold18. Putin’s stance was 
enthusiastically supported by the Russian public, as Yanukovych was seen as friendlier 
towards Russian interests among a population who desired close ties between the two 
nations – Fraser (2008) finds that three-quarters of Russians at the time felt that Russia 
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and Ukraine should merge into a single country. Additionally, in an interview with 
Ukrainska Pravda, the Ambassador of Russia to Ukraine Viktor Chernomyrdin stated, 
“Ukraine and Russia have never lived as two sovereign states. Ukraine has never been a 
sovereign government. Now we have to learn how to perceive her as such” (9). Reid 
(2015) notes that Putin personally called Yanukovych to recognize him as the new 
President before the votes were verified19. Unlike in Euromaidan, however, there was 
little evidence that Putin sent any tactical materials to Yanukovych.    
Instead, the Russian reaction at the time focused on discrediting the movement 
to reduce the chance that democratic forces in Russia and Belarus would be inspired to 
undertake similar campaigns. Indeed, Herd (2005) finds that one Russian analyst 
specifically said shortly after Yanukovych was ousted from power, “Russia cannot allow 
defeat in the battle for Ukraine. Besides everything else, defeat would mean velvet 
revolutions in the next two years, now following the Kiev variant, in Belarus, Moldova, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and possibly Armenia” (17). This is clear evidence of a fear of 
regional diffusion, in which one autocratic ally after another could fall from power. 
Interestingly, authors including Delcour and Wolczuk (2015) argue that while the 
Russian government worked to combat the spread of democracy in hybrid states since 
the Orange and other “Color” Revolutions, this has caused a backlash in which hybrid 
regimes become more intent on liberalizing and moving West than they otherwise would 
have been. Herd (2005) suggests that “Putin became the factor that helped to unite 
Ukrainian nationalists, liberals, and socialists against the authorities and against 
Moscow. Having taken part in the Ukraine struggle, Moscow has…narrowed the field for 
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domination in the post-Soviet space” (24). On the whole, democratic support appears to 
have outweighed autocratic intervention in the Orange Revolution, making participation 
by protesters more likely than would have otherwise been the case. 
What evidence exists that my causal mechanisms were operating during the 
Orange Revolution? First, ample content shows that protesters were highly cognizant of 
and solicitous towards external democratic forces in hopes that their assistance would 
strengthen the movement. According to a 2004 New York Times article written during 
the height of the protests, the author finds that many people were hoping for – at the 
most basic level – a significant amount of symbolic recognition from the West.  
The article notes, “Here's a suggestion for President Bush from the protesters 
behind the democratic “orange revolution” here: Wear an orange tie. “If he wore an 
orange tie, people here would be crying,” said Yuri Maluta, a protester from Lviv. “It 
would show that the American president supports democracy here20.”” This is a highly 
relevant example of the power of purposive solidarity – for this activist, Bush’s possible 
decision to publicly declare his support for the movement would have sent a clear signal 
to protesters that they were being seen, recognized, and validated by a powerful 
democratic leader21. Another strong example of purposive solidarity can be seen by the 
prominent public appearances of former Polish President Lech Walesa, who regularly 
supported the protests during his visits to the country and made statements including, 
“I opposed the Soviet Union, and I opposed communism, and I came out victorious. 
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Ukraine has a chance22!” In this case, Walesa was providing a clear signal to protesters 
that they stood a chance at succeeding, strengthening their belief that creating political 
change was possible2324. Finally, statements made by protest leaders themselves reflect 
the fact that the campaign was seeking attention from the outside world. At a rally 
celebrating the Orange Revolution’s victorious outcome, Yushchenko proclaimed, “’The 
heart of Ukraine was on Independence Square…Good people from all over the world, 
from far away countries, were looking at Independence Square, at us252627.’" Taken 
together, these quotes indicate clear evidence that purposive solidarity played a large 
role in shaping the perceptions of participants in the Orange Revolution. 
Similarly, other sources provide information indicating that participants were 
aware of the fact that their campaign stood a better chance at success should they attain 
the attention of actors elsewhere. As one respondent noted in a December 2004 Los 
Angeles Times article, “The last campaign rally we had -- we were trying to show the 
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world that Yushchenko supporters are also human beings, and we have the right to 
gather, to express our opinion under orange banners28.” Moreover, a number of other 
reporters covering the events described the Orange Revolution as “a media-savvy 
revolution, almost like a democracy festival, aimed at winning the sympathy of 
Europeans and Americans29” and a campaign that forcefully demanded some type of 
significant response from Western countries and political actors3031. Further, this sense 
of solidarity extended in some cases even to non-democratic contexts  – a November 
2004 Los Angeles Times article presents the views of one respondent who managed to 
convince her friends in Russia that the movement was worthy of support. As she 
recounted, “‘When they heard that we’re here all night in the snow and rain, they wrote 
us and said, ‘We understand you’…They feel they are in warm flats and we are in cold 
tents, and now they understand and want to help us. We feel like winners32.’” 
In addition to purposive solidarity, there is significant on-the-ground evidence 
that the presence of Western support for the protesters helped their cause by sending a 
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credible threat of sanctioning should the Kuchma regime crack down too forcefully. 
Several pieces including Dell’Arciprete (2005), Kemp and Solonenko (2007), and Haran 
(2012) note that linkages between Ukrainian civil society groups and international 
organizations increased the ability of activists to bring outside forces to Kyiv. According 
to authors such as Emeran and Polyakova (forthcoming), individual actors including 
Western diplomats played an effective role in deterring the usage of force by appearing 
regularly and publicly in Kyiv, indicating both to activists and to the regime that any 
serious repression against the movement would be noted and reported quickly33. 
This section has shown that democratic support from outside forces shaped 
protesters’ beliefs by signaling to them that people elsewhere championed their cause, 
granting them feelings of emotional solidarity and decreasing the chances that the 
regime would repress their movement. It is also important to consider the role played by 
perceptions of autocratic intervention from the Russian regime to support Yanukovych. 
According to several reports issued by journalists in Kyiv at that time, a significant 
number of activists made clear their frustration and anger at unwanted intervention 
on Yanukovych’s behalf. The primary determinants driving people to the streets were 
domestic in nature, but I now show that beliefs about Russia played a role as well. 
As evidence of this, reports reference everything from activists brandishing 
English-language signs reading “Putin: Hands Off Ukraine34!” to respondents stating 
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that the movement was partially about moving beyond Russia’s sphere of influence35 to 
crowds in the Maidan loudly booing whenever images of Vladimir Putin were projected 
onto the square’s many screens36. Two other pieces of evidence are relevant for this 
discussion. First, a Time report from November 2004 presents the viewpoint of one 
respondent who sarcastically thanked both Putin and Yanukovych for uniting Ukrainian 
protesters against both domestic corruption and unwanted intervention. For physician 
Taras Kuchma, “‘they [Putin and Yanukovych] finally forced the Ukrainians to unite to 
become a nation37.’” Here, his perception is clearly that the two figures were working 
together to suppress the movement. Finally, a CBS News article reports the viewpoint of 
an activist who viewed the Orange Revolution within a broader geopolitical framework 
aimed at ending Russian influence in Ukraine. The report notes, ““This is the end of the 
big game. After this, with Yushchenko Ukraine has the opportunity to become a real 
state, a real nation — not Russia's back yard," said 35-year-old Bohdan Mysorsky, one of 
the throng waiting in subfreezing temperatures for the speech38.” For these people, their 
actions were driven by a desire to combat visible efforts from the Russian government to 
sway the election in a way that would benefit Russia. 
The preceding discussion has drawn from scholarly work and news sources to 
explain the origins of the Orange Revolution and to provide evidence that activists were 
aware of outside forces working to influence dynamics on the ground. What can 
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empirical data illustrate regarding actions taken by external actors and resultant 
changes in crowd size? I now present and interpret data from the NAVCO 3.0 database. 
As mentioned earlier, analysts involved in constructing this dataset tracked day-by-day 
news reports and event information to code and list important developments. I report 
and illustrate the most relevant findings from their data in Figure 5.1 below. 
 What information is being presented here? First, the plotted data depict events 
that took place from November 21, 2004 to January 23, 2005 – these are the beginning 
and end dates of the Orange Revolution. Bar graphs in blue are the most easily 
interpreted in the figure – these indicate the number of protesters (in the thousands) 
who were estimated to have joined the mass movement in central Kyiv on any given day. 
One can see that estimates hold that nearly 100,000 people took to the streets at several 
points, with activity particularly concentrated near the beginning of the campaign in late 
November and early December. Participation rates decreased following that time before 
flaring up again in late January, when Yushchenko was inaugurated as President. 
 The red lines indicate actions that were taken or statements that were made by 
officials, politicians, or international organizations elsewhere in favor of the protesters; 
these therefore represent external democratic support. It is not possible to explicitly 
quantify these statements in a way that is directly comparable with numerical estimates 
of crowd size, of course. However, as the timing of these statements is important, I have 
plotted them together on one graph to provide a sense of the temporal points at which 
international support was most prominent and the times at which crowd sizes were 
largest. I have coded the figure so that days with the most significant amounts of activity 
display higher bar graphs than days where no statements were made.  








 day with the single highest bar graph in Figure 5.1. According to NAVCO 3.0, on this 
day alone, several external actions were taken in support of the protests including 
France expressing “serious doubts” about the election’s legitimacy; a European Union 
monitor decrying the Ukrainian election as “North-Korean style;” the staff at the Kyiv 
embassy of the United States declaring that the peoples’ will must be respected; a series 
of demonstrations in Poland to support the Yushchenko campaign and to criticize the 
falsified results; and the Canadian Prime Minister issuing a statement questioning the 
vote’s legitimacy. Quite evidently, the eyes of the world were in many ways on Ukraine 
at this time, as leaders made statements against Yanukovych’s victory clearly and loudly. 
 What indicators are represented by the green bars? Days with these bars denote 
instances when public statements were made by an authoritarian leader elsewhere 
either against the protests or in support of Yanukovych as the election’s victor, despite 
widespread knowledge that the vote was fraudulent. It is apparent from Figure 5.1 that 
authoritarian support was not as large during the Orange Revolution as was democratic 
promotion. Notable exceptions include several of the earliest days of the Revolution, 
when Putin publicly congratulated Yanukovych on his victory multiple times (both 
before and after the formal results were announced), Russia’s parliamentary speaker 
adopted a similar stance in attempts to legitimize Yanukovych’s win, and Chinese 
officials indicated that they respected the apparent “will of the people.” While none of 
these statements in and of themselves were forceful condemnations against the protests, 
they still represented clear interjections by dictatorial leaders who were aiming to throw 
their support behind their corrupt ally to undermine oppositional forces. 
 In interpreting these data, it is imperative to offer a note of caution. As presented 




clear from Figure 5.1 that high periods of international attention and large-scale turn-
out at rallying events tend to be correlated with one another. This is true not only at the 
start of the movement, but also during a brief period in central January when activity in 
both spheres elevated once again. It is entirely possible (and indeed likely) that 
international attention was being paid to Ukraine because the protests themselves were 
large, and not specifically that the protests themselves were large because they were 
receiving international attention. Instead, it is plausible that both factors were feeding 
into one another – more protests begat more attention, which sustained more protests, 
which gained more attention, and so on. It is difficult to clearly trace a causal linkage 
within the scope of this particular case, but taken together, these data along with the 
qualitative information produced in the preceding discussion suggest that my theory is 
supported within the context of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. 
 I conclude this study by noting the outcome of the Revolution. As the protests’ 
goal was to challenge a fraudulent election, the campaign was successful – authorities 
agreed to hold a re-vote between Yanukovych and Yushchenko. Voters cast their ballots 
in late December 2004 amidst the presence of international observers and election 
monitors, and the Central Election Commission of Ukraine declared Yushchenko the 
winner with 51.99% to Yanukovych’s 44.20%. Yanukovych decided not to challenge the 
results, and Yushchenko was formally inaugurated as President on January 23, 2005. 
 From an immediate perspective, the Orange Revolution was triumphant. Fraser 
(2008) notes that the media space became notably (if also incrementally) freer – though 
the Verkhovna Rada passed a law preventing journalist from commenting on election 
campaigns, reporters were still able to criticize the regime to a greater degree than 




tenuous. Analysis of Freedom House in the years before the protests make this clear – 
Ukraine received a score of “4” (“Partly Free”) in 2003, 2004, and 2005, meaning that 
there was no observably meaningful improvement in political rights or civil liberties. 
This is likely due to the powers of history, as Fraser notes that Ukraine had no memory 
of democratic pluralism or national cohesion from which to draw in becoming more 
free. Evidently, this indicates that issues with corruption and authoritarian politics 
remained a problem for several years, eventually leading to Yanukovych’s election as 
President in 2010 and the Euromaidan movement shortly afterwards39. I turn now to 
the second case study in this chapter – Bahrain’s 2011 uprising against authorities. 
Case study #2: Bahrain – autocratic intervention quashes a movement 
 Whereas the Orange Revolution serves as an example of an anti-governmental 
movement that succeeded partly because of the presence of democratic support, Bahrain 
in 2011 provides an example of the opposite scenario. As the following study will show, 
protests in Bahrain were generally not supported by Western forces in any meaningful 
way but were directly repressed by external forces, leading the movement to collapse. 
 Though Bahrain is a small nation of one million people, several authors including 
Kinninmont and Sirri (2014) show that the country has a lengthy history of prominent 
oppositional movements, unusual considering its location in the Middle East – 
campaigns calling for more popular representation and for a powerful legislature vis-à-
vis the ruling family have existed since the 1970s, with a petition in the 1990s that aimed 
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to strengthen the parliament even receiving the signatures of ten percent of the 
population.  Part of the problem was lack of representation and opportunity for the 
country’s Shiite Muslim majority – Kasbarian and Mabon (2017) point to the fact that 
the Sunni minority have always held political and economic positions of power, leading 
to perceptions of inequality and lack of accountability among leaders. According to Al-
Rawi (2015), protesters and their allies wanted political and economic reforms that 
would create a more just society, while Friedman (2012) suggests that the youngest 
protesters even supported the idea of converting Bahrain into a constitutional monarchy 
with free elections. This was compounded by the fact that the same faces had held de 
facto power for decades –  members of the Al Khalifa transferred power from one 
generation to another since 1783, leading protesters to demand a fundamental 
reshaping of the system and its rulers. 
 The precise trigger that prompted dissatisfied citizens to come together was the 
simultaneous protests taking place in other Arab Spring countries at the time, according 
to Kinninmont and Sirri (2014). Nepstad (2013) finds that protesters were emulating 
the movements occurring elsewhere, noting that activists began to march and occupy 
public spaces such as the Pearl Roundabout, a common gathering place in the Bahraini 
capitol of Manama. Protesters believed that because anti-governmental movements in 
Tunisia and Egypt were able to remove leaders from power, their own campaign could 
likely succeed as well40. Among their specific demands were “an end to torture, the 
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release of political prisoners, genuinely free elections, and a representative consultative 
council” (343). These protests were met with violence by the regime, as security forces 
attacked demonstrators on February 17 and killed four people. However, this caused a 
backlash that led even more citizens to take to the streets. 
 Survey data collected relatively close to the 2011 protests reinforce the notion that 
many activists were Shiite Muslims who were much more dissatisfied with 
circumstances in the country than were the comparatively privileged minority Sunni 
Muslims. As evidence of this, I present the results of three survey questions in the 2007 
Arab Barometer in Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 below41. Responses in each table represent 
three sets of opinions – those of Bahrainis in the aggregate (column one), specifically 
Shiite Muslims (column two), and specifically Sunni Muslims (column 3).  
First, Table 5.2 presents the results of a question asking respondents to express 
their level of satisfaction with their government. Participants were asked to choose a 
possible response ranging from “completely unsatisfied” (equivalent to a rating of 1) to 
“completely satisfied” (equivalent to a rating of 10).It is immediately apparent that there 
is a strong disconnect between Shiite and Sunni Muslims in their orientations towards 
the authorities at this time. More than a third of Shiites (34.9%) indicated complete 
dissatisfaction with their leaders, as compared with a miniscule 2.9% of Sunnis; 
moreover, a full 59.1% of Shiites selected a rating of either 1, 2, or 3 on this scale, 
demonstrating a clear clustering near the low end of satisfaction. In contrast, nearly half 
of Sunnis (49.1%) clustered themselves at the other end of the scale, selecting ratings of 
either 8, 9, or 10 to express a much more positive orientation towards the status quo. 
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Table 5.2. “Satisfaction with the performance of the current government” 
 All Shiite Muslims Sunni Muslims 
Completely 
unsatisfied 
21.1% 34.9% 2.9% 
2 
 
8.5% 12.3% 3.4% 
3 
 
7.0% 11.9% 0.6% 
4 
 
6.1% 8.5% 2.9% 
5 
 
11.4% 11.9% 10.8% 
6 
 
8.7% 4.7% 14.3% 
7 
 
10.2% 4.7% 16.0% 
8 
 
10.4% 3.4% 20.0% 
9 
 
8.0% 2.6% 15.4% 
Completely 
satisfied 
6.8% 1.7% 13.7% 
Missing/Don’t 
know 
1.8% 3.4% - 
N 
 
413 175 23542 
Other relevant survey questions from the 2007 Arab Barometer further highlight 
this disconnect between Shiites and Sunnis in their beliefs, reinforcing the notion that 
this was a cleavage in society prompting protesters to take to the streets. Table 5.3 
presents the results of a question asking, “How democratic is Bahrain?” Again, results 
are presented in three columns – the aggregate response rates among the entire 
population, the responses of Shiites, and the responses of Sunnis – to differentiate 
between the two groups. Individuals were asked to rate their views of Bahrain on a scale 
ranging from “complete dictatorship” at one end to “complete democracy” at the other. 
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Table 5.3. “How democratic is [respondent’s country]? 
 All Shiite Muslims Sunni Muslims 
Complete 
dictatorship 
8.8% 15.9% 1.2% 
2 
 
11.5% 20.1% 2.3% 
3 
 
10.7% 16.4% 4.6% 
4 
 
9.6% 12.2% 6.9% 
5 
 
19.7% 16.4% 22.5% 
6 
 
13.2% 5.3% 22.1% 
7 
 
10.1% 2.6% 17.9% 
8 
 
6.6% 1.6% 12.1% 
9 
 
4.1% 1.6% 6.9% 
Complete 
democracy 
3.0% 2.6% 3.5% 
Missing/Don’t 
know 
2.7% 5.3% - 
N 
 
365 173 189 
 It appears from the table that no significant number of either Shiites or Sunnis 
considered Bahrain to be a full democracy in 2007, as only 7.1% of all respondents 
selected a score of either 9 or 10 on this particular question. Nevertheless, the two 
groups again exhibit quite different belief patterns here – 52.4% of Shiites assign 
Bahrain a score of 1, 2, or 3 on this scale, while only 8.1% of Sunnis do the same. 
Instead, Sunnis appear to be much more likely to congregate in the middle of the scale 
when it comes to their beliefs on this topic, implying a more moderate stance.  
Finally Table 5.4 below presents the results of a survey question asking 
respondents whether they agree or disagree that the government does all it can to 




Table 5.4. “The government does all it can to provide citizens with all 
services” 
 All Shiite Muslims Sunni Muslims 
Strongly agree 
 
14.8% 5.0% 28.0% 
Agree 
 
39.8% 27.2% 55.6% 
Disagree 
 
30.0% 43.9% 11.8% 
Strongly disagree 
 
11.7% 17.6% 3.9% 
Missing 
 
3.9% 6.3% 0.7% 
N 
 
420 239 171 
Sunnis either strongly agree or agree with this sentiment, while only 32.2% of Shiites 
feel the same. Clearly, Shiites at the time experienced a much greater sense of 
disenfranchisement from the state and much more frustration with the way things were. 
These surveys are not equivalent to an on-the-ground survey that could have been taken 
during the protests themselves, of course, but they do provide evidence of the 
underlying beliefs that likely triggered people into taking action.  
Numerous scholars point to the fact that protesters in the Bahrain movement 
were initially peaceful, indicating that their tactics were intentionally non-violent. 
Karolak (2011) notes that although the first days of the protest were termed the “Day of 
Rage,” the actual movement itself contained many families, several of whom brought 
their young children to sit in the Roundabout with them rather than angrily confront 
regime forces with their demands. Furthermore, Davies (2014) emphasizes that several 
non-governmental and civil society organizations including the Bahrain Youth Society 
for Human Rights actively promoted the usage of non-violence, suggesting that their 




Al-Rawi (2015) and Katzman (2012) also note that the protesters’ initial response 
to the first round of violent repression from the regime was non-confrontational; 
instead, it was largely one-sided, as regime forces attacked protesters while they slept, 
rendering them defenseless. Individuals attempted to return to their places on the 
Roundabout, but groups were repeatedly shot upon by regime forces, leading to several 
deaths. The Pearl Roundabout lost its status as a nexus for protesters’ gathering in 
March 2011, however, as Kasbarian and Mabon (2017) and Khalaf (2013) show that 
regime forces bulldozed over the space and removed it as a central rallying spot. 
 The most striking comparison between Ukraine in 2004 and Bahrain in 2011 was 
the starkly differing response in terms of both objective external democratic 
support and autocratic intervention. Whereas support from the West for protesters in 
Ukraine was loud and unequivocal, with leading figures traveling directly to Kyiv to 
make their stances known, this assistance was significantly more muted in Bahrain. 
Here, Western leaders were less likely to criticize authorities, choosing instead to 
remain quietly and unobtrusively on the sidelines43. 
 Why might this have been the case? Why were representatives from the European 
Union and the United States so unwilling to call for democratization ? Several authors 
adopt a cynical, if likely accurate, perspective in addressing this question. According to 
Nuruzzaman (2013), Western forces were less willing to speak out on behalf of the 
protesters because they were hesitant to weaken their broader geopolitical and strategic 
tactics in the region. More specifically, Nepstad (2013) posits that the United States in 
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particular recognized the fact that Bahrain hosts the American Navy’s Fifth Fleet and 
serves as a crucial base for American operations in the Gulf region, and that weakening 
the ruling regime might destabilize their future plans in the area. (Katzman does note, 
however, that the Obama administration eventually responded to critics from human 
rights groups and some Congressmen and Congresswomen by putting on hold the sale 
of armored vehicles and anti-take weapons to Bahraini officials). 
 Other authors including Matthiesen (2013) and Hehir (2015) broaden their focus 
to criticize the reaction of the United Kingdom as well – the country has maintained 
close ties with its former colonial territory, and the fact that British forces constructed a 
six million dollar base in Bahrain several years after the 2011 protests were contained 
indicate their interest in working with Bahraini allies. In this case, geopolitical 
considerations and an unwillingness to alienate an important ally in the Gulf region 
trumped the normative goal of supporting protesters in their calls for liberalization. 
 While certain Western countries’ interest in procuring Bahraini support for their 
naval and military excursions explains part of their reticence, it is also important to 
consider the role played by Saudi Arabia. Though Saudi Arabia today is unquestionably 
a repressive dictatorship with a dire record on human rights and civil liberties, it is a 
close ally of Bahrain due to the religious composition of both countries’ Sunni regimes. 
Why would this matter for the United States and other allies? Nuruzzaman (2013) finds 
that Saudi authorities purchase a significant number of arms and other weapons from 
the United States, meaning that any significant crackdowns or sanctions on Bahrain 




leaders appeared unwilling to jeopardize due to the ramifications of doing so, leading 
them to remain acquiescent in the regime’s repression of protesters44.  
Gelvin (2012) echoes these claims, pointing also to the fact that the United States 
purchases a great deal of oil from Saudi Arabia45. This financial relationship is an 
important one in many respects, and American officials prioritized its preservation. 
Nepstad extends this into a study of Bahraini regime strength, suggesting that security 
forces were unwilling to defect from leaders because they doubted that the international 
community would pressure Bahrain in any way – they did not believe that the 
movement stood a chance at success and therefore remained loyal to the government. 
 This lack of meaningful condemnation or sanctioning from the international 
community undermined protesters’ willingness to continue their campaign against the 
regime – if activists receive no real signals that their mission is supported by outside 
forces, this can lead them to feel alone with little chance of succeeding. One final topic to 
consider within the frame of external democratic support concerns the role of 
international media. Global media coverage is often crucial for supporting a movement 
because it both transmits the campaign’s message to other countries and allows helpful 
content from other states to reach protesters. 
 In Bahrain, there is significant evidence both that international news coverage 
was severely lacking on its own merits, and also that the few outlets that were providing 
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coverage were restricted and forced out of the country altogether. Davies (2014) finds 
that international media conglomerates were much less likely to travel to Bahrain or to 
cover the events taking place there than they were for similar circumstances elsewhere. 
According to Kasbarian and Mabon (2017), this provided a media vacuum that the 
Bahraini regime was more than happy to fill – the Bahraini Foreign Minster released a 
statement following an violent crackdown in February claiming that such force was 
necessary to keep the country from collapsing into a ‘sectarian abyss.’ Because there was 
no external media willing or able to counter this message, this narrative quickly became 
dominant and provided cover for further repression towards protesters46.  
 Finally, in addition to capitalizing on the absence of international media 
coverage, Bahrain sought to further control the narrative of the protests by eventually 
forcing out reporters that did not comply with their mission.  As Karolak (2011) notes, 
“Moreover, after the violent clampdown on the opposition, foreign correspondents were 
gradually expelled from the country and Bahrain disappeared from the headlines of 
international newspapers. The authorities tried to preserve the image of the “island of 
golden smiles,” as once Bahrain was known, by cutting out the flow of unfavorable and 
disapproving information abroad” (173). Furthermore, according to a 2012 article from 
The Guardian, reporters from CNN who had been interviewing dissidents recounted 
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being attacked by regime forces who forced them to the ground at gunpoint and 
destroyed their film and audio recordings47. Clearly, therefore, media coverage was 
heavily constrained, preventing protesters from establishing any communication with 
the outside world. From a decision-making perspective, therefore, this closed valve of 
external communication dampened activists’ willingness to continue the fight. 
The preceding section has shown that for protesters in Bahrain, external 
democratic support was severely lacking. Another striking difference between Ukraine 
and Bahrain is the role played by external authoritarian actors in working to 
suppress the protests. Whereas Ukraine’s neighbors largely refrained from becoming 
overly involved in the movement, Bahrain actively appealed to its regional allies to 
directly intervene and stop the uprising from growing. As protesters became more 
impassioned, their numbers began to overwhelm Bahrain’s domestic police force. As a 
result, according to a 2011 news report from Al-Jazeera, Bahraini leaders issued a 
request on March 14 for manpower and assistance to other members of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC), a six-member alliance consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates48. In response to this, Saudi 
Arabia immediately sent one thousand troops and 150 vehicles into the country, while 
the United Arab Emirates contributed five hundred members of its own forces. 
According to Friedman (2012), this followed a March 10 proclamation by the GCC that 
members were committing to a ten-year, twenty-billion dollar pledge to the 
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governments of Bahrain and Oman to support their socioeconomic development, a 
move seen by many protesters as lending resources to suppress their movement. 
Kasbarian and Mabon (2017) argue that for many protesters, this sent a dramatic 
signal that Bahrain’s neighbors were willing to directly intervene in its affairs to support 
an embattled leader. Taken together with a newly reenergized Bahraini regime, this was 
effective enough to quell the majority of the opposition, as the protest numbers never 
reached the peaks that they exhibited prior to the arrival of Saudi and Emirati troops. 
This was partially due to the fact that following the troops’ intervention, as Davies 
(2014) notes, the Bahraini King issued a nation-wide state of emergency and martial law 
that allowed even higher levels of repression. This provides strong evidence that the 
situation facing protesters at the time would have dramatically inhibited activists’ 
willingness to continue their campaign – in an environment where Western forces 
ignored their plight, international media coverage was non-existent, and autocratic 
leaders elsewhere sent troops to strengthen their leaders’ capacity, their calculations 
would rationally err towards heading home rather than remaining on the streets. 
When considering the Bahrain’s autocratic neighbors, it is important to mention 
the actions of Kuwait. Though Kuwait is a member of the GCC, it did not contribute 
ground troops to weaken the uprising. Instead, Kuwait was briefly considered to act as a 
mediator in the crisis. Ultimately, this was abandoned for reasons that are still unclear, 
and the Kuwait government ultimately deployed its navy to Bahrain instead. A 2011 
Reuters article notes that the GCC initially showed signs of welcoming the mediation 
move, with Secretary-General Abdulrahman al-Attiyah telling reporters that the 
initiative should contribute to security and stability. However, it appears that Bahraini 




Affairs Sheikh Khaled bin Ahmed bin Mohammed al-Khalifa quickly took to Twitter to 
dispel these rumors and to clearly state that there was no need for any type of mediation 
whatsoever49. 
What individual-level evidence exists to illustrate that protesters’ beliefs and 
decision-making processes were affected by the lack of democratic assistance and the 
presence of autocratic intervention? The arrival of Saudi and Emirati troops appeared to 
be designed from the beginning to send a signal to the population that further protests 
stood no chance at succeeding. Reports from the initial days of the crackdown indicate 
that Saudi troops openly flashed signs of victory to television cameras as they entered 
Bahrain, sending a clear image to protesters that the invading forces felt that the 
situation was already under control. Additionally, Bahraini television stations 
immediately began broadcasting archival footage of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and 
King Hamad of Bahrain performing a traditional Bedouin war dance together, again 
projecting an image of unity and strength50 – the suggestion was clearly that Saudi 
forces and Bahraini forces should be viewed as one unified front in defiance against the 
rebellion. An interview with an activist at this time pointed to perceptions that Western 
support was more important at that stage than ever before – as the individual stated, “If 
the US walks away from us, this regime will continue to come for us…there is no option 
but to press ahead515253.”  
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Ample evidence exists that the arrival of these troops changed the perceptions of 
the dangers involved for citizens who were considering joining the campaign. Multiple 
reports indicate that despite the regime’s authoritarian nature, local police had been 
increasingly challenged in their efforts to control the uprising at the Pearl Roundabout. 
The initial reaction by many protesters was to view the arriving forces as an “invasion54” 
or an “occupation55” from an unwanted neighbor intervening in Bahrain’s affairs, and 
several protesters initially indicated a willingness to avoid any negotiation with their 
leaders while foreign troops were present on Bahraini soil56. This could have been the 
case because the incoming troops did not officially present themselves as direct threats 
– instead, they claimed that their main purpose was to restore order and to defend 
governmental buildings and infrastructure, despite unofficial indicators of a starkly 
different purpose57. 
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After the true purpose of the foreign troops became clear, however, individuals 
updated their beliefs about the situation on the ground, both at the Pearl Roundabout 
and in their own hometowns. Indeed, a March 2011 article from the Washington Post 
indicated that many protesters were forced to abandon the main uprising in Manama 
due to the fact that Bahrain’s police, previously concentrated in the nation’s capital, 
were freed up by the Saudi arrival to repress smaller uprisings throughout Bahrain’s 
countryside58. Tactics used by the newly-energized government included blanketing 
Manama and the surrounding villages with tanks and other large vehicles, utilizing live 
bullets and other weapons to disperse small bands of protesters who were comparatively 
defenseless and vulnerable relative to their counterparts in the uprising’s epicenter5960.  
Protesters at the Pearl Roundabout therefore rationally decided to defend their 
homes in any way that they could, reasoning that it made sense for them to abandon the 
main protest even though doing so would undermine the movement’s overall efficacy61. 
Equally important is that according to several eyewitnesses, the danger threshold at the 
Pearl Roundabout itself rose with the arrival of new troops; these soldiers utilized a 
range of strategies to subdue activists including “teargas grenades fired at point-blank 
range into the faces of unarmed demonstrators; punishment beatings for injured 
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protesters in their hospital beds; [and] violence and intimidation against the wives and 
children of opposition activists in their village homes62.” Whereas protesting before 
certainly posed several dangers in and of itself, these reenergized security forces proved 
too intimidating for many Bahraini citizens to overcome63. 
Though it is somewhat anecdotal in its scope, the example of one individual 
interviewed by PRI demonstrates the shifting perceptions of safety and danger that 
many experienced as a result of the interventions. When the woman was interviewed 
during the protests’ early days, she enthusiastically echoed Barack Obama’s optimistic 
phrase of, “Yes, we can!” When contacted for a follow-up conversation after the 
invasion, however, the same woman reported that three of her cousins had since been 
detained and she was no longer willing to continue agitating against leaders.   
Psychologically, there is evidence that the arrival of Saudi and Emirate troops 
also began to deepen and exacerbate tensions between Sunni and Shiite Muslims in 
Bahrain, undermining the chance that citizens who had not yet joined the movement 
would ever decide to do so. According to an article from the Guardian, local Sunnis who 
were critical of the movement became emboldened in their attacks and increased the 
event’s divisiveness, while local Shiites began to protest wearing white funeral 
shrouds64. Taken together, the intervention therefore both increased the risks of 
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protesting and reduced the chance that protesters could attract a broader cross-section 
of the country that would have been necessary to sustain the movement’s existence. 
While not as comprehensive as reports detailing perceptions of increasing threats 
following the arrival of foreign troops, there also exists much individual-level evidence 
that protesters were hoping for support from international actors. A Bahraini journalist 
detailed his efforts to inform the world about what was taking place  during the early 
days, noting, “Since the protests started in 2010 and 2011, it has become very important 
for me to show the true picture of Bahrain to the world: what is actually happening 
between the regime and the people, without any filter. Since the revolution in 2011, the 
regime has been attacking anyone using social media to stop them from showing other 
countries what was happening here. They took us to jail just to prevent us from 
publishing our photographs65.” This indicates that activists aimed to capture the 
attention of the outside world but were unable to do so due to checks on their freedom. 
In a 2011 interview with the Huffington Post, Nabeel Rajab of the Bahrain Center 
for Human Rights noted, “The response from the West has been very timid and it shows 
the double standards in its foreign policy compared to Libya…Saudi influence is so huge 
on Bahrain now and the West has not stood up to it, which has disappointed many. 
They’re losing the hearts and minds of the democrats in Bahrain66.” Similarly, an April 
2011 Washington Post article found that pro-democracy protesters were “very, very 
disappointed” by the American response to the uprising, with one activist charging the 
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United States as protecting the Bahraini leaders67; much in the same vein, a March 2011 
New York Times article reported that many protesters felt that their movement was 
being directly impeded by the unwillingness of United States officials to criticize 
Bahraini leaders in fear of losing access to a naval port on Bahraini territory68.  
Several other prominent instances of Bahraini disillusionment towards the 
West’s pallid response further highlight the fact that activists were intentionally tracking 
the stances of other countries. Following a statement made by President Barack 
Obama’s statement that exerted a slight amount of pressure on Bahraini authorities, 
according to a PBS News Hour report, “Sheikh Ali Salman, leader of the largest 
opposition party Al Wefaq…was “delighted” to hear the criticism of the detentions of 
opposition leaders and the destruction of Shia mosques. But Salman remained wary. “I 
am pleased with the whole speech, and now looking for the speech to be carried out in 
practice,” he said, adding “there shouldn’t be a different standard” for how the U.S. 
responds to uprisings in different countries.”” Similarly, the same report details an 
interview with a human rights activist with several arrested family members who 
declared, ““The U.S. is directly complicit in the violations taking place in Bahrain right 
now because there’s been a lot more silence about these violations than there has been 
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 Al-Khawaja (2014) finds that once the United States government failed to forcefully condemn the arrival 
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in other countries.”” For these activists,  help from outside forces was clearly something 
that they desired, and a factor that could have sustained the movement69. 
 One final example reinforces the themes presented here about demonstrators’ 
desire for Western support, as well as their disappointment when this support largely 
failed to materialize. A March 2011 New York Times article notes, “Yet those who lead 
and take part in the nearly daily demonstrations here say they fear at least one key 
difference: The United States may not be fully on their side. “The U.S. is not acting like 
they did in other countries,” said Ali Najaf, who marched on Friday amid a sea of red-
and-white Bahraini flags. “We thought they would support the people7071.”” Again, the 
disillusionment and failed hope in these types of statements is clearly apparent. 
 What type of picture do the concrete data from NAVCO 3.0 depict regarding the 
dynamics of the 2011 protest movement in Bahrain? Figure 5.2 below plots day-by-day 
changes in crowd size among activists, as well as statements and actions taken by 
external democratic and autocratic forces throughout the movement. Again, the blue bar 
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graphs represent estimated peak crowd size (in the thousands); red bar graphs 
represent actions taken to show democratic support, with higher graphs indicating more 
support on a certain day; and green bar graphs representing cases of authoritarian 
intervention or support for the Bahraini regime. 
 Figure 5.2 portrays several interesting findings. First, one can see that the 
movement’s highest levels of participation – estimated in the data set at approximately 
200,000 people on each day – occurred after several days of statements that were made 
by external democratic actors. These include a statement from the United Nations 
criticizing disproportionate force from the regime against activists; the governments of 
the United States and the United Kingdom expressing “deep concern” and “calls for 
restraint,” respectively; a condemnation by President Obama of the use of violence in 
the country; and calls from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for Bahrain to issue 
reforms in showing restraint. While the preceding section has shown that none of these 
statements truly had any real teeth due to American and British unwillingness to disrupt 
the strategic or financial status quo, these proclamations do demonstrate that protesters 
initially heard some degree of international support. As Figure 5.2 makes clear, this 
period of attention was immediately followed by the largest protest participation of the 
entire movement. While this alone cannot prove causality, it does demonstrate an 
interesting relationship suggesting that protesters might have been emboldened by the 
international attention to take to the streets in larger and larger numbers. 
 As one can see from the figure, however, this international attention began to 
deplete shortly thereafter, as did the number of people willing to challenge their leaders. 
The most significant effects of external autocratic actors clearly occurred on March 14, 




down the movement. This was followed by more criticism from the West (represented 
by the subsequent shorter red bar graphs) and a brief resurgence in protest crowd size, 
but the uprising never recovered to its prior peak. Taken together with the qualitative 
findings presented above, this shows that in the absence of democratic support but the 
presence of autocratic intervention, protesters rationally decided to stand down. 
 Given these factors, what was the ultimate outcome of Bahrain’s movement? In 
stark contrast to the Orange Revolution, protesters failed to achieve any of their goals. 
The country has not made meaningful progress towards reforming its political 
institutions, and its freedoms actually declined in the wake of the uprising – while 
Bahrain’s Freedom House score was 5.5 in 2010 and 2011, it dipped to 6 in 2012. 
Further, the government further consolidated power after the protests were contained, 
with security forces arresting and detaining those who were involved in the campaign, 
including human rights activists and editors of the oppositional newspaper Al Wasat. 
Bahrain can therefore be viewed as a situation in which the protest movement’s collapse 
allowed the autocratic regime to maintain its hold on power and preserve the status quo. 
Case study #3: Uzbekistan – the importance of domestic regime capacity 
 The preceding studies have demonstrated that for protesters in authoritarian 
regimes, support from outside forces can be a critical component in determining 
whether a campaign succeeds in its goals. However, many cases around the world also 
exemplify the fundamental importance of domestic regime capacity – when a country is 
simply far too repressive or powerful for outside messages to have much of an effect, 
this can dampen any democratic messaging that might occur. In order to illustrate the 
dynamics of a dominant regime overcoming any democratic signaling, I turn now to a 




 While not as large or long-lasting as other movements profiled here, Andijan still 
justifies inclusion due to the motivations behind the uprising, the international 
response, and the regime’s reaction. The trigger for the protests in Andijan – a city of 
320,000 – was frustration over the arrest and detainment of twenty-three local 
businessmen. A 2015 Al-Jazeera article notes that the arrests served as a focal point 
over years of disillusionment and frustration with the regime’s political and economic 
failings72. According to a report issued by Human Rights Watch, thousands of protesters 
congregated in Andijan’s Bobur Square to challenge the businessmen’s arrests under 
artificial charges of “religious fundamentalism.” Protesters were initially comprised of 
the detainees’ families, but Nichol (2005) notes that the movement eventually grew to 
include other citizens and members of the business community who saw the arrests as 
emblematic of broader problems involving poverty and corruption. While Fumagalli and 
Tordjman (2010) characterize the protesters’ motivations as more economic than 
political, other pieces – including the Al-Jazeera article referenced above – view the 
movement as being influenced by Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution and other “Color 
Revolutions” pushing for democracy and human rights at the time73. 
 It is important to note that the protesters’ tactics were not entirely as peaceful as 
in the other situations studied here. As the Al-Jazeera article notes, the majority of 
protesters were calm; many occupied public buildings in a manner reminiscent of the 
Orange Revolution, utilizing locations as spaces for organization and rest. On May 12, 
                                                          
72
 Mirovalev, Mansur. “Uzbekistan: 10 years after the Andijan massacre.” Al-Jazeera. Published on May 
12, 2015. Available online at 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/05/150511123115026.html. 
73
 A 2005 International Crisis Group report finds that the protests were initially prompted by economic 
concerns over official decrees that leveled high taxes on imports and limited the activities of bazaar 
traders, but also that these problems were compounded by underlying frustration with corruption 




2005, the movement acquired a revolutionary nature as protesters physically broke the 
businessmen out of jail. Demonstrators continued to gather on the following day, but 
the strategies of both the regime and opposition became more violent – the Human 
Rights Watch report indicates that troops surrounded the square and eventually began 
firing indiscriminately into the crowd, shooting and killing hundreds of unarmed 
citizens. In response, some protesters took governmental workers as human shields, 
leading many regime forces to be fatally wounded by troops in addition to the scores of 
activists surrounding them. The report finds that while certain protesters were armed, 
the provocation was begun by the authorities and the fact that so many protesters were 
not armed can reasonably lead the movement to be termed a “massacre.” 
Though most independent sources and eye witness accounts estimate that as 
many as 700 individuals were killed on that day, official governmental reports put the 
number at a much smaller 173. Additionally, authorities claimed in the movement’s 
aftermath that the vast majority of protesters were violent and fundamentalist Islamic 
terrorists. Many scholars challenge this – Hartman (2016) is adamant that these claims 
were untrue; according to his analysis, there were no ties whatsoever between protesters 
and any outside groups, religious or otherwise. Overall, therefore, the Andijan 
movement can be viewed as an uprising against repressive rule and deteriorating 
economic conditions that was ultimately overwhelmed and suppressed by regime forces. 
What was the objective response of international democratic actors at the 
time towards the protests? Though Uzbekistan is not a key player in global affairs, 
democratic organizations have still attempted to establish operations there since the fall 
of the Soviet Union. However, Fumagalli and Tordjman (2010) note that much of this 




much immediate awareness and attention from Western partners as there otherwise 
could have been. Still, numerous governments, international organizations, and human 
rights groups did issue statements in the days after protests were disbanded.   
A number of sanctions were put into place – Axyonova (2015) notes that these 
included an embargo on arms and related technical assistance, as well as travel 
restrictions on twelve Uzbek officials who were responsible for the crackdown; however, 
it appears as though these actions did not have any serious effect on Uzbek authorities. 
Furthermore, Paton Walsh (2005) suggests that it was Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice’s request to Kyrgyzstan that several Uzbek dissidents be safely transferred to a 
neutral country that prompted Uzbekistan to force American troops from its borders, 
indicating the reprisals that officials there took against interference in their affairs. 
The fact that some Western actors did not criticize the authorities and support 
the protesters can be attributed in part to the regime’s ability to control the flow of 
media coming out of Uzbekistan at the time. In the immediate aftermath of the 
massacre, a Human Rights Watch report indicates that “Uzbek authorities imposed a 
strict clampdown on media coverage of the events, effectively banning journalists from 
entering the city and taking harsh measures against those who tried to report openly on 
the events. First, authorities made sure to deal with the journalists who happened to 
witness the killings in Andijan, confiscating materials they managed to gather and 
blatantly threatening them74.” Similarly, Kendzior (2010) finds that authorities expelled 
all foreign media from the country shortly after the protests, preventing them from 
interviewing survivors or making the situation known to a broader audience. This 
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created an environment that prevented protesters from transmitting their message and 
independent media sources elsewhere from knowing what was taking place75. 
Several actors including the United States and the United Nations demanded 
independent investigations into the protests, but as Gleason (2006) points out, Uzbek 
authorities pushed back against any type of intervention from liberal forces, even 
refusing to meet with American politicians who had traveled to Uzbekistan with the 
express purpose of speaking with them. These efforts from the outside were likely well-
received by the population, which data indicate viewed the United States favorably at 
that particular time – a 2002 Pew Research survey found that a full 85% of Uzbek 
respondents reported an either “very favorable” or “favorable” view of the United 
States76. Western organizations and states did implement a series of punishments and 
short-term sanctions aimed against Uzbek leaders, but several authors stress that these 
lacked much bite – Schmitz (2009) finds that the European Union imposed sanctions 
on Uzbekistan in November 2005 but that the sanctions were later abandoned due to 
the country’s strategic importance, while Bosse (2016) notes that the European Union’s 
decision to stop selling arms to the regime was somewhat meaningless as Uzbek leaders 
purchased most weapons at that time from Russia and Ukraine instead. 
The preceding section has shown that a repressive regime capacity prevented 
much democratic support from penetrating into Uzbek society, as crackdowns on 
reporters and other media forces prevented the flow of information into and out of the 
country. It is also important to consider the role played by external authoritarian 
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forces in supporting Karimov in the face of challenges to his regime. Whereas Uzbek 
authorities refused to permit Western media into the country77, to meet with visiting 
American politicians, or to allow an independent inquiry into the protests, Gleason 
(2006) notes that they did allow one foreign team to visit and make an investigation into 
the uprising – a delegation sent from Russia. Given that the Putin regime was one of the 
most prominent backers of Karimov at the time, this is unsurprising as such an inquiry 
would likely find little about which to criticize Uzbek authorities.  
Indeed, the only significant international actors who gave much genuine support 
to the Uzbek regime after the Andijan crisis were both powerful authoritarian neighbors 
– Russia and China. According to Nichol (2005), officials from both states praised the 
regime’s response to “anti-terroristic” activities. While this represents only two 
countries, the fact that both are prominent politically and both play an important role in 
Uzbek affairs likely bolstered the confidence of regime officials and depressed 
oppositional actors’ willingness to continue their uprising. 
There is also evidence that the Uzbek regime used the support of its autocratic 
allies in to burnish its international image, though whether this was successfully 
accomplished is unclear. According to the Human Rights Watch report, “Uzbek 
authorities responded to growing international concern by demonstrating that they have 
nothing to hide, and organized a tour for diplomats and journalists to Andijan on May 
18. About sixty diplomats and journalists, mostly representing official Russian media 
(TV Channels 1 and 2, ITAR-TASS, Rossiiskaia Gazeta, and the like) were taken to 
Andijan on a special plane from Tashkent and driven across Andijan in the course of 
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approximately one hour, accompanied by heavily armed special forces troops. The 
participants were shown the major sites of "rebel" attacks [including the prison].” By 
coopting Russian media, Uzbek authorities attempted to discredit the protesters’ 
narrative, using an ally’s biased news corporations to propagate a false message about 
what truly took place. 
What type of evidence exists that can provide insight into the perceptions of 
protesters at the time of the uprising? Due to the strict limitations placed on media and 
civil society in Uzbekistan, an unfortunately low amount of information is available 
regarding what people were thinking and feeling. This in itself demonstrates that many 
protesters faced an environment that was more repressive and dangerous than many of 
the others that have been profiled in this chapter7879. However, it is possible to use 
reporting gleaned after the fact to show that many activists were hoping to recruit more 
assistance from liberal Western forces than was actually seen or obtained.  
A 2008 New York Times article quotes one activist forced into exile who notes, 
“To be honest, [the West] abandoned us80,” while the director of Human Rights Watch 
recounted the results of his conversations with Uzbeks by noting, ““If I were an Uzbek 
citizen, I would feel abandoned by the West, as if my fate didn’t matter to the West. It 
cannot be put better than that. And I am not in doubt – I know from thousands of 
conversations with Uzbeks – that they increasingly feel that way. I am sure I would. And 
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some of these people will lose all hope in this “Western” idea of democracy81.”” 
Similarly, the preceding New York Times article makes the point that this failure to 
engage Uzbekistan’s protesters could have serious implications for foreign policy in the 
region in the future, stressing that the population is likely to become disillusioned by a 
non-committal response to their demands. The years since the uprising have 
demonstrated a similar pattern, with the continued failure of Western actors to confront 
the Uzbek government continuing to underwhelm activists there8283.  
There also exists evidence that support from then-Uzbek President Islam 
Karimov’s autocratic allies might have suppressed protesters’ interest in maintaining 
their rebellion against leaders. Noubel (2005) suggests that Uzbekistan’s influence over 
its smaller neighbors Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (one of which had just experienced its 
own revolution) prompted leaders of those states to support his crackdown on activists, 
echoing the regime’s stance that radical Islamists were to blame for the conflict. 
Moreover, Ayupova (2015) proposes that the country’s autocratic neighbors promoted 
the narrative that Uzbekistan’s citizens simply did not hold the truly democratic and 
liberal values that would be needed for an uprising to succeed, further undermining 
citizens’ ability to recruit others to join the movement84.  
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Importantly, due to the fact that the uprising was largely not covered by either 
Uzbek or international media, there is little evidence that protesters in other states held 
any types of significant commemorations or events to show a sense of solidarity with the 
activists in Andijan. As a result, it is likely that people there felt that they were 
disconnected from the outside world, reducing their perceptions of any meaningful 
support coming from elsewhere85. Further, Olcott (2007) finds that Chinese and 
Russian officials offset the financial difficulties that Uzbek officials were facing in light 
of Western sanctions, eliminating the chance that the government would need to offer 
any meaningful concessions in order to stabilize itself86. In addition, Schatz (2006) 
suggests that for autocratic regimes such as Uzbekistan, receiving international 
validation from authoritarian allies deepens leaders’ support among segments of the 
population who already view them favorably, preventing the opposition from recruiting 
others in society to join them.  
What information about the protests can be gleaned by analyzing event data 
from NAVCO 3.0? Figure 5.3 below depicts a graphical representation of important 
trends in Andijan, presenting crowd size, external democratic support, and international 
authoritarian intervention. First, it is immediately apparent in Figure 5.3 that this 
campaign was neither as large nor as long-lasting as other movements profiled here. 
Indeed, the movement reached a peak size of approximately five thousand, far below the 
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large masses of people involved in the Orange Revolution. Similarly, this uprising – as a 
distinct event – lasted for only a few days. 
 One striking finding from this chart concerns the fact that while many liberal 
actors issued statements against the regime in the immediate aftermath of the 
shootings, these were not sufficient for driving oppositional forces back onto the streets. 
As an example, according to NAVCO 3.0, May 13 saw the British government urge 
restraint and the White House call for calm in the country; May 14 saw the European 
Union blame the Uzbek government for its draconian response; May 15 saw the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe call for an end to the regime’s 
violence; May 16 saw the French government condemn the violence; May 18 saw the 
United Nations call for an independent probe into the event’s origins and outcome; May 
19 saw the German Foreign Minister call for a similarly independent probe; and May 29 
even saw three American Senators visit Uzbekistan in a call for justice. Despite all of 
these statements and proclamations, however, the data reveal that no protesters ever 
took to the streets again in serious numbers following the initial wave of repression. 
 What events are captured by the authoritarian bar graphs in Figure 5.3? Echoing 
the findings of the reports above, these graphs indicate that on the whole, Uzbek 
authorities neither called for nor received significant amounts of support from 
autocratic allies elsewhere. Indeed, the only significant indicators of autocratic 
expression in the data are a May 13 statement by the Putin administration criticizing the 
protesters’ radical violence and offering praise and support to President Islam Karimov 
and a May 14 statement by Putin expressing concerns over “destabilization” in Central 




was so secure and powerful that it was able to contain the movement, despite the fact 
that it was criticized by the West and received little assistance from allies elsewhere. 
 What was the ultimate outcome of Andijan? Unfortunately, very little changed 
following the protests’ quick end. Uzbekistan’s Freedom House scores from the years 
before and after the uprising provide evidence of this – while the country received 
scores of 6.5 in both 2004 and 2005 (denoting an extremely repressive but not 
totalitarian form of government), Uzbekistan’s rating in 2006 slipped to 7, the worst 
score that a country can receive. This is echoed by many of the authors profiled here – 
Schmitz (2009) expressly notes that the movement did not achieve any of its goals, 
while Fumagalli (2006) states that the regime went as far as to seal the Andijan area off 
from the rest of the country to ensure that the campaign did not spread. Uzbek leaders 
appear to have reflected their shift towards full authoritarianism by re-orienting 
Uzbekistan’s foreign policy as well – Gleason (2006) finds that in the wake of the 
uprising, Uzbek forces ordered American troops to leave the country and intentionally 
began to pursue closer ties with Russia.  
Fumagalli and Tordjman (2010) and Herd (2005) posit that this reorientation in 
Uzbekistan was driven by leaders’ fears that the uprising was yet another “Color 
Revolution” backed by Western forces, making closer alignment with Putin’s Russia 
more attractive. The uprising therefore failed to achieve any of its economic or political 
missions, stressing the fundamental importance not only of international factors but 
also of an authoritarian state’s domestic regime capacity. I now turn to the fourth case 






Case study #4 – Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution of 2005 
 This dissertation is concerned not only with protesters’ domestic frustrations in 
authoritarian states, but also with what these activists think about outside forces. The 
case of Lebanon’s 2005 “Cedar Revolution”  is therefore extremely relevant in this 
regard – Lebanese activists took to the streets not only to challenge their national 
leaders’ dismal record on corruption and human rights abuses, but also specifically to 
protest decades of unwanted outside influence from Syria on their country’s political 
and socioeconomic development. As the following study will show, for protesters in the 
Cedar Revolution, one of their main motivating factors was precisely to challenge 
undesired authoritarian intervention from a neighboring country. 
 Before delving into the specific trigger that prompted activists to take to the 
streets, it is important to first explore Lebanon’s history and its complicated relationship 
with Syria to understand how this dynamic shaped both Lebanon’s political past as well 
as the foundations of the Cedar Revolution. As Safa (2006) explains, much of Lebanon’s 
history has been one of foreign intervention and influence – as far back as the early 
twentieth century, great powers including France and Great Britain intervened to 
partition the country and its neighbors into independent states. Lebanon was again 
influenced by external actors throughout the Cold War, as Egyptian forces supported 
local Communist actors while the United States intervened to back an anti-Communist 
opposition. The population was then altered by Palestinians who entered Lebanon after 
the creation of Israel, producing another situation in which developments elsewhere 
affected Lebanon’s internal dynamics. The most significant factor for understanding 





 Syrian troops decided to enter Lebanon in 1976 to restore order and to protect 
Muslims from the conflict that was taking place. Following their arrival, however, these 
forces essentially then failed to leave for the next thirty years. Instead, they became 
more and more entrenched, keeping an active presence of twenty thousand troops on 
Lebanese soil.  In addition to this physical presence, Syria’s political influence also 
began to grow significantly – in 1990, the Arab League brokered the Taif Accord, a 
provision that created a “special relationship” between Syria and Lebanon that further 
undermined and weakened the smaller state. Syrian officials used their money and 
influence to recruit the loyalty of Lebanese politicians who would support closer ties 
between the two countries, effectively purchasing their partnership in a mafia-like 
behavior allowing them to run governmental affairs and dole out the spoils of power. 
In the face of Syria’s disproportionate influence on Lebanese affairs, one 
particular figure emerged as a prominent champion of Lebanon’s development and a 
fierce critic of Syrian involvement. Safa (2006) notes that politician Rafic Hariri grew to 
become a key proponent for the country, investing in business and political sectors to 
help cities such as Beirut develop independently of Syrian influence. He was eventually 
elected Prime Minister, and was highly critical of efforts that urged Lebanese politicians 
to amend their constitution to allow pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud to extend his 
time in office. This made him a prominent enemy of Syrian-aligned forces in the 
Lebanese government and Syrian President Bashar Al Assad. 
Hariri eventually resigned from his post as Prime Minister, but his role in 
sparking the Cedar Revolution itself was crystallized on February 14, 2005 when a car 
bomb exploded and killed Hariri and twenty-one members of his security team. Hariri’s 




suspicions that pro-Syrian forces in the government had been involved in his 
assassination. His death was the ignition to unite citizens frustrated with the direction 
that Lebanon had taken, and the revolution was underway. 
Knio (2005) summarizes the fundamental goals of the Cedar Revolution neatly 
and succinctly, noting that “the political demands of this popular movement were very 
straightforward. The opposition called for a clear timetable for a complete withdrawal of 
Syrian armed troops and intelligence services (armed troops are estimated to be around 
14,000), the removal of Lebanese intelligence chiefs, the appointment of a “neutral” 
government with the task of preparing parliamentary elections for May 2005, and an 
international investigation into Hariri’s death” (225). The movement therefore explicitly 
concerned itself with both domestic and international considerations. An attempted 
governmental cover-up of Hariri’s assassination only served to fan the flames – by 
producing stories about Islamic suicide bombers that turned out to be complete 
fabrications, regime authorities unwittingly undermined themselves and strengthened 
protesters’ resolve to challenge the regime in pursuit of a new path forward. 
Protesters were directly influenced by anti-governmental movements that had 
taken place elsewhere. Safa writes that Lebanese activists were inspired by Georgia’s 
2003 Rose Revolution, Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, and Iraq’s nascent 2005 
“Purple Revolution,” all of which involved popular calls and proclamations in support of 
democratic governance. He goes on to state that this influence was widely noted in 
Lebanese media at the time, finding that “interviews, talk- show discussions, and 
commentaries buzzed with the drawing of parallels between the Beirut protests and the 




communist forces tried to steal the presidential election through means that included a 
possible assassination attempt on a popular opposition leader” (32). 
What did the protests look like, and what were their tactics? First, the 
movement united a diverse set of citizens who were willing to work with a variety of 
religious and ethnic groups. According to Norton (2007), the anti-governmental 
coalition brought together Sunni Muslims, Druze, and Christians, an impressive task in 
a country with marked religious diversity. Sutton (2014) notes that while early protests 
managed to attract approximately twenty thousand protesters, later events were much 
larger, garnering the support of eight hundred thousand. Sutton further finds that 
protesters advocated the usage of non-violent techniques that would eventually be used 
in the Arab Spring, writing that “in the development of tented protest communities, like 
“Camp Freedom,” and the vast numbers of often secular middle-class protesters who 
occupied the streets, the protests of the Cedar Revolution mirrored and arguably 
inspired those seen in Tahrir Square” (99). 
There is much evidence that protesters were agitating against undue Syrian 
influence on their country. Geukjian (2017) shows how Syrians were keeping the 
Lebanese parliament from operating as an independent political body, weakening its 
ability to represent Lebanese interests. More anecdotally, Kurtulus (2009) provides a 
quote from a protester who claimed, ““We don't want Syrian spies and secret police; we 
don't want any foreign intervention. Those Lebanese who want the Syrians to stay can 
go live in Syria. There are plenty of Lebanese here to fill the country”” (200). 
How did the movement ultimately evolve? Tens of thousands of Lebanese 
gathered in Beirut’s central Martyrs’ Square on February 28 to watch Prime Minister 




forces. Lebanese and Syrian supporters of Hezbollah held a large counter-rally on March 
8 to support Syria’s presence in Lebanon, but this was dwarfed by a massive rally on 
March 14 that attracted nearly 1.2 million protesters – roughly a quarter of Lebanon’s 
population at the time – on the streets of Beirut to demand Syria’s withdrawal from the 
country, to push for an investigation into Hariri’s death, and to demand new legislative 
elections that would take place without any type of Syrian interference. Karami’s 
resignation was therefore a first step in achieving the protesters’ demands, but it was not 
the only goal that activists hoped to attain. Importantly for my theoretical framework, 
much evidence indicates that protesters remained calm and non-violent throughout the 
duration of their campaign – activists sang, danced, and offered flowers to regime 
security forces, meaning that the revolution did not become bloody or violent as a means 
of pursuing its broader mission. 
According to several scholars and news reports, objective statements made and 
actions taken by external democratic forces were highly instrumental in motivating 
protesters to agitate against the regime. Kurtulus (2009) points to survey data collected 
at the time indicating that for many activists, the main legal reasoning demanding a 
Syrian withdrawal was the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, which was 
adopted on September 2, 2004 and called for a free and fair presidential election and for 
remaining foreign forces (understood to be Syrian troops) to withdraw. This indicates 
that international support for the opposition clearly existed and was being signaled to 
activists well before people began to take to the streets following Hariri’s assassination. 
Further evidence that the debate was internationalized can be found in statements from 
politicians at that time – Kurtulus notes that then-Prime Minister Karami “declared that 




with the United States and Israel” (203). In framing the debate between regime insiders 
and the opposition in this manner, Karami and other officials were clearly priming 
citizens to think of the debate over Syria in a very interventionist, international way. 
Support from outside forces was strong and visible for nearly the entire duration 
of the movement. Hariri was a particularly well-connected politician with ties to leaders 
both in Western states and in the authoritarian regime of Saudi Arabia. This created an 
unusual alliance in which actors from both realms were calling for an investigation into 
his death, meaning that the proclamations had more force than they would have had 
they come from the West alone – by joining together with an Arab state in Lebanon’s 
neighborhood, Kurtulus (2009) and Geukjian (2017) note, this transformed what had 
formerly been tacit disapproval into real and tangible criticism of the regime and its 
response to the crisis. 
This criticism took very concrete forms at different points during the protest 
movement. Geukjian (2014) notes that the United States and France were instrumental 
in galvanizing the UN Security Council Resolution 1559 that demanded the withdrawal 
of Syrian troops from Lebanon, and that these countries were able to recruit other Arab 
allies such as Egypt in addition to Saudi Arabia to give the proclamation more heft. 
Additionally, Kulic (2016) notes that broader European Union pressure on the Lebanese 
authorities increased during this time as well, turning from something that was rather 
symbolic into something more truly effective and forceful. 
Democratic support for the opposition at this time was also apparent because of 
the opportunities that were afforded to politicians making their case to the West. As 
evidence of this, Kurtulus (2009) discusses the fact that Lebanese legislator Walid 




troops to be deployed to Lebanon to install order after Hariri’s assassination; he then 
gathered nine other oppositional parliamentary figures to meet with representatives 
from the European Union who visited Lebanon to hear their perspective. Following this, 
Jumblatt traveled to the United States and met with both Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice and United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to appeal for their support. 
Furthermore, this interest from Western forces in assisting the opposition 
continued even more intensively in the days immediately before and after the country’s 
first post-Revolution election. Monitored closely by international election observers 
from the European Union, the election’s results installed a new government dominated 
by oppositional forces. Secretary of State Rice visited Lebanon three days after the new 
government was elected. Upon arriving in Lebanon, Rice decided to meet with 
opposition leader Saad Hariri (son of the assassinated Prime Minister) before any other 
governmental official and subsequently decried President Emile Lahoud (an ally of 
Syrian forces) as the “old Lebanon87.” 
Finally, this Western influence continued on behalf of the opposition even after 
the election had taken place and the new government was installed. Safa (2006) notes 
that the last Syrian troops left Lebanon’s borders on April 26, 2005, marking the first 
time that Lebanon had been free of Syrian presence in nearly thirty years. Following 
this, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1595, calling for an 
international investigation to determine the identities of Harari’s assassination; the 
study ultimately found the perpetrators to be a series of both Syrian and Lebanese 
operatives and conspirators, providing some justice in this particular case. 
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Also important was the role played by media in the Cedar Revolution. As previous 
case studies have shown, media openness often plays a critical role in determining a 
movement’s success. In Lebanon, the environment was sufficiently free and open to 
allow protesters to capture the world’s attention. Indeed, as Safa (2006) notes, 
“throughout the crisis and ensuring standoff with the government, sympathetic print 
and broadcast media – themselves basking in what they saw as the restoration of full 
freedoms of speech and assembly – gave the demonstrators wide and favorable 
coverage” (32). Furthermore, he specifically points to the fact that the campaign 
fostered transnational linkages through which supporters in other countries were able to 
express their sympathies, noting, “The March 14 rallies were beamed all over the world 
thanks to Arabic-language satellite-television networks, and messages of support poured 
in from across the globe all the next week” (33). Similar to Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, 
it appears that a free media apparatus was instrumental in creating a feeling of 
purposive solidarity through which protesters were able to form connections with 
people elsewhere, granting them the feeling that they were not alone and that important 
actors and citizens elsewhere supported their cause. 
The preceding section has shown that there was extensive democratic support for 
anti-governmental protesters before, during, and after the growth of the Cedar 
Revolution. What role did external authoritarian actors objectively play in the 
movement? Most apparent, of course, is the presence of Syrian troops and Syrian 
influence on Lebanese politicians that endured for nearly three decades – this 
imposition from an external force played a visible role in everyday life. Norton (2007) 
notes that this likely persisted in some manner after the election, despite the removal of 




positive towards Syrian involvement, and members of the opposition continued to see 
Hezbollah as an internal tool of the Syrian regime due to its radical Islamic nature and 
its ties to Syria. Additionally, but less visibly, Nizameddin (2008) suggests that the 
Russian government might have played some role in supporting the Syrian presence; he 
notes that the Soviet Union actively aided Syria during the Cold War and that this 
positive relationship has continued into the present day, partially as a way for the Putin 
regime to extend its own influence into Middle Eastern affairs. This is therefore not as 
apparent as the Syrian presence, but it does point to the possibility that Russian forces 
were supportive of Syria’s involvement in Lebanon. 
What individual-level evidence exists that Lebanese citizens were protesting 
against autocratic intervention from Syrian forces, or that outside liberal actors played 
some part in shaping the dynamics of the movement? As presented in the preceding 
section of this study, numerous reports indicated that protesters were virulently and 
visibly anti-Syrian in their campaign, stressing that activists were angered by and 
pushing back against unwanted external intervention from an authoritarian neighbor. 
Indeed, a British Broadcasting Company report indicates that prominent among the 
protesters were farmers, taxi drivers, and construction workers chanting both “down 
with the government” and “Syria out8889.” According to the same article, several 
protesters began to dress in red and white clothing, transposing the main colors of 
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Lebanon’s flag onto their bodies in order to convey the nationalist, anti-occupation 
perspective that motivated many of them to take to the streets. 
Similarly, a separate British Broadcasting Report noted that many protesters 
were chanting slogans explicitly blaming Syria both for Hariri’s death and for other 
problems facing Lebanon, as well as championing the need for increased Lebanese 
independence and self-governance free from Syrian intervention – one protester is 
quoted in the article as shouting, “It is the 21st century, and people should be able to 
govern themselves. We have to regain our country90.” Moreover, other news reports 
conducted at the time depict Lebanese protesters who demanded that Syria exit 
Lebanon and let protesters take care of themselves91, a sentiment that was strengthened 
by sympathetic media coverage92. Echoing tactics utilized by protesters in the “color 
revolutions” that took place during the same period, activists in Beirut relied heavily 
upon cell phones and the Internet to mobilize people in support of their cause93. It is 
worth noting that while Lebanon at the time was hardly democratic, it also was not 
severely authoritarian – instead, participants in the protests enjoyed a fair amount of 
autonomy from government repression, a factor that lowered their perceptions of the 
dangers that might be involved in joining the nascent revolution. 
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While there was clearly evidence gleaned from interviews and on-the-ground 
reports that many Lebanese were actively protesting against unwanted autocratic 
intervention into their affairs, what information exists to show that protesters were 
aided in their efforts by democratic forces? First, several sources provide strong 
indicators both that activists were aware of attention being paid to their cause and that 
they were working intentionally to deepen this attention. This is summarized in detail in 
a March 2005 Washington Post article, which notes, “[No] Lebanese citizen bothers to 
be furtive when speaking Syria's name. Today, they hang it from the tops of buildings in 
Martyrs' Square. They work it into clever English-language puns on signboards: "Syria's 
killers get out." They chant it in slogans, on CNN and on al-Jazeera, and freely give their 
names to international news reporters. After the shocking assassination of former prime 
minister Rafiq Hariri last month, the anti-Syria movement has become big, brash and 
unapologetic. “Why should we be afraid of Syria now?” one protest organizer in Martyrs' 
Square asked me. “The world is watching us on television94.”” Interestingly, this same 
article reports that many protesters were actively inspired by the success of Ukraine’s 
Orange Revolution, leading them to emulate the earlier movement’s direct appeals for 
assistance from outside forces and indicating again that activists incorporate the 
international context into their perceptions as well. 
In terms of the active strategies that protesters employed to maximize the chance 
that they would secure support from external actors, one of the most important was 
focused on marketing and projecting a certain image of the movement. One activist 
reported during an interview that groups of protesters were intentionally making 
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calculations about how best to signify an easily visible and unified front that would 
convey the message of the campaign, noting, “We were there to think: what to do? Who 
to support? How to make this work? How to support the youths in the tents? We needed 
to ensure that there were enough printed signs and slogans… We discussed how to 
ensure the continuity of this…to reach the objective of getting Syria out95.” 
These slogans were clearly designed to appeal both to domestic and international 
audiences as evidenced by the colors that were chosen by protesters to wear and the 
language in which many signs were written. As noted above, many protesters 
intentionally wore red and white clothing to send a clear signal to local and external 
news cameras that their movement was fundamentally rooted in securing Lebanese 
independence and democratic governance96. Protest leaders also worked closely with 
branding companies including the public relations firm Quantum Communications to 
design signs and posters in white and red which read, “Independence ’05.” According to 
Eli Khoury, President of Quantum Communications, the ’05 indicated the end date by 
which protesters demanded Syrian troops be withdrawn from the country97. 
Equally important in securing international attention was the fact that many 
protesters bore signs inscribed in the English language. According to a Tavaana report, 
“Knowing full well the role international pressure can play in civic disputes of such 
magnitude, the demonstrators made sure to play to both local and international 
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audiences by making signs in both English and Arabic, giving them a more accessible 
brand image.” Again, the notion of central importance here is that many protesters were 
attempting to capture the attention of important forces outside of Lebanon. Had this not 
been the case, signs would likely all have been printed in either Arabic or French, the 
two languages that are most predominant in the country. 
Technology played a significant role in allowing these citizens to convey their 
messages to a broad audience. Al-Jazeera was particularly critical, as it was able to 
operate relatively independently of serious censorship or repression by the Lebanese 
government at the time98. Similarly, Seib (2007) notes that many protesters strategically 
utilized online streaming websites, where direct video and audio feeds from Beirut’s 
Martyr’s Square could be transmitted instantaneously around the world, bringing 
protesters’ demands onto screens across the globe. 
While the preceding section has focused on protesters’ ability to use signs, colors, 
and technology to make appeals for international support, one particularly critical 
external factor particularly relevant for Lebanon was the role played by the Lebanese 
diaspora. Indeed, the diaspora evinced two of this project’s main theoretical notions – 
the need to promote purposive solidarity with protesters in Beirut and the ability to 
affect the protests’ success by lobbying politicians in their home countries to support 
the revolution. Earlier sections of this dissertation have shown how external actors can 
promote purposive solidarity by holding rallies in their own countries to send the 
message that protesters are being heard.  Numerous articles discuss the fact that the 
Lebanese diaspora held simultaneous rallies in locations including Paris, London, and 
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Sydney, where over ten thousand individuals took to the streets in solidarity with the 
Cedar Revolution99100. Other sources report that in addition to holding solidarity rallies, 
many members of the Lebanese diaspora actually traveled to Beirut for the duration of 
the protests to lend their voices to the cause. 
According to Fakhoury (2018), Lebanon’s diaspora population began to grow 
following the country’s Civil War in 1975, an event that led Lebanese to migrate across 
North America, South America, Western Europe, and Northern Africa. Many members 
of this diaspora became highly educated, and remittances sent from these emigres to 
Lebanon constitute approximately fifteen to twenty percent of the country’s Gross 
Domestic Product. Skulte-Ouaiss and Tabar (2014) note that members of this 
community have also sought to remain politically involved in the affairs of their former 
homeland, monitoring events and remaining intensively engaged. Koinova (2011) shows 
how these politically- inclined members of the diaspora directly involved themselves in 
campaigning for the success of the Cedar Revolution, as Lebanese-Americans in 
particular were forceful advocates lobbying for international pressure against Syria’s 
presence in Lebanon and subsequent support for the activists. As a result, this sent a 
message to participants in Beirut that their compatriots were acting on their behalf. 
Additionally, evidence exists to the present day indicating that members of the 
Lebanese diaspora remain poised to step in should a similar movement arise in the 
future. In 2015, the Lebanese Information Center and other Lebanese-American 
organizations held a special event on Capitol Hill to commemorate the tenth anniversary 
of the revolution. In doing so, the organizations reaffirmed their commitment towards 
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lobbying leaders for their attention towards Lebanese causes. Additionally, the event 
organizers issued a statement reading, “The 10th anniversary of the Cedar Revolution is 
an important milestone for us, as Americans of Lebanese descent, as we work to keep 
the cause of a free Lebanon alive for decision-makers in Washington, D.C. and around 
the world…Every year, this commemoration sends a powerful message that the 
Lebanese diaspora in the United States and the US government will stand together, now 
more than ever, in support of the Lebanese people, the legitimate institutions of the 
Lebanese state, and the struggle for genuine democracy, stability, and peace in 
Lebanon101.” This clear expression of promised aid sends a message to the Lebanese 
people that they will be assisted in any future causes they might undertake, granting 
them some comfort in the face of possible governmental repression. 
Several preceding case studies have presented graphical representations of event 
data to depict trends in crowd size and patterns in international statements made to 
support or challenge the protesters. Unfortunately, the Lebanon case was not included 
in NAVCO 3.0, meaning that including a comparable graphical representation for this 
situation is not possible. However, it is possible to turn to other forms of data to indicate 
the beliefs that were motivating people to take to the streets at that time. 
Kurtulus (2009) points in his study to survey data collected during the protests, 
as researchers asked respondents specifically about their views of Syrian troops and the 
United States of America, the leading international figureheads on the two sides of the 
debate. According to his findings, Lebanese citizens were roughly divided into two 
opposing camps when it came to both religion and their stance on the protests – one 
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camp was largely against the Syrian presence and consisted of Christian Maronites, 
Druze (a monotheistic Abrahamic religion), and Sunni Muslims, while the other camp 
was largely pro-Syrian and consisted much more heavily of Shiite Muslims. Among 
those in the first camp, 94% of Maronites, 75% of Druze, and 53.3% of Sunnis felt that 
the full and immediate withdrawal of Syrian troops was essential for resolving the 
Lebanese crisis. In stark contrast, Kurtulus notes that only 24.6% of Shiite Muslims felt 
this way, indicating that this group was likely the base of the many counter-protests 
organized by Hezbollah to advocate for a continued Syrian presence. 
These differing motivations are reinforced by other survey data as well. Kurtulus 
reports the findings of questions measuring respondents’ attitudes and beliefs towards 
both the United States and the United Nations Council Resolution 1636, which openly 
criticized Syria. According to the data, 65% of Druze, 58% of Maronites, and 40.5% of 
Sunni Muslims regarded the United States as an “ally or friend” of Lebanon. These 
numbers are not overwhelmingly positive, but they are markedly higher than the 3.6% 
of Shiite Muslims who responded to this question in the same way. This indicates that 
for many activists, support from the United States was welcome and desirable. 
Further, when asked about the UN Council Resolution, this internationally-endorsed 
document was viewed positively by 97.7% of Maronites, 97.1% of Druze, and 87% of 
Sunni Muslims. Conversely, only 9.6% of Shiite Muslims responded favorably to this 
question, indicating a deeply held division in views of Syrian involvement and 
democratic support. These data do not encapsulate all protesters, of course, but they still 
provide compelling evidence not only that people on the streets were aware of 
international forces intervening to shape their country’s dynamics, but that they also 




The preceding section shows that Western support for the protesters likely played 
a role in galvanizing their decision to remain on the streets against leaders. What was 
the ultimate outcome of the Cedar Revolution? In the short term, the movement 
achieved its goals – several key governmental officials stepped down from power and 
new elections were held shortly afterwards. As Safa (2006) and Sutton (2014) note, the 
2005 election created a legislature that was voted in through one of the fairest and freest 
processes in Lebanese history. In addition to actually forcing Syrian troops to withdraw, 
the movement also spurred Lebanese civil society to become more active, leading to a 
deeper sense of civic engagement that for a time overcame many of the country’s 
sectarian and religious divisions. Politically, the movement seemed to have positive 
effects as well – an analysis of the country’s Freedom House ratings shows that 
Lebanon’s rating improved from a 5.5 in 2004 and 2005 to a 4.5 in 2006102. 
The decade and a half since the protests have seen a greater amount of political 
and societal flux, though the situation currently appears to again be rather stable. 
Geukjian (2014, 2017) finds that tensions between anti-Syrian and pro-Syrian forces in 
Lebanese society came to a head in the years immediately after the election, leading to a 
series of violent clashes and instability, and suggests that outside actors did not do 
enough to mollify a situation that they in large part helped cause. Sutton notes that 
Lebanon’s Freedom House score increased to a high of 4.0 in 2011, but also that the 
score has since reverted back to 4.5; nevertheless, this still remains a lasting 
improvement on the country’s pre-2005 ratings. 
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Sutton also stresses that the Syrian Civil War has undoubtedly strained tensions, 
a fact that is likely given that a June 2019 Associated Press report indicates that out of 
Lebanon’s current population of five million, a full one million are Syrian refugees103, or 
twenty percent of the state’s residents. This does not mean that the Syrian government 
is necessarily extending its influence in a way that is reminiscent of the past, of course, 
as these refugees are fleeing the very leaders that had been intervening in Lebanese 
affairs earlier, but it does demonstrate that the relationship will likely continue to 
remain tense in the future. I now turn to the fifth and final case study of this chapter – 
an analysis of the ongoing uprising that has continued to grip Venezuela amidst a 
deepening economic and humanitarian crisis. 
Case study #5 – An uprising in contemporary Venezuela 
The final case study in this chapter is different from the others explored above 
due to the fact that it is a dynamic protest movement that is still ongoing – the 
movement’s outcome is currently unknown, as the protesters have not decisively 
succeeded or fallen short in their goals of demanding regime change. Nevertheless, it is 
still an extremely valuable case to analyze here because it fits the parameters of my 
theoretical framework well, and provides evidence of both strong democratic support for 
the protesters’ demands and visible authoritarian aid to the embattled President Nicolás 
Maduro. Evidence exists that these international factors are affecting protesters’ 
perceptions in addition to relevant domestic variables at hand, and exploring the 
protests’ dynamics here is therefore an important task. 
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Protests have been taking place in Venezuela for more than half a decade due to 
the country’s urban violence, inflation, chronic shortages of basic services and goods, 
and slide into repressive governance. The following case study will focus specifically on 
protests that have taken place between 2017 and 2019, as this represents a distinct event 
with a more discrete beginning and cause than would be possible to identify if I 
attempted a broader study of the multi-year movement. For the most recent round of 
protests, one primary trigger that prompted Venezuelans to take to the streets was 
Maduro’s second inauguration as President of the country on January 10, 2019. 
These protests are the culmination of years of frustration over governmental 
crises that have engulfed Venezuela. Puerta Riera (2018) provides a particularly 
illuminating perspective on the problems the country has faced– Venezuelan officials 
committed a number of harmful acts since 2013 that severely damaged both the 
country’s financial development and its (nominally) democratic institutions. Among 
these have been rampant corruption and economic crime that drove the inflation rate to 
the world’s highest at 254.9% in 2018; widespread poverty and lack of access to food 
that have left 33% of Venezuelans medically malnourished; actions taken by the 
Supreme Court (regarded in the country as a tool of the regime) to strip the legislative 
National Assembly of its functions and bring it under the control of a combined 
executive-judicial branch of government; and a military apparatus that remains 
committed to protecting the regime, likely because top generals and officials realize that 
they would be subject to international prosecution for human rights abuses should their 
allies in the Maduro regime fall from power104. 
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Puerta Riera goes on to propose that many of the protesters are likely doing so 
because very few have solid memories of life under Venezuela’s prior military 
dictatorships; instead, many Venezuelans (particularly younger citizens) have become 
accustomed to living in a more democratic, open society. To provide quantitative 
evidence of this, she points to public opinion surveys showing that according to 
Latinobarometer studies, satisfaction with democracy in Venezuela fell from 24% to 13% 
between 2016 and 2017, a trend that is a full seventeen points below the regional 
average. Other authors provide similar evidence regarding the extent to which life in 
Venezuela has become dire and untenable under Maduro. A 2019 CBS News report 
indicated that nearly 94% of Venezuelans were living in poverty despite the country’s 
natural resource wealth from oil and other products105, while Ellis (2017) notes that 
more than seventy percent of Venezuelan citizens reported losing weight in 2017 due to 
food shortages throughout the country. Ellis goes on to note that this health crisis has a 
political dimension as well, as the country’s politicized military has the power to 
distribute food rations to different neighborhoods. Given the regime’s autocratic bent, 
troops are often instructed to give more food to regions that are supportive of the 
government, punishing those who have been critical of Maduro. This problem is 
compounded by the fact that the military has been infiltrated by spies from Cuba, many 
of whom report on potential defectors in order to keep the armed forces loyal to the 
state. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
centers that provide ninety percent of the country’s medical care. Further, the same study finds that child 
morality has increased by thirty percent in recent years. This has led to the fact that out of all the 
displaced persons currently living around the world today, approximately five percent are Venezuelans 
who have been driven out of their home due to the regime’s policies and living conditions in their country.  
105 Ruffini, Christina. “Venezuelan refugees demand U.S. action as Pompeo visits Colombian border.” CBS 






The crisis has continued to grow, leading more Venezuelans to head not only to 
the streets but also out of the country itself. As a June 2019 National Public Radio 
report notes, more than four million Venezuelans have left their home for other nations 
in recent years, leading to a massive humanitarian and migration problem106. The 
overall sense that the current situation is not sustainable can be effectively captured by a 
quote in a news report from FRANCE 24 published earlier this year – the publication 
cites 70-year old small business owner Carlos Alberto, who notes, ““We are tired of this 
regime, that has brutally impoverished us. My children and almost all my family have 
already left Venezuela…We know that if it's not today, it will be tomorrow, because this 
has to end107.”” While the protesters’ tactics have not been unilaterally peaceful, the 
majority of activists have been much calmer and more civil than the regime’s repressive 
response against them would justify. As evidence of this, the same report describes the 
fact that following a large-scale May Day protest, regime forces injured forty-six people 
and killed one woman; additionally, forces fired rubber bullets at reporters who were 
standing nearby in an effort to disband them and keep them from transmitting the story. 
What types of clear and objective actions have external democratic actors 
taken to support the protesters? The response has primarily been one of two strategies – 
1) promoting sanctions against Maduro and other members of his regime and 2) offering 
symbolic statements of recognition that the protesters’ cause is just. Within the area of 
sanctions, the United States government under both Presidents Obama and Trump has 
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led the way in promoting economic punishments. As a Congressional Research Service 
report issued on July 5, 2019, notes, “Under the Obama Administration, the Treasury 
Department froze the assets of seven Venezuelans—six members of Venezuela’s security 
forces and a prosecutor who repressed protesters. Under the Trump Administration, the 
Treasury Department currently has sanctions on an additional 78 Venezuelan 
government and military officials. These officials include President Nicolás Maduro and 
his wife, Cecilia Flores; Executive Vice President Delcy Rodriguez; PSUV First Vice 
President Diosdado Cabello; eight Supreme Court members; the leaders of Venezuela’s 
army, national guard, and national police; four state governors; the director of the 
Central Bank of Venezuela; and the foreign minister108.” In addition to this, which 
clearly shows that the American government is sanctioning a number of specific (and 
very high-level) individuals associated with Venezuela’s authoritarian regime, the report 
goes on to note that the Treasury Department has currently issued sanctions against 115 
different people in total, revoked visas from hundreds of others, issued sanctions against 
Venezuela’s state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), sanctioned then 
Vice-President Tareck El Aissami for drug trafficking, and also sanctioned non- 
Venezuelan shipping companies that were nonetheless doing business with the regime. 
Finally, the report finds that the United States Congress enacted the Venezuela 
Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act in 2014 which, among other goals, 
“requires the President to impose sanctions (asset blocking and visa restrictions) against 
those whom the President determines are responsible for significant acts of violence or 
serious human rights abuses associated with protests in February 2014 or, more 
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broadly, against anyone who has directed or ordered the arrest or prosecution of a 
person primarily because of the person’s legitimate exercise of freedom of expression or 
assembly.” This Act was later extended by a Congressional vote into 2019, indicating 
that the provisions regarding sanctions are active. Other reports show that the American 
government continues to impose new sanctions on relevant individuals and entities well 
into 2019 – a National Public Radio report issued in June 2019 notes that the Trump 
administration recently imposed sanctions against Nicolás Maduro Guerra, Maduro’s 
son – the head of the Corps of the Special Inspectors of the Presidency and a member of 
the pro-government National Constituent Assembly – in an effort to further punish the 
regime for corruption and its role in suppressing protests. 
As the preceding section shows, aggressive and targeted sanctions from the 
United States government have served as one of the clearest international signals of a 
democratic state pressuring the Maduro regime to end its repression of protesters and 
the Venezuelan people more broadly. Another technique that democratic forces have 
adopted in criticizing Maduro and offering their support to the opposition has been 
through the proclamation of symbolic statements and messages that endorse Juan 
Guaidó as Venezuela’s legitimately elected President, championing those in the country 
who dissent against Maduro’s rule. 
As evidence of this, one can analyze the text of a prominent speech made by 
Donald Trump to various members of Miami’s Venezuelan and Cuban expatriate and 
refugee communities on February 18, 2019. It is important to note that this speech – as 
is the case with many speeches given by Trump throughout the duration of his 
Presidency – often deviates aimlessly from its intended message, wandering 




numerous members of his administration, as well as attacking the ideological tenets of 
socialism (and implicitly, communism) more broadly beyond its existence in Venezuela. 
Nevertheless, it is also extremely important to note that despite these reprehensible 
issues, the speech itself also contains many clear, overt, and unequivocal statements of 
support for the protesters. In this case, therefore, the leading figure of one of the most 
powerful nations on the planet was specifically recognizing and affirming the country’s 
support for members of the anti-Maduro opposition109. 
As proof of this, it is possible to provide specific passages from Trump’s speech 
here110. Among other statements, he noted that “Today, our hearts are filled with hope 
because of the determination of millions of everyday Venezuelans, the patriotism of the 
Venezuelan National Assembly, and the incredible courage of Interim President Juan 
Guaidó. The people of Venezuela are standing for freedom and democracy, and the 
United States of America is standing right by their side.” He also went on to say, “I want 
to especially thank the Venezuelan exile community that has done so much to support 
President Guaidó to organize aid for their compatriots and to do just a lot back home. 
Thank you very much for being here... We’re with you. We are profoundly grateful to 
every dissident, every exile, every political prisoner, and everyone who bears witness to 
the horrors of socialism and communism, and who has bravely spoken out against them. 
Thank you very much… You have protested, and protested with respect, but loudly.” 
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Finally, he concluded his remarks by noting, “Peace-loving nations are ready to help 
Venezuela reclaim its democracy, its dignity, and its destiny…and so as the United States 
stands up for democracy in Venezuela, we reaffirm the solidarity with the long-suffering 
people of Cuba and Nicaragua and people everywhere living under socialist and 
communist regimes111.” 
This speech therefore contained several important proclamations of support for 
the Venezuelan people, despite its occasionally partisan nature. It is also worth noting 
that in addition to an audience that included numerous Venezuelan and Cuban refugees 
and dissidents, the speech was delivered in the presence of many influential Florida 
politicians, including Senators Marco Rubio and Rick Scott, Governor Ron DeSantis, 
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart, and the Ambassador of Venezuela to the United 
States Carlos Trujillo. This illustrates that the event was lent a legitimate amount of 
gravity due to the political rank of those who were in attendance, showing 
demonstrators both in Miami and in Venezuela that their message was recognized and 
respected by people in positions of power and influence. 
One other important symbolic stance that numerous countries have adopted is to 
recognize Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s legitimate President. Though Guaidó lost the 
country’s 2018 Presidential election, he has alleged that widespread fraud allowed 
Maduro to win another term, and he positioned himself as the figurehead of the 
opposition. According to a February 2019 article from Foreign Policy, leaders from 
more than forty countries – the vast majority of them liberal democracies – have 
recognized Guaidó as President. These include states from numerous regions of the 
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globe, including North America (the United States and Canada); Latin America (Costa 
Rica, Brazil, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Peru, and Argentina); Europe (Spain, 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Poland, and more than ten other 
European Union members); and the Pacific (Australia)112. Protesters in Caracas desire 
evidence that their mission actually stands a chance at succeeding, and the fact that so 
many powerful nations around the world have openly endorsed the leader of their 
campaign could make this outcome more likely. 
One final point of critical importance to make here is the fact that in several 
cases, members of the opposition both in Venezuela and abroad have actively solicited 
the attention and assistance of outside actors in advancing their cause. As evidence of 
this, an April 2019 CBS News article describes a visit that Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo took to meet with exiles and dissidents who had been displaced to Colombia113. 
The article notes, “Venezuelan refugees demonstrated as Pompeo visited with 
[Colombian President Ivan] Duque over the weekend, chanting "Libertad!" and anti-
Maduro slogans. When asked what they wanted from the United States, the protesters 
yelled back: “intervention114!”” The visibility of these demands for external action is 
echoed in other ways, as the article goes on to note that members of the Trump 
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 The aforementioned FRANCE 24 article notes that American officials announced in early May that they 
would consider the option of military intervention to resolve the conflict if necessary, though so far no 




administration have so far made more visits to Central and South America than did 
representatives from the Obama administration115. 
For the foreseeable future, this seems likely to continue. In a testimony made to 
the House Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere 
Affairs, Professor R. Evans Ellis of the Army War College recommended that 
“[American] sanctions should be coupled with a strong message to Russia and China 
that we will actively oppose the honoring of contracts granted without the role of 
Venezuela’s constitutionally legitimate, elected national assembly, and that we will not 
lift sanctions without a clear restoration of Venezuela’s democratic order, to include 
active cooperation by the successor regime with efforts by the U.S. and rest of the 
international community to bring to justice those who are known to have committed 
crimes under Venezuelan, U.S. and international law116” (13-14). The Trump 
administration has displayed a markedly (and disturbingly) inconsistent approach to 
foreign policy vis-à-vis dictatorial leaders around the world in general, as Trump’s 
embrace of strongmen including Russia’s Putin and the Philippines’ Duterte make clear, 
but the administration’s members seem intent on maintaining their critical stance 
towards Maduro and his allies117. 
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What objective role have international authoritarian forces played in 
attempting to suppress protesters’ chance at success? First, at a broad level, it can be 
helpful to provide an overview of the states around the world that continue to recognize 
Maduro as leader. Whereas Guaidó was recognized by many democratic nations, 
according to the aforementioned Foreign Policy article, the list of states supporting 
Maduro resembles a rogue’s gallery and includes prominent authoritarian or semi-
authoritarian nations such as Russia, China, North Korea, Cambodia, Iran, Turkey, 
Syria, and Cuba. It is immediately apparent that the political backers of Maduro are 
significantly more dictatorial than those that support Guaidó; at the same time, the fact 
that a number of powerful autocrats have openly voiced their support for Maduro also 
lends resolve to remaining supporters of the regime among broader Venezuelan society. 
In considering the actions that autocrats have taken to strengthen Maduro’s 
power beyond simply recognizing him as leader, it can be helpful to turn to the 
aforementioned testimony by R. Evan Ellis to the House Subcommittee on Western 
Hemisphere Affairs. In a presentation aiming to list the ways in which China and Russia 
have bolstered Maduro in office, Ellis note that China has been the most significant 
backer of the current regime. This assistance has been heavily economic, as the country 
provided a vast market for Venezuelan oil sales and financial investments and created 
an alternative outlet that at least partially ameliorates the sanctions enacted by the 
United States and others. China has also played a part in extending credits to 
Venezuelan officials who otherwise would be unable to access them, allowing the regime 
to obtain materials to domestically compensate supporters. 
Beyond economics, Ellis notes, China has also played an important role in 




government has provided Venezuela with “not only conventional weapons systems and 
munitions, but also riot control vehicles and other equipment for helping the regime to 
put down protests” (5). In addition, Chinese leaders have sponsored the attendance of 
Venezuelan officers at technical training courses in China, enhancing their ability to act 
tactically against the opposition. Clearly, therefore, China plays a role in supporting 
Maduro –its financial assistance keeps the regime afloat, while its military training and 
provisions lend Maduro the physical resources to keep protests from growing too large. 
While China has been instrumental in propping up the regime, the Russian 
government has also played a significant part in championing this effort. Putin has been 
among the most vocal critics of American sanctions on Venezuela, making it clear that 
Maduro has an ally on this front. Additionally, Russia has provided strong economic 
support, primarily by investing in Venezuela’s petroleum sector. Aid has been critically 
important as well – the Russian state-owned company Rosneft has poured seventeen 
billion dollars into finance and investment in Venezuela since 2018. 
Furthermore, Russia has contributed to Maduro through military aid, training, 
and resources. A June 2019 Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty article makes this clear, 
noting that Moscow deployed one hundred military experts to Venezuela in March 2019 
to lend advice and recommendations to Maduro and his council; these tactical advisers 
remained in Venezuela for at least three months to carry out their mission118. This 
represents a direct form of intervention; though the Russians who visited Venezuela 
were not troops, they still entered the country to make one political outcome more likely 
than the other. The article also notes that the Russian government sold hundreds of 
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millions of dollars of weapons to Maduro, showing that Putin invested economic, 
strategic, and material resources to increase the chance that his autocratic ally would be 
able to stay in power. The United States has been the main force pushing back against 
this assistance, continuing to position itself as the champion of the opposition. Secretary 
of State Pompeo has openly criticized the governments of Cuba and Russia for providing 
military aid to Maduro and has called for a reduction in these channels119, while White 
House National Security Adviser John Bolton called for Russia to refrain from 
intervening in Venezuela’s affairs to keep an autocratic leader in office120. 
What individual-level evidence exists that Venezuelan protesters are paying 
attention to the role of outside forces and soliciting their support? First, numerous 
reports gathered on the ground indicate protesters’ willingness to “show the world” that 
they are standing on the streets for a just cause. These include a 2019 New York Times 
article in which one activist claimed, ““This Saturday, I will be out there with my gas 
mask, my helmet and vest, to see what I can show the world121;”” a 2019 ABC News 
article in which a woman stated, ““I’m here to show the world that we have a crisis and 
they are stepping over our human rights122;”” a January 2019 Miami Herald report that 
quotes a protester who noted, ““This is a chance for the opposition to show the world 
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that the immense majority of people don’t agree with the government, want a change, 
and want the opposition to call for new elections123;”” and a May 2019 Christian Science 
Monitor report in which Alejandro Velasco, a Venezuelan Professor of History at New 
York University, aptly commented, ““Levels of domestic support, whether expressed 
through being able to get people to the streets or polls – they’re important…But they’re 
not decisive. What’s important for momentum is showing the expat [and international] 
population that you can actually deliver on the promises you’ve been making124.”” While 
these are all responses from individual people, the common thread underlying their 
reasoning is clear – the movement stands a better chance at success should the outside 
world pay attention to and champion it in its goals 
In some cases, this desire for outside attention and support has even involved 
expressed desire for external military intervention to deliver aid to protesters and to 
manually remove Maduro and his allies from office125. Similarly, a May 2019 CNBC 
report documents the fact that “Guaidó…said he’s instructed his political envoy in 
Washington to immediately open relations with the U.S. military in a bid to bring more 
pressure on President Nicolás Maduro to resign. The leader said he’s asked Carlos 
Vecchio, who the U.S. recognizes as Venezuela’s ambassador, to open “direct 
communications” toward possible military “coordination.” The remarks, at the end of a 
rally Saturday, mark one of his strongest public pleas yet for greater U.S. involvement in 
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 Phillips (2019) interviews Luis Pedro España, a sociologist and member of the opposition, who notes, 




the country’s fast-escalating crisis126.” For some protesters, this desire for external 
intervention on their behalf stemmed from the fact that the Venezuelan military was 
standing firm with Maduro and his allies, leaving members of the civilian opposition 
comparatively helpless against the armed forces127. 
Crucially, one of the most significant examples of the opposition’s desire for 
external recognition is the fact that Juan Guaidó has regularly touted numerous 
countries’ recognition of him as Venezuela’s legitimate leader. Indeed, Phillips and 
Lopez (2019) note that this has been one of Guaidó’s main strategies in mobilizing 
crowds, writing of a rally in early 2019, ““A round of applause for the EU!” Guaidó 
shouted, although the bloc has yet to explicitly back him as interim president. Guaidó 
claimed “the entire planet” was backing his movement to end Maduro’s 
“dictatorship128.”” Here, supporters of the opposition are placing a significant amount of 
stock in the fact that multiple forces outside of Venezuela’s borders agree with their 
cause129. As noted above, this has been strengthened by actions taken by the current 
American Presidential administration, which have regularly and vocally pledged their 
support towards advancing protesters’ goals and missions130. For one activist quoted in 
a Guardian article, this international recognition sent some signal that their outcome 
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might actually be achieved; as she noted, “[this recognition] is “a step towards the hope 
that the government will change… and we can be with our families again131.”” 
In terms of the specific mechanisms proposed in this dissertation, two appear to 
be most relevant to the Venezuelan case – the influence of a powerful and influential 
diaspora who affect the dynamics of the protests from outside Venezuela’s borders and 
protests held in other countries that express a series of purposive solidarity with the 
activists in Caracas. As the following section will show, these two mechanisms are not 
mutually exclusive – many of the members of the diaspora who lobby their national 
leaders also participate in solidarity protests. Nevertheless, they constitute two distinct 
actions that are taking place, and will be analyzed separately in turn. 
 As preceding discussion has shown, the harsh living conditions facing 
Venezuelans today has produced a large and influential diaspora residing in many 
different countries. One of the most important ways that this diaspora has affected the 
protests has been through providing material resources and assistance to sustain 
activists, making it possible for them to continue their campaign against the regime. In 
several cases, this has even involved instances of crowd-funding, in which Venezuelans 
in exile actively solicit funds and materials from people around the world to send to the 
country and increase the chance that the movement will endure. As evidence of this, a 
2017 Washington Post article describes an operation that exists to the present day: “The 
growing toll — along with fears of worse violence to come — has prompted Venezuelans 
living outside the country to start raising money for shipments of safety equipment. 
“The idea is to protect as many heads as we can,” said Nelly Guinand, 25, a Venezuelan 
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living in New York who collected more than $22,000 and sent 128 motorcycle helmets 
to Caracas, with more on the way. She calls the fund drive “Cascos contra Bombas” 
(Helmets vs. Bombs)…Guinand is part of a widening international campaign to 
crowdfund the protests, with some online drives raising more than 
$24,000 in less than a month. As many as 17 campaigns to solicit money for food, 
medicine and protest gear such as protective goggles, heavy gloves and gas masks can be 
found on the website GoFundMe132.” 
In addition to these communities of donors, protesters in Venezuela have 
established linkages with diaspora members and their allies in other countries through 
multiple channels that could also help sustain the protests. While Maduro has 
attempted to block the import of foodstuffs or resources, news reports indicate the 
existence of an online network of supporters in states including Colombia who form 
several chains through which food and other sustenance materials can be funneled into 
Venezuela despite the regime’s orders133. Other sources report the fact that Venezuelans 
have been particularly successful in establishing linkages with diaspora and their allies 
in Brazil, again creating networks of supporters who make it possible for humanitarian 
aid to reach activists in Caracas and elsewhere134. 
Assistance has also come from as far away as Canada, where members of the 
Venezuelan diaspora formed the Canada Venezuela Democracy Forum to raise and send 
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supplies to Venezuelan hospitals. Rather than sending resources through the mail, the 
group is forced to send materials by boat, which are then received by a network of 
doctors and human rights workers who secretly store supplies in private homes until 
they can be smuggled into hospitals135. In the United States, some reports estimate that 
the number of Venezuelans in exile has reached more than six hundred thousand, with 
many coming together to form more than one hundred non-governmental organizations 
to send humanitarian aid and to solicit the attention of elected officials136. Relatedly, 
members of Venezuela’s government-in-exile regularly hold events and meet with 
supporters in the United States; a 2019 Houston Chronicle article reports that Guaidó’s 
Ambassador Carlos Vecchio met with members of the diaspora at Rice University and 
urged them to keep up the pressure on the American government to oppose Maduro137. 
Members of the diaspora and their allies have also exhibited signs of purposive 
solidarity by holding large, active, and visible rallies outside of Venezuela to show people 
in Caracas that they are being heard. Spurred by calls from Guaidó and Venezuela’s 
National Assembly (which opposes Maduro), Venezuelans in exile have taken to the 
streets in locations ranging from Canada138 to Mexico to Hong Kong139. On-the-ground 
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accounts from these rallies provide excellent insights into the motivations of those who 
are participating. Phillips and Parkin Daniels (2019) interview members of the diaspora 
who gathered in Mexico City to protest, and spoke with one individual who expressed 
the following perspective: “One year ago Albert Molina and his family joined the historic 
exodus from Venezuela, fleeing to Mexico after his ailing father fell victim to the collapse 
of its health service. On Wednesday night…he stood outside the Venezuelan embassy in 
Mexico City with a placard reading “No more dictatorship” and suddenly rekindled 
dreams of a homecoming. “The thing Venezuelans most want is to go back to our 
homeland,” said Molina.” 
Similarly, the article also recounts observations from an event in Hong Kong and 
Mexico: “As far away as Hong Kong demonstrators took to the streets with banners that 
read: “Juan Guaidó – we will stand with you until democracy is restored” and “I do not 
live in my country but my country will always live in me.” As the crowd outside the 
Mexico City embassy swelled, protesters unfurled a giant Venezuelan flag and began to 
chant the national anthem of their decaying nation. “Glory to the brave people, who 
shook off the yoke,” they sang. “Let’s cry out aloud: ‘Down with oppression!’”” 
While not as prominent as the two mechanisms described above, there also exists 
some evidence that protesters in Venezuela are calculating that international attention 
might reduce the chance that Maduro will crack down on them in an excessively harsh 
manner. For example, a January 2019 Miami Herald article interviewed one protester 
who stated, ““[It] is full of uncertainties. There’s unrest inside the armed forces and we 




some ways it’s not in Maduro’s best interests to squash the march because he’s trying to 
convince the international community that there’s no dictatorship here140.”” 
How do the Venezuelan people themselves view the international actors that have 
been working to intervene in their affairs? While no NAVCO 3.0 data exists to measure 
changes in crowd size at different points in the movement, highly relevant survey data 
can reveal the attitudes of both regime supporters and regime opponents towards the 
United States, China, and Russia. The 2018 Latinobarometro asked individuals to rate 
their opinions of each of these three countries as “very good,” “good,” bad,” or “very 
bad141.” Following the strategy employed in the Bahrain case study above, I first present 
aggregate views toward each country across all members of Venezuelan society. I then 
specify the views of certain subsections of the survey sample, dividing respondents into 
those who categorize themselves as government supporters and those who categorize 
themselves as supporters of the opposition. Table 5.5 begins this section by presenting 
respondents’ views towards the United States. 
Several interesting trends are evident from this table. First, roughly seven times 
as many people in the opposition have a “very good” view of the United States than do 
those who support the government, at 28.4% to 4.1%. Moreover, among supporters of 
the opposition, 84.7% have either a “very good” or a “good” view of the United States 
overall. In sharp contrast, only 27.9% of government supporters feel the same way. 
Instead, 67.0% of respondents in this second camp have either a “bad” or “very bad” 
perception of the United States as a global actor, compare with only 13.3% of the 
opposition’s supporters. This suggests that among those who do not support Maduro, a 
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Table 5.5. View of the United States – “"Me gustaría conocer su opinión 
sobre los siguientes países u organizaciones que le voy a leer.¿Tiene Ud. 
una muy buena (1), buena (2), mala (3) o muy mala (4) opinión sobre?:"  






15.5% 4.1% 28.4% 
Good 
 
46.5% 23.8% 56.3% 
Bad 
 
20.9% 34.0% 11.8% 
Very bad 
 
12.1% 33.0% 1.5% 
Don’t know 
 
4.3% 5.1% 2.0% 
Invalid response 
 




significant majority appears to be cognizant of American efforts to support Guaidó and 
other oppositional figures, and that these actors are positive and receptive towards such 
support when it emerges. 
What trends can be seen in public opinion among Venezuelans towards China 
and Russia, the two leading autocratic forces that have been identified as affecting the 
country’s internal affairs? First, Table 5.6 presents respondents’ views of China. While 
not as stark as the divisions seen in respondents’ views of the United States, there are 
still significant differences between the beliefs of government supporters and members 
of the opposition. Nearly three times as many government supporters have a “very 
good” view of China than do members of the opposition (23.3% as compared with 
8.3%), and the share with either a “very good” or “good” view is also significantly higher 
– 81.1% as compared to 55.8%. Given these statistical findings, it seems likely that 
regime supporters and opponents are quite aware of the various ways in which the 




Table 5.6. View of China – “"Me gustaría conocer su opinión sobre los 
siguientes países u organizaciones que le voy a leer.¿Tiene Ud. una muy 
buena (1), buena (2), mala (3) o muy mala (4) opinión sobre?:"  






12.5% 23.3% 8.3% 
Good 
 
50.8% 57.8% 47.5% 
Bad 
 
19.9% 6.4% 27.9% 
Very bad 
 
6.9% 2.7% 10.5% 
Don’t know 
 
8.9% 9.8% 5.8% 
Invalid response 
 




their respectively warmer or colder views towards the country. Finally, Table 5.7 below 
presents respondents’ views of Russia in the same manner. 
What does Table 5.7 reveal? First, both governmental supporters and opponents 
appear to have a more muted and moderate view of Russia than they do of China in the 
aggregate. Whereas 23.3% of government supporters had a “very good” view of China, 
only 9.7% hold the same type of feelings towards Russia, though the overall share with a 
“very good” or “good” view is still relatively high at 68.0%. Members of the opposition 
have similar feelings towards Russia as they do China, though they are also less likely to 
feel “very” good or “very” bad. It is possible that this is because as preceding discussion 
has shown, China has overall been the more significant supporter of Maduro through its 
financial investments and military aid, leading Venezuelans to associate the Chinese 
government more closely with Maduro. These data do not necessarily or directly 
translate into Venezuelans’ specific beliefs of opinions about intervention from the 




Table 5.7. View of Russia – “"Me gustaría conocer su opinión sobre los 
siguientes países u organizaciones que le voy a leer.¿Tiene Ud. una muy 
buena (1), buena (2), mala (3) o muy mala (4) opinión sobre?:"  






5.7% 9.7% 4.8% 
Good 
 
46.4% 58.3% 46.7% 
Bad 
 
25.0% 13.9% 30.3% 
Very bad 
 
5.9% 3.7% 7.0% 
Don’t know 
 
16.1% 14.4% 11.2% 
Invalid response 
 




for citizens’ views on these topics because of how prominent the intervention has been. 
What outcome currently seems most likely in the Venezuelan case? While it is 
difficult to say with any certainty, one thing is unequivocally clear – Venezuela’s 
Freedom House score has dropped precipitously since the protests began. An analysis of 
the country’s scores in the past four years shows how the state has become more 
increasingly authoritarian – whereas Venezuela received a Freedom House rating of 5.0 
in 2016, this rating dropped to 5.5 in 2017 and 2018. Moreover, the country’s score for 
2019 sits at an intimidating 6.5, showing how severely autocratic the developments 
there have been. Much still remains to be done in the country’s protest movement, but 
as of mid- 2019, a Reuters article indicated that the anti-governmental campaign was 
beginning to resemble a stand-off where neither party was truly willing to budge142. It is 
clear that the country’s elites have been dictatorial in their rule, but it is not yet evident 
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that protesters have lost their fight – Guaidó has not assumed the Presidency, but much 
can still happen, and supporting the opposition preserves the chance that Venezuela can 
avoid a fully dictatorial fate and return to a more democratic state of existence in the 
future. 
Synthesizing themes across cases 
The preceding discussion has presented and analyzed five distinct cases, each of 
which illustrates a different aspect of my dissertation’s theoretical framework. What 
common themes can be drawn across contexts? First, support from external 
democratic forces can have a real and meaningful effect on protesters’ beliefs, 
decision-making strategies, and goals. Evidence from Venezuelan dissidents both within 
Venezuela and elsewhere demonstrated that anti-regime activists intentionally wished 
to solicit the help of outside forces in their struggle against the regime, while surveys in 
Lebanon showed that significant numbers of protesters viewed external forces including 
the United States as allies and international documents condemning the Syrian 
occupation of their state as important and valid. At the same time, the fact that multiple 
foreign leaders traveled to Ukraine to support the Orange Revolution in 2004 sent clear 
signals that the outside world was with them and stood against the machinations of the 
regime. Evidently, protesters care about these actions because this shows that they are 
heard and supported, making it more likely that they will continue their fight against 
dictatorial leaders. When individuals believe that their campaign actually has a chance 
at succeeding and will not be brutally repressed, they will be more likely to remain 
steadfast in their drive against authoritarian forces. 
Second, domestic regime capacity, and – perhaps most importantly – 




Lebanon’s 2005 Cedar Revolution, protesters enjoyed a great deal of advantages that 
anti-regime activists elsewhere did not. Namely, oppositional forces in these countries 
were able to take advantage of relatively free and independent media sources to transmit 
their messages to a broader audience around the world, granting them the opportunity 
to capture the symbolic and material aid of sympathetic audiences in a variety of 
different countries. As earlier discussion noted, the world stood with protesters in those 
cases – rallies in other nations were held to illustrate this fact to the activists, while 
leaders intentionally made clear statements and pronouncements that were designed to 
undermine autocratic leaders and bolster oppositional campaigns against them. 
Protesters elsewhere who faced markedly less friendly media environments 
experienced a starkly different situation – in Bahrain’s failed 2011 uprising and 
Uzbekistan’s short- lived 2005 revolution, members of the opposition were deprived of 
any significant assistance from media (whether within their country or beyond its 
borders), a fact that significantly undermined their ability to attract outside support and 
attention. Here, unfortunately, activists were less able to transmit their message to an 
external audience; instead, they perceived a signal that they were alone in their efforts, 
an awareness that must have decreased their willingness to continue their fight against 
authorities. In each case, regime capacity was of critical importance, and each 
movement failed to remove leaders or procure any meaningful and long-lasting changes. 
Finally, authoritarian intervention is most successful in depressing 
protests when it is coupled with a heavily repressive domestic regime. In 
2004 Ukraine, Russian complaints regarding American interference accomplished little, 
and activists were able to achieve their goals of removing corrupt leaders from power 




When Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates sent troops to quash protests in 
Bahrain, in contrast, this represented a case in which activists were forced to contend 
not only with outside troops who arrived with the aim of supporting an unpopular 
domestic dictator, but also with a newly re-energized Bahraini regime that was able to 
double down on its repressive capabilities. In this case, therefore, the interaction of 
domestic regime strength and outside autocratic intervention clearly was enough to 
keep the opposition from ever gaining any serious type of power or influence. 
Conclusion 
Protests in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes take place in a variety of 
geographical and political contexts around the world, from relatively open hybrid states 
in which some opposition is permitted to more repressive, dictatorial states in which 
leaders enjoy a wide range of tools in maintaining a hold on security forces and 
clamping down on challenges to their power. At the same time, states regularly monitor 
and intervene in one another’s affairs at greater rates than ever before, meaning that it is 
an increasingly pressing task to understand how the competing effects of democratic 
promotion and autocratic repression affect activists’ perceptions and decision-making 
strategies across situations.  
The five case studies presented in this chapter demonstrate the ways in which 
liberal actors and authoritarian forces have, to varying degrees, interjected themselves 
into different states affairs to either support protesters or to assist embattled autocratic 
leaders. The triggers, tactics, and outcomes may vary from case to case, but taken 
together, much can be learned by analyzing Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, 
Bahrain’s 2011 protests, Uzbekistan’s 2005 Andijan uprising, Lebanon’s 2005 Cedar 




regime capacity matters heavily in shaping the dynamics of a protest movement’s 
effectiveness and impact, and external democratic promotion will not always be able to 
combat this fact. When protests stand a real chance at success, however, sending clear 
signals that their mission is worthwhile and that outside forces stand together with them 
in solidarity can play a key role in sustaining their motivation and drive, potentially 
laying the groundwork for a long-lasting and impactful push to change an authoritarian 
society from the bottom up. The five cases here have illustrated these conclusions in a 
number of ways, and my findings therefore have a number of important substantive 
policy implications for liberal states’ foreign policies and promotion of human rights in 





CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
Joining a protest in an authoritarian or hybrid state in the modern era is not a 
decision that one makes lightly. Whereas protesters in consolidated and established 
democracies can take to the streets and criticize leaders without fear of repercussion, 
activists in more repressive states face the possibility of arrest, harassment, violence, or 
death. Nevertheless, protesters in places ranging from Ukraine to Hong Kong to 
Venezuela to Egypt have shown up in significant numbers to demand reforms in their 
countries’ political, social, and economic spheres. In doing so, they have in many cases 
managed to secure real and meaningful changes, utilizing both domestic and 
international tools of leverage to force leaders to comply with their requests. 
What effects do international factors have on the decision-making strategies of 
protesters in these situations? I have shown in this dissertation that external actors can 
play a highly significant role in affecting the way that activists view themselves, their 
movement, and the chance that their campaign will succeed. Protesters today do not 
operate within a vacuum devoid of international context. Instead, individuals can 
harness the power of social media and online communication both to establish linkages 
with actors elsewhere and to make their causes known to a broader global audience. 
Oppositional forces can instantly transmit their message across thousands of miles 
without ever leaving their homes, utilizing advances in media to reach as many 
sympathetic ears as possible. This has numerous implications for the types of activities 
that protesters can undertake in soliciting this attention, as well as the kinds of methods 
that outside forces can employ to help activists secure their desired political outcomes. 
In this dissertation, I show that international engagement can significantly 





governmental movement. In what ways can signals of support from liberal actors 
elsewhere alter these important beliefs and considerations? I propose four key 
mechanisms here. First, meaningful external support can provide activists with a sense 
of purposive solidarity – the emotional sense that the world is standing with the 
protesters and the notion that the movement is not alone in its efforts. This can lend 
activists a great amount of psychological and moral fortitude, increasing the likelihood 
that they will remain resolute in their demands for human rights and democratic 
governance. As my interviews investigating Ukraine’s 2013-2014 Euromaidan protests 
show, many protesters in Kyiv were heartened by both the fact that citizens in other 
countries were holding simultaneous “Maidans” to highlight their support and the fact 
that politicians from Western states visited Ukraine to visibly indicate that activists 
were seen, heard, and recognized. 
Second, I stress the important role of transnational learning – the process by 
which strategies from civic activists and democratic forces in one country can cross 
national borders to be used in a new context. This can often assume the form of activist- 
to-activist connections, as was seen in Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution. In that case, 
reformers from Serbia and Georgia worked closely with protesters in Kyiv to help them 
devise tactics that would be most effective in presenting a united front against the 
Kuchma regime. Moreover, international non-governmental organizations with links to 
the United States and Western Europe provided necessary training to Orange 
Revolution activists to make a victorious outcome more likely. A similar strategy can 
also be seen in 2019 Venezuela – there, transnational linkages take the form of 
technical  assistance and aid, as groups in neighboring states including Colombia and 





Third, I point to the credible threat of checking and sanctioning that liberal 
forces can issue against authoritarian leaders who otherwise might be more likely to 
crack down on a protest. If forces elsewhere can provide convincing evidence that 
leaders will be held accountable for their actions, this can dissuade autocrats from 
employing troops and security forces against citizens in too forceful a manner. One can 
see evidence of this in Ukraine (both in 2004 and 2013), as democracies elsewhere 
made clear that the regime’s actions were being carefully monitored and that any undue 
actions would lead to significant reprisals. Similarly, I provide evidence from Venezuela 
suggesting that Maduro is constrained in his repression of protesters at least in part 
because of scrutiny from outside forces. Equally importantly, I point to the failings that 
occur when such credible threats of sanctioning do not exist. In Bahrain, democracies 
elsewhere never provided a serious or legitimate warning against regime elites, leaving 
leaders free to act with impunity and protesters forced to fend for themselves against 
increasingly brutal suppression and subjugation. 
Finally, I propose a fourth and final mechanism spurred by external democratic 
support – the material and political benefits that can be gained through strong linkages 
with ordinary citizens and diaspora groups elsewhere. These types of actors are 
distinct from the transnational forces in the second mechanism above, as their 
connection to the protesters is often closer and more personal; in addition, they act 
outside of official political environments, differentiating their motivations and 
capabilities from human rights organizations or governmental committees. Members of 
a country’s diaspora in particular can be critically important in sustaining a movement 
by sending resources that make it easier for activists to continue their campaign and by 





What role might external authoritarian intervention play in shaping the 
perceptions of activists in these contentious situations? I predict two competing 
effects, dependent upon the domestic context at hand. Assistance from autocrats 
elsewhere to support an embattled leader can signal vulnerability by suggesting that 
the regime cannot stay in power without help from abroad, but external intervention 
can also cause fear of repercussions should the incumbent stay in office. I posit that in 
semi-authoritarian regimes, the first effect will dominate and cause an unexpected 
backlash in which protesters see their leader as increasingly fragile. In these cases, 
activists will resent undue external intervention in their affairs, prompting them to 
turn out in larger and larger numbers. This was the case in Ukraine’s Euromaidan 
revolution, where perceptions that Vladimir Putin was intervening to support 
Yanukovych spurred increasingly large groups of people to take to the streets in anger 
and defiance against the actions of the Russian government. 
In fully autocratic states where the regime is equipped with a powerful security 
apparatus, however, I propose the second mechanism will dominate – intervention will 
cause deterrence and intimidation as protesters perceive the dangers involved in 
challenging the regime as even more threatening than before. In these situations, the 
risk calculus for individuals will shift dramatically, reducing the chance that they will 
remain willing to challenge autocratic rulers. Evidence of this can be seen from Bahrain 
– protesters there were heavily intimidated when authorities in Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates sent troops to quash their nascent movement, increasing the 
domestic repressive capacity of Bahrain’s own security forces and raising the perceived 
costs of participation so dramatically that many individuals chose to return home rather 





I have presented three empirical chapters in this dissertation to provide evidence 
that my proposed theoretical mechanisms operate across geographical and temporal 
contexts today. First, I turn in Chapter 3 to a case study of Ukraine’s 2013-2014 
Euromaidan protest movement involving six months of fieldwork conducted across 
two trips to Ukraine in 2017. Both Western states and the Russian government accused 
the other of having undue influence on the Euromaidan protests’ evolution. In order to 
determine how these external forces shaped the beliefs of activists on the ground in Kyiv, 
I interviewed more than 120 Members of Parliament, reporters, activists, civil society 
leaders, and academics to examine ways in which protesters’ beliefs about Western 
support and Russian intervention shaped their behavior and decision-making strategies. 
My findings show that many activists heavily considered the impact of external 
support when deciding to act, indicating that the world’s attention provided a 
significant boost in enhancing their determination to challenge the Yanukovych 
administration. Several interview respondents (particularly those who were on Kyiv’s 
Maidan square from the beginning) pointed to the mechanisms of purposive solidarity 
that I outlined above, stressing that Euromaidan protests held in other countries 
bolstered their spirits and convinced them that they actually stood a chance at success. 
Equally important was the assistance of human rights groups and the Ukrainian 
diaspora, who lobbied officials in their adopted nations to highlight the movement’s 
importance and sent resources and funding to strengthen the campaign. 
Furthermore, many of my interviewees showed how protesters resented overt 
Russian support for Yanukovych and stressed the fact that their actions were driven 
partly by the need to keep Ukraine from transforming into “the next Russia.” 





fear of becoming too similar to their autocratic neighbor made many Ukrainians realize 
that the country stood at a precipice, convincing them to take action in order to prevent 
an undesirable and potentially irreversible outcome. This was made possible by the fact 
that Ukraine was a semi-autocratic – rather than a fully authoritarian – state with a 
relatively free and open media environment. Because of this, protesters were able to 
regularly share messages on Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, allowing them to 
circumvent messages issued by media that were more closely tied to the state. In 
addition, the Yanukovych regime was never repressive enough to contain the 
movement by itself. In this case, therefore, both external democratic intervention and 
autocratic support played a meaningful role in shaping activists’ decision to sustain a 
movement that was ultimately successful in securing regime change. 
My second empirical chapter provides further evidence in support of my 
fundamental theoretical claims. In Chapter 4, I present the results of an original 
survey experiment that I designed and carried out in Ukraine, involving nearly two 
hundred undergraduates. In recruiting subjects, I targeted students from Ukrainian 
universities that had reputations for promoting strong traditions of democratic 
activism, as these types of institutions are the locations from which future protest 
participants would likely emerge. This led me to travel to and recruit student 
participants from the National University of Kyiv – Mohyla Academy in Kyiv, Taras 
Shevchenko National University in Kyiv, and Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv. 
All participants in my sample were therefore students, making them the precise 
population of actors about which I aimed to make inferences with my experiment – I am 
not claiming to explain the motivations of senior citizens or middle-aged Ukrainians 





activists. All participants were randomly assigned into two treatment groups and one 
control group, ensuring that the results of my experiment were not biased in any way. 
Participants read a vignette requesting them to imagine that they lived in a repressive 
state where students had begun to protest against an authoritarian government that was 
reversing recent democratic reforms in favor of retrenched autocracy. Following this, 
subjects rated their willingness on a ten-point scale to engage in three increasingly 
intense forms of protest – signing a petition, contacting an elected official, or joining a 
lawful anti-governmental movement. Subjects in the first treatment group learned that 
democracies elsewhere were actively supporting the protests, participants in the second 
treatment group learned that autocracies elsewhere were intervening to suppress the 
protests, and participants in the control group received no information about external 
actors whatsoever. No other difference between the vignettes existed, meaning that any 
significant difference in protest willingness between groups could be attributed entirely 
to the experimental manipulation at hand. 
T-tests comparing mean rates of protest willingness between groups provided 
null results for the first two forms of protest behavior that I was testing, as there was no 
significant difference between those in the treatment groups and those in the control for 
signing a petition or contacting an elected official. In these cases, participants’ decision- 
making strategies were not affected by either democratic or authoritarian intervention. 
However, the results for the most intense form of behavior – actually committing to 
joining a movement – strongly support my theory. For this final dependent variable, 
participants in the liberal democratic treatment are far more likely to protest than those 
in the other two groups (p<0.001). On a scale of protest willingness ranging from 1 to 





higher than the mean rate of the control group. This suggests that for the most intensive 
form of participation in my project, respondents were likely to consider external 
democratic support to the greatest extent when stakes were highest. 
Finally, I present a series of comparative analyses in Chapter 5, my third 
empirical chapter. Here, I assess five case studies that illustrate different 
mechanisms from my theoretical framework in action. In selecting specific cases to 
examine, I chose to focus on countries representing a range of temporal and 
geographical conditions to show that my mechanisms do not operate in only one part of 
the world or one particular moment in time. I therefore analyze Ukraine’ s 2004 Orange 
Revolution; a failed 2011 uprising in Bahrain; a failed rebellion in 2006 in the Uzbek 
village of Andijan; Lebanon’s successful 2005 Cedar Revolution; and the protests that 
have been taking place in Venezuela since the mid-2010s. Taken together, these cases 
span a time period of more than fifteen years and include states from Eastern Europe, 
the Middle East, Central Asia, and Latin America. 
In general, none of these case studies highlight every one of my mechanisms in 
action. Rather, each illustrates several mechanisms on its own, showing how certain 
aspects of international influences shaped protesters’ actions dependent on the context 
at hand. In Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, crowds were strengthened in their efforts to 
wage a campaign against the Yanukovych regime by the fact that numerous Western 
governments and non-governmental organizations provided ample transnational 
linkages and training on the ground in Kyiv. Further, activists were heartened by 
statements made by world leaders in support of their cause, lending them a significant 






External support was equally important for protesters in Lebanon and Venezuela. 
In Lebanon, protesters actively solicited global attention, and were significantly aided by 
members of the Lebanese diaspora who pressured their home governments to speak out 
in favor of the uprising. This external attention reduced the barriers to joining the 
movement, and Lebanese were therefore able to campaign actively against both their 
own leaders and against Syria’s decades-long autocratic intervention into their country’s 
affairs. Similarly, significant evidence exists that transnational linkages with activists in 
Brazil and Colombia and the efforts of the Venezuelan diaspora ensure that much 
international attention remains focused on Caracas. This concerted effort has even 
persuaded the leaders of more than fifty countries to recognize oppositional leader Juan 
Guaidó as Venezuela’s official President. While the ultimate outcome of the protests is 
unclear as of 2019, it seems probable that external actors will continue to shape 
Venezuela’s domestic affairs for some time to come. 
Finally, the cases of Bahrain and Uzbekistan provide cautionary examples of what 
can happen when external democratic support is too weak to counter authoritarian 
intervention or a durable and repressive domestic capacity. In Bahrain, liberal actors 
elsewhere failed to pay much attention to the movement or to offer any serious aid to the 
campaign. Instead, Bahrain’s autocratic neighbors Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates sent in troops to help put down the movement and prevent it from achieving 
its goals. Protesters saw their level of threat perception increase dramatically, and 
rationally decided to step down. Similarly, the Uzbek regime’s repressive capacity and 
ability to violently suppress any independent media proved central to the event’s 
undoing. Activists there were unable to capture much attention from the outside world, 





moderate amount of external support from the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom was undermined when politicians decided that maintaining strategic ties with 
Uzbek leaders was more important than championing protesters. In both cases, a lack of 
democratic aid and an imposing amount of autocratic power proved to be too much for 
activists to overcome. 
Theoretical and Normative Implications 
These findings produce a number of important implications both theoretical and 
normative. From an academic perspective, this dissertation implies that future studies 
of protest behavior should be particularly intent on incorporating some consideration 
of external factors into their analyses. In many authoritarian and hybrid states around 
the globe, protesters are able to transmit their messages to the outside world and 
monitor the reaction of states elsewhere. This indicates that democratically-minded 
activists will increasingly view international allies as an important bargaining tool in 
their campaigns against autocratic leaders, and that studies of this topic should be sure 
not to ignore this fact. Failing to grant this variable the influential power that it can 
hold might undermine a project’s ability to capture all aspects of a movement, leading a 
study to be less comprehensive than it otherwise would be. 
This dissertation has produced a number of relevant findings from a more 
normative and policy-oriented perspective as well. It is important to precede the 
following discussion by noting that the foreign policy efforts of democracies in the 
modern world must certainly incorporate a variety of factors into consideration when 
deciding which course of action to pursue. Combatting international challenges to the 
global order such as terrorism or climate change can often require governments of all 





order to achieve a common goal. Concerns about democracy will therefore obviously 
not always override the need to cooperate when doing so is of critical importance. 
Nevertheless, this project posits that democratic actors should recognize and capitalize 
on their ability to make a meaningful difference in supporting liberal movements 
around the world today. This is particularly true given the alarming declines that have 
been seen in global democratic governance, as right-wing, populist, and illiberal 
regimes capture power in states across Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. Furthermore, as 
certain political leaders in long-standing democracies including the United States and 
the United Kingdom favor a nativist, exclusionary, and inwardly-oriented foreign policy 
at the expense of international engagement and cooperation, promoting an active and 
participatory approach towards global politics should be of central importance today. 
Supporting nascent democratic uprisings in authoritarian countries matters for 
both domestic and international reasons. From a domestic perspective, protesters 
deserve the right to live in a state that values freedom, tolerance, liberty, and respect for 
human rights. Dictatorial governments suppress these important norms, and 
individuals who work to fight back against oppression and injustice should be 
commended and assisted. Championing these democratic campaigns matters on a 
larger, global level as well. It is certainly important to acknowledge that pro-democratic 
movements can sometimes destabilize countries, resulting in either domestic turmoil or 
re-entrenched authoritarian rule – many of the failed Arab Spring movements attest to 
this fact, as Libya and Egypt are no more free or fair in 2019 than they were in 2011. 
Nevertheless, in other cases including Tunisia and Georgia, uprisings did introduce 
new regimes that were more democratic and adhered to human rights standards more 





illiberal challenges facing other parts of the globe, and supporting reformist movements 
can help stabilize the entire international order by creating new allies and coalition 
partners that are willing to seriously tackle these issues. 
Extending my Analysis: Proposed Directions for Future Research 
There are a number of different areas into which I plan to expand this research 
agenda in the future. First, I plan to draft this dissertation as a book manuscript. This 
would involve surveying additional individuals about Ukrainian affairs to develop my 
findings more deeply, as speaking with a greater number of analysts, activists, and 
academics would increase my certainty that the results of my existing interviews are valid 
and provide me with a broader amount of data both qualitative and quantitative.  
Beyond drafting my dissertation as a book manuscript, there are several other 
projects that I aim to undertake. My extensive experience studying and traveling to both 
European and post-Soviet states has prepared me to maintain a focus on this region, and 
I expect to continue studying the post-Soviet space because many of these countries are 
not democratic and remain important cases for testing my theory. First, I plan to extend 
the scope of my research to studying protest behavior in other parts of Ukraine that I 
have not yet reached. The country is still highly volatile in this regard– I saw this first-
hand during my second round of fieldwork, as protesters driven by frustration over 
corruption camped outside Parliament and again occupied the central Maidan square. 
Much of my doctoral research was conducted in Kyiv and Lviv, regions where 
citizens are generally much more favorable towards the global West than towards 
Russia. I can now extend my study to different parts of the country where Russian 
intervention has been more visible, and where citizens’ geopolitical views of the 





important to determine which aspects of my theoretical framework would hold in 
Ukraine’s Southern and Eastern regions, where people likely view pro-Western 
democratic protests very differently than do the individuals that I contacted for my 
dissertation. I hypothesize that subjects’ beliefs and values in these parts of Ukraine 
would place less value on the need for democratic government and liberal reforms, 
and that democracy promotion efforts would not be as effective with this population 
because of that fact. Testing these claims in a new context would involve drafting a 
new round of surveys and experiments, and finding new student subjects to serve as 
participants in future research. 
My efforts to complete this analysis would be strengthened by contacts that I 
established with many individuals during my fieldwork at the three universities 
mentioned above as well as policy institutes such as the European Union Advisory 
Mission to Ukraine. (Ukrainian Catholic University is particularly relevant for studies of 
political, sociological, and psychological behavior, as their campus contains a sociological 
lab that regularly designs and implements such projects, and professors there have close 
ties with behavioral scientists in other parts of the country.) Extending my analysis to 
these new regions of Ukraine could illustrate a valuable amount of insightful trends, and 
I believe that there is much to be gained by pursuing this channel of scholarship. 
In addition to this, I plan to pursue a second avenue of research focusing on the 
“supply” side of external support for democratic protests in authoritarian regimes. My 
prior research focuses primarily on the “demand” or “receiving” side of this relationship, 
as I have worked to understand what protesters themselves desire, think, and perceive. 
However, I am also cognizant of the need to speak with individuals that are actually 





non-governmental organizations decide which groups of activists to support in a given 
authoritarian or hybrid state? This question can be particularly fraught when the anti-
governmental opposition in a country is unorganized, weak, or fragmented. In these 
cases, democratic operatives run the risk of choosing to back individuals or groups that 
might in fact be highly intolerant or otherwise controversial. Beyond the decision of 
whom to support, those involved in democracy promotion must also determine ways to 
measure whether their assistance is effective in achieving its goals. What types of 
indicators do these groups rely upon to assess social and political outcomes, particularly 
when it can be difficult to decisively state that progress has been achieved? In studying 
these issues, I therefore extend my analysis into a new (but related) research agenda 
that could be relevant for projects in a variety of academic disciplines. 
My primary goal for this second project would be to interview and survey people 
who are actively involved in democracy promotion efforts. Because of my prior work 
for the Joint Baltic American National Committee a non- governmental organization 
aimed at bolstering American support for democratic movements in Central and 
Eastern Europe. I have maintained contacts at several think tanks and non-
governmental organizations in Washington, D.C. including the Atlantic Council, the 
United States Institute for Peace, the International Republican Institute, and Freedom 
House through whom I could reach actors involved in this area. 
Turning to an international level, I recognize the need to focus not only on 
democracy promotion originating from the United States, but also on the role played by 
liberal forces in other parts of the world as well. Considering my regional specialization 
in Central and Eastern Europe, I would aim to reach policymakers in Brussels who are 





Partnership plays a significant role in championing democracy in Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Interviewing actors there would greatly inform 
my research by helping me understand how their efforts are implemented and measured 
on the ground, and also how to determine the ways in which progress has been made. 
Conducting these interviews would let me obtain primary, qualitative data from first- 
hand sources directly involved in this area, strengthening the quality and veracity of my 
findings. Democracy assistance has come under attack from many different forces, and 
understanding the precise mechanisms of this foreign policy in action is essential. 
Finally, I conclude by discussing two other lines of research that I am interested 
in pursuing. First, to extend my Euromaidan analysis explored in Chapter 3 and the 
five case studies presented in Chapter 5, it would be possible to conduct both a textual 
examination of Tweets that were issued during those movements and a content 
analysis of news reports written at the time that they were taking place. Analyzing 
these published materials, particularly the Twitter postings of leading oppositional 
figures, could reveal the ways in which protesters were speaking about international 
factors while the movement was actually happening; this would provide a great 
amount of real-time insight into what protesters were thinking and considering. 
Second, it would be possible for me to extend my theories about the effects of 
external intervention on protesters’ perceptions and beliefs into a democratic 
context. More specifically, it would be highly relevant to apply my findings about 
Ukrainians’ resentment of unwanted Russian interference to the context of the 
United States, where multiple sources throughout the American intelligence 
community and the media have accused Russia of unduly influencing our own 





interference from outside forces in shaping our elections or charting the nature of 
our political discourse? How would political knowledge, ideology, or partisanship 
affect these feelings? Would these perceptions change when such interference is 
tacitly welcomed (or even explicitly invited) by elected officials including the 
President? There is much to be explored in this area of study, and I believe that this 
research agenda could produce many valuable findings in the future. 
Conclusion 
 
Political protest has become an extremely effective tool for pursuing and 
implementing change in authoritarian countries today. Over the past decade, 
individuals have taken to the streets against rulers in places as diverse as Hong Kong, 
Nicaragua, Algeria, Russia, and Zimbabwe. Participants in these movements are willing 
to face very real and significant threats to their occupations, their families, and even 
their lives in order to demand social and political reforms from leaders who suppress 
calls for democratic governance or human rights. While these movements certainly face 
a number of obstacles in achieving their goals, such campaigns can significantly improve 
the quality of life for their fellow citizens if they are successful. 
At the same time, international forces have the ability to support these protest 
movements more now than ever before. Through the use of targeted sanctions against 
autocratic leaders, training and tactical assistance provided to activists, and 
expressions of solidarity with protesters, outside actors can affect the decision-making 
strategies of both oppositional figures and governmental elites. In the preceding 
dissertation, I have shown through an original case study of Ukraine’s Euromaidan 
movement involving more than 120 interviews and six months of fieldwork; a field 





comparative case studies that democratic support can often play a crucial role in 
shaping the dynamics of these developments. Supporting demands for human rights 
and civil liberties is a critical task, and should remain central to the foreign policies of 
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APPENDIX A: CLOSED-ENDED SURVEY QUESTIONS  
(ENGLISH LANGUAGE) 
 
1. Were you personally involved in the Euromaidan protest movement? 
a. Yes, I joined the protests near the beginning of the movement 
b. Yes, I joined the protests in the middle of the movement 
c. Yes, I joined the protests near the end of the movement 
d. No, I never joined the protests but I approved of the movement 
e. No, I never joined the protests and I had no opinion of the movement 
f. No, I never joined the protests and I generally disapproved of the movement 
g. Don’t know/other 
 
2. Did you support the basic goals of those who were participating in the movement at 
the time? 
a. Strongly supported 
b. Supported 
c. Neither supported nor opposed 
d. Opposed 
e. Strongly opposed 
 
3. Based on your observations, did “Western” states or organizations (such as civil 
society groups based in European Union member nations or the United States) have 
any effect on the protesters’ perceptions, strategies, or goals? 
a. Yes, Western states or organizations had a strong effect 
b. Yes, Western states or organizations had a moderate effect 
c. Yes, Western states or organizations had a weak effect 
d. No, Western organizations had no effect 
e. Don’t know/other 
 
4. Based on your observations, did protesters’ calculations about the Russian 
government’s reaction to Euromaidan have any effect on peoples’ perceptions, strategies, or 
goals? 
a. Yes, it is very likely that considerations about Russia’s reaction mattered 
b. Yes, it is somewhat likely that considerations about Russia’s reaction 
mattered 
c. No, it is somewhat unlikely that considerations about Russia’s reaction 
mattered 
d. No, it is very unlikely that calculations about Russia’s reaction mattered 
e. Don’t know/other 
 
5. If you feel that Russia was intervening to undermine Euromaidan’s success, what 
are some ways in which the Russian regime might have been acting? 
a. Military aid to the Yanukovych regime mentioned  
b. Sending troops mentioned 
c. Providing financial aid mentioned 
d. Online and media propaganda campaign mentioned  





6. How would you characterize the movement’s long-term effects today? 
a. Very successful 
b. Somewhat successful 
c. Neither successful nor unsuccessful 
d. Somewhat unsuccessful 
e. Very unsuccessful 
f. Don’t know/other 
 
7. How likely is it that a similar movement would emerge in the future? 
a. Very likely 
b. Somewhat likely 
c. Not very likely 
d. Not at all likely 
e. Don’t know/other 
 
8. Do you ultimately think that Ukraine will join Western organizations like the 
European Union? 
a. Ukraine will likely move towards the West 
b. Ukraine will likely move towards Russia 
c. Ukraine will likely remain situated equally between the West and Russia 
d. Don’t know/other 
 
9. How important is it that Western states and organizations support democratic 
protests in Ukraine? 
a. Very important 
b. Somewhat important 
c. Not very important 
d. Not at all important 
e. Don’t know/other 
 
10. If a mass protest movement such as Euromaidan arose again in the future, how likely 
is it that you would join the movement? 









j. 1 Not at all likely 
 
Demographic Questions 
11. Which of the following categories best describes your current occupational status? 
a. Politician or elected official 
b. Political consultant 
c. Activist 







g. Non-governmental organization employee 
h. Media 













a. 18-24 years old 
b. 25-34 years old 
c. 35-44 years old 
d. 45-54 years old 
e. 55-64 years old 
f. 65-74 years old 
g. 75 years or older 
h. Prefer not to answer 
 
15. What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
a. No schooling completed 
b. Some high school, no diploma 
c. High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED) 
d. Some college credit, no degree 
e. Trade/technical/vocational training 
f. Associate degree 
g. Bachelor’s degree 
h. Master’s degree 
i. Professional degree 
j. Doctorate degree 
k. Prefer not to answer 
 
16. On a scale of political ideology from very liberal (represented as 10) to very conservative 
(represented by 1), where would you place yourself? 













j. 1 – very conservative 
 
17. Have you ever signed a petition? 
a. Yes 
b. Have not, but would 
c. Have not and would not 
d. Other/don’t know 
 
18. Have you ever contacted an elected official to express your views on an issue? 
a. Yes 
b. Have not, but would 
c. Have not and would not 
d. Other/don’t know 
 
19. Have you ever participated in a lawful demonstration? 
a. Yes 
b. Have not, but would 
c. Have not and would not 
d. Other/don’t know 
 
20. How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? 









j. 1 – Not at all important 
 
21. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to 
be very careful in dealing with people? 
a. Most people can be trusted 
b. Some people can be trusted 
c. Few people can be trusted 
d. Need to be very careful 
 
22. How satisfied are you with the way that democracy is working in your country? 
a. Very satisfied 
b. Somewhat satisfied 
c. Not very satisfied 















1. Чи були ви особисто брати участь в протестному русі євромайдан? 
a. Так, я приєднався до протестів біля початку руху 
b. Так, я приєднався до протестів в середині руху 
c. Так, я приєднався до протестів в кінці руху 
d. Ні, я ніколи не приєднався до протестів, але я схвалив руху 
е. Ні, я ніколи не приєднався до протестів і у мене не було ніякої думки  
  руху 
f. Ні, я ніколи не приєднався до протестів, і я взагалі не схвалював руху 
g. Не знаю / інше 
 
2. Ви підтримуєте основні цілі тих, хто брав участь в русі в той час?  
а. сильно підтримується 
b. підтриманий 
с. Ні підтримується, ні проти 
d. проти 
е. сильно проти 
 
3. Ґрунтуючись на своїх спостереженнях, так і «західні» держави або 
 організації (такі як групи громадянського суспільства, які базуються в 
 країнах-членах Європейського Союзу або США) впливають на сприйняття 
 або цілі протестуючих? 
а. Так, західні держави або організації, зробили сильний вплив 
b. Так, західні держави або організації мали помірний ефект  
с. Так, західні держави або організації мали слабкий вплив 
d. Ні, західні організації не мали ніякого ефекту  
е. Не знаю / інше 
 
4. Грунтуючись на своїх спостереженнях, так і протестуючих розрахунки про 
 реакцію російського уряду на євромайдан робить ніякого впливу на народи 
 сприйняття або цілі? 
а. Так, це дуже ймовірно, що міркування про реакцію Росії мали   
  значення 
b. Так, це кілька ймовірно, що міркування про реакцію Росії мали  
  значення 
с. Ні, тут щось малоймовірно, що міркування про реакцію Росії мали  
  значення 
d. Ні, це дуже малоймовірно, що розрахунки про реакцію Росії мали  
  значення 







5. Якщо ви відчуваєте, що Росія втручається, щоб підірвати успіх євромайдан в 
 те, що деякі способи, в яких російська режим, можливо, діяв? 
а. Військова допомога режиму Януковича 
b. Відправка військ 
с. Надання фінансової допомоги 
d. Інтернет та медіа-пропагандистська кампанія  
е. Інший 
 
6. Як би ви охарактеризували довгострокові наслідки цього руху сьогодні?  
а. дуже успішний 
b. кілька успішно 
с. Ні успішно, ні безуспішні 
d. кілька невдало 
е. дуже невдала 
f. Не знаю / іншe 
 
 
7. Наскільки велика ймовірність того, що подібний рух буде з'являтися в 
 майбутньому? 
а. Ймовірно 
b. швидше за все, 
с. Не дуже ймовірно, 
d. Не зовсім ймовірно,  
е. Не знаю / інше 
 
8. Чи є в кінцевому рахунку, здається, що Україна приєднається західні 
 організації, такі як Європейський Союз? 
а. Україна, швидше за все, рухатися в бік Заходу 
b. Україна, швидше за все, рухатися в напрямку Росії 
с. Україна, швидше за все, залишиться розташованої порівну між  
  Росією і Заходом 
d. Не знаю / інше 
 
9. Наскільки важливо, що західні держави і організації підтримують 
 демократичні протести в Україні? 
а. Дуже важливо 
b. досить важливо 
с. Не дуже важливо 
d. Зовсім не важливо  
е. Не знаю / інше 
 
10. Якщо масовий рух протесту, такі як євромайдан знову виникла в 
 майбутньому, наскільки ймовірно, що ви б приєднатися до руху? 

















11. Які з наступних категорій найкраще описує поточний професійний статус? 
а. Політик або виборна посадова особа 
b. політичний консультант  
с. активіст 
d. аналітик / аналітик думає танк  
е. Професор / академічне 
f. студент 
g. Співробітник Неурядова організація 
h. годину засоби масової інформації 













а. 18-24 років 
b. 25-34 років 
с. 35-44 років 
d. 45-54 років 
е. 55-64 років 
f. 65-74 років 
g. 75 років і старше 
h. За краще не відповідати 
 
15. Який найвищий рівень освіти, який ви завершили?  
а. Немає шкільної освіти завершена 
b. Деякі середньої школи, що не диплом 
с. Середнє, диплом або еквівалент (наприклад: GED) 
d. Вища кредит, немає ступеня 
е. Торгівля / технічна / професійну освіту 






g. Диплом бакалавра 
h. Диплом магістра 
i. професійна ступінь 
j. докторська ступінь 
k. За краще не відповідати 
 
16. За шкалою політичної ідеології з дуже ліберальним (представлено у вигляді 
 10) дуже консервативно (в особі 1), де б ви поставити себе? 









j. 1 - дуже консервативний 
 
17. Ви коли-небудь підписали петицію? 
а. Так 
b. Ні, але буде 
с. Нехай і не буде 
d. Інші / не знаю 
 
18. Ви коли-небудь зв'язався виборна посадова особа, щоб висловити свою 
 думку з питання? 
а. Так 
b. Ні, але буде 
с. Нехай і не буде 
d. Інші / не знаю 
 
19. Ви коли-небудь брали участь в законній демонстрації?  
а. Так 
b. Ні, але буде 
с. Нехай і не буде 
d. Інші / не знаю 
 
20. Наскільки важливо для вас, щоб жити в країні, яка управляється 
 демократично? 











  h. 3 
i. 2 
j. 1  Зовсім неважливо 
 
21. Взагалі кажучи, ви б сказати, що більшість людей можна довіряти, або що 
 ви повинні бути дуже обережні в спілкуванні з людьми? 
а. Більшість людей можна довіряти 
b. Деякі люди можуть довіряти  
с. Мало людей можна довіряти 
d. Потрібно бути дуже обережним 
 
22. Наскільки ви задоволені тим, як демократія працює у вашій країні?  
а. Дуже задоволений 
b. частково задоволений  
с. Не дуже задоволений 



































APPENDIX C: COMPARING PERCEPTIONS OF WESTERN SUPPORT 




Figure C.1. Interviewees’ Perceptions of the Role Played by Western Forces 
during the Protests (Euromaidan Participants) 
 
 
Figure C.2. Interviewees’ Perceptions of the Role Played by Western Forces 








APPENDIX D: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD CONSENT FORM FOR 
OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEWS AND CLOSED-ENDED SURVEYS 
 
 
SOCIAL BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH CONSENT FORM 
TEMPLATE 
Research Information and Consent for Participation in Social Behavioral 
Research 
 
The Revolution Will be Made Public 
 
You are being asked to participate in a research study. Researchers are required to provide a 
consent form such as this one to tell you about the research, to explain that taking part is 
voluntary, to describe the risks and benefits of participation, and to help you to make an 
informed decision. You should feel free to ask the researchers any questions you may have. 
 
  Principal Investigator Name and Title: Professor Carol Leff  
  e-mail: leff@illinois.edu 
 
  Student Investigator Name and Title: Peter Chereson 
  e-mail: pcheres2@illinois.edu 
 
Department and Institution: Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at 
Urbana- Champaign 
 
Address and Contact Information: 420 David Kinley Hall MC-713 
 1407 W Gregory Drive 
 Urbana, IL 61801 
 
Why am I being asked? 
 
You are being asked to participate as a subject in a research project focusing on the 
Euromaidan movement that took place in Ukraine in 2013 and 2014. The project aims to 
understand the primary causes that brought Ukrainians to the streets against Viktor 
Yanukovych and his government, and to more closely study the effects of both domestic and 
international factors on citizens’ decisions to join the broader protest campaign. 
 
You have been asked to participate in this research project because your broad knowledge 
of Ukrainian politics and your specific familiarity with the Euromaidan movement could 











Your participation in this research is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate 
will not affect your current or future dealings with the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign. If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time without 
affecting that relationship. 
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
 
The purpose of this research is to gain a deeper understanding of the causes that led 
Ukrainians to protest against the Yanukovych regime during the Euromaidan movement of 
2013 and 2014. This study’s goal is to speak with people who are familiar with the protests’ 
dynamics, and to understand the role played by both domestic and international factors. 
The information obtained through these interviews will be used to complete one 
component of the researcher’s dissertation in the Department of Political Science at the 
University of Illinois. 
 
What procedures are involved? 
 
This research will be performed at a location that is convenient for you – the researcher 
is able to travel to meet interview subjects. 
 
You will need to come to the study site only one time, for a visit that will last approximately 
thirty to sixty minutes. 
 
The study procedure is conversational. We will ask you a series of questions regarding your 
thoughts on the causes of Euromaidan and record your answers. We will be audio-
recording the conversation. However, this procedure is optional and is not necessary. If you 
would prefer not be recorded, this is possible as well. Please indicate your preference for 
utilizing or not utilizing audio-recording below: 
 
I give permission for my interview to be audio-recorded.  YES  NO 
 
If our conversation is recorded, we may later transcribe these answers for incorporation 
into the text of my dissertation. However, your identity will be kept wholly confidential 
during the entire process. We will affix a code number to your interview, remove your name 
and all other identifying information, and delete the recording as soon as we have 













Upon completion of our conversation, the researcher will then ask you to complete a 
relatively short survey consisting of twenty-two closed-ended questions. These questions will 
address the same topics that are covered in the course of the conversation, and will also 
include a few demographic indicators as well. As is the case with any of the interview 
questions, you are entirely free not to answer any questions that you do not wish to answer. 
This component of the interview should take approximately five minutes to complete. 
 
What are the potential risks and discomforts? 
 
To the best of our knowledge, the things you will be doing have no more risk of harm than 
you would experience in everyday life. One risk of this research is a loss of privacy (revealing 
to others that you are taking part in this study) or confidentiality (revealing information 
about you to others to whom you have not given permission to see this information). There 
is also a slight risk in divulging prior personal participation in protests if such behavior was 
illegal at the time. However, every precaution will be taken to minimize these risks by 
confidentially protecting your identity and any personal statements that you express through 
the course of the conversation. Additionally, to further minimize any potential risk, you are 
free to skip any questions that you prefer not to answer. 
 
Are there benefits to taking part in the research?  
 
Taking part in this research study may not benefit you personally, but your contribution 
could be very valuable by illustrating important findings relevant to the project’s outcome. 
 
What other options are there? 
 
You have the option to not participate in this study OR to participate at a later date and time if 
you so choose. 
 
Will my study-related information be kept confidential? 
 
Faculty, staff, students, and others with permission or authority to see your study 
information will maintain its confidentiality to the extent permitted and required by laws 
and university policies. The names or personal identifiers of participants will not be 
published or presented. 
 
What are the costs for participating in this research? 
 
There are no costs to you for participating in this research – participation is entirely 










Will I be reimbursed for any of my expenses or paid for my participation in this research? 
 
You will not be offered payment for being in this study. All participation is entirely voluntary. 
 
Can I withdraw or be removed from the study? 
 
If you decide to participate, you are entirely free to withdraw your consent and discontinue 
participation at any time. Additionally, you are able to move on to a different question if 
you do not wish to discuss a particular topic or question. 
The Researchers also have the right to stop your participation in this study without your 
consent if: 
 They believe it is in your best interests; 
 You were to object to any future changes that may be made in the study plan; 
 
In the event you withdraw or are asked to leave the study, you will still be compensated as 
described above. 
 
Who should I contact if I have questions? 
 
Please contact either of the two primary researchers involved in this project – you are able 
to e-mail Peter Chereson (pcheres2@illinois.edu), Professor Carol Leff (leffc@illinois.edu), 
or Mariia Vasilets at the National University of Kyiv – Mohyla Academy (at 
int_students@ukma.edu.ua): 
 if you have any questions about this study or your part in it, 
 if you have questions, concerns or complaints about the research. 
 
What are my rights as a research subject? 
 
If you feel you have not been treated according to the descriptions in this form, or if you 
have any questions about your rights as a research subject, including questions, concerns, 
complaints, or to offer input, you may call the Office for the Protection of Research Subjects 




Your participation in this research is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate will 
not affect your current or future relations with the University. If you decide to participate, you 






I have read (or someone has read to me) the above information. I have been given an opportunity to 
ask questions and my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to participate in this 














Printed Name of Person Obtaining Consent 
362 
 














Logit Join a 
Protest 
Movement 
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Prior protest 
participation 
X   X   
Prior signing a 
petition 
X                 X  X X X 
Trust in others X   X   
Ideology X                 X X  X X 
Interest         






  Sat. with 
democracy 





APPENDIX F: FULL TEXT OF SURVEY EXPERIMENT QUESTIONS 
(ENGLISH LANGUAGE) 
 
Liberal International Actor Treatment Vignette 
 
1. Imagine that you live in an authoritarian country in which elections are neither 
free nor fair. Freedom of speech and expression are limited by harsh laws and 
restrictions, the economy has been suffering, and corruption is pervasive. While your 
leaders began to democratize recently, this progress abruptly ended a month ago when 
security forces aggressively clamped down on pro-democracy rallies. 
 
Increasing numbers of students have started to demonstrate against the government. 
These protests have been praised by democratic Western states, which are providing 
funding and manpower to help sustain the movement. 
 
How much influence do you think outside actors can have on protests in other 
countries? 
 















Authoritarian International Actor Treatment Vignette 
 
1. Imagine that you live in an authoritarian country in which elections are neither 
free nor fair. Freedom of speech and expression are limited by harsh laws and 
restrictions, the economy has been suffering, and corruption is pervasive. While your 
leaders began to democratize recently, this progress abruptly ended a month ago when 
security forces aggressively clamped down on pro-democracy rallies. 
 
Increasing numbers of students have started to demonstrate against the government. 
These protests have been criticized by other authoritarian states, which are providing 





How much influence do you think outside actors can have on protests in other 
countries? 
 

















1. Imagine that you live in an authoritarian country in which elections are neither 
free nor fair. Freedom of speech and expression are limited by harsh laws and 
restrictions, the economy has been suffering, and corruption is pervasive. While your 
leaders began to democratize recently, this progress abruptly ended a month ago when 
security forces aggressively clamped down on pro-democracy rallies. 
 
Increasing numbers of students have started to demonstrate against the government. 
 
How much influence do you think outside actors can have on protests in other 
countries? 
 


















Dependent Variables & Remaining Survey Questions 
Given the dangers that might be involved in the situation above, how likely is it that you 
would sign a petition against the government’s actions? 
 















Given the dangers that might be involved in the situation above, how likely is it that you 
would contact an elected official to express your views on the issue? 
 















Given the dangers that might be involved in the situation above, how likely is it that you 
would join the protesters’ lawful demonstrations in their calls for democracy? 
 


















2. How interested would you say you are in politics? 
 
a. Very interested 
b. Somewhat interested 
c. Neither interested nor disinterested 
d. Not very interested 
e. Not at all interested 
 
3. Have you ever signed a petition? 
 
a. Have done 
b. Have not, but might do 
c. Would never do 
d Other/don’t know 
 
4. Have you ever attended a peaceful political demonstration? 
 
a. Have done 
b. Have not, but might do 
c. Would never do 
d. Other/don’t know 
 
5. Have you ever contacted an elected official to express your views on an issue? 
 
a. Yes 
b. Have not, but would 
c. Have not and would not 
d. Other/don’t know 
 
6. How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? 
 










  i. 2 
j. 1 – Not at all important 
 
7. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
need to be very careful in dealing with people? 
 
a. Most people can be trusted 
b. Some people can be trusted 
c. Few people can be trusted 
d. Need to be very careful 
 









c. Equally Ukrainian and Russian 
d. Other 
 
10. What is your age? 
 
11. What is your political ideology? Do you consider yourself liberal, conservative, or 
neither? 
 









j. 1 – Very conservative 
 
12. How closely do you follow the news? 
 
a. Very closely 
b. Somewhat closely 
c. Not very closely 




13. How closely do you follow international news? 
 
a. Very closely 
b. Somewhat closely 
c. Not very closely 
d. Not at all 
 
14. Do you ultimately think that Ukraine will move towards Western organizations 
like the European Union? 
 
a. Ukraine will likely move towards the West 
b. Ukraine will likely move towards Russia 
c. Ukraine will likely be situated equally between the West and Russia 
d. Don’t know/other 
 
15. How important is it that Western states and organizations support democratic 
protests in Ukraine? 
 
a. Very important 
b. Somewhat important 
c. Not very important 
d. Not at all important 
e. Don’t know/other 
 
16. How satisfied are you with the way that democracy is working in your country? 
 
a. Very satisfied 
b. Somewhat satisfied 
c. Not very satisfied 




















APPENDIX G: FULL TEXT OF SURVEY EXPERIMENT QUESTIONS 
(UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE) 
 
Liberal International Actor Treatment Vignette 
1. Уявіть, що ви живете в авторитарній країні, в якій вибори не є ані вільними, 
ані справедливими. Свобода слова та висловлювання обмежені жорстокими 
законами, економіка страждає, всеохоплююча корупція. Ваші політичні лідери 
нещодавно почали лібералізацію, та цей прогрес різко завершився місяць тому, 
коли силові органи почали агресивно розганяти демократичні мітинги. 
 
Безперервно збільшувалась кількість студентів, що виступали проти діяльності 
уряду. Ці протести були схвалені демократичними західними державами, що 
підтримували протестні рухи, забезпечуючи їх фінансуванням та людьми. 
 
На вашу думку, наскільки потужний вплив можуть мати сторонні актори на акціях 
протесту в інших країнах? 
 
А. 10 Потужний вплив 
Б. 9  
В. 8  
Г. 7  
Д. 6  
Е. 5  
Є. 4  
Ж. 3  
З. 2  






Authoritarian International Actor Treatment Vignette 
1. Уявіть, що ви живете в авторитарній країні, в якій вибори не є ані вільними, 
ані справедливими. Свобода слова та висловлювання обмежені жорстокими 
законами, економіка страждає, всеохоплююча корупція. Ваші політичні лідери 
нещодавно почали лібералізацію, та цей прогрес різко завершився місяць тому, 
коли силові органи почали агресивно розганяти демократичні мітинги. 
 
Безперервно збільшувалась кількість студентів, що виступали проти діяльності 
уряду. Ці протести були піддані критиці іншими авторитарними державами, які 
виділяють гроші і людей для протидії цим протестам. 
 
На вашу думку, наскільки потужний вплив можуть мати сторонні актори на акціях 





А. 10 Потужний вплив 
Б. 9  
В. 8  
Г. 7  
Д. 6  
Е. 5  
Є. 4  
Ж. 3  
З. 2  







1. Уявіть, що ви живете в авторитарній країні, в якій вибори не є ані вільними, 
ані справедливими. Свобода слова та висловлювання обмежені жорстокими 
законами, економіка страждає, всеохоплююча корупція. Ваші політичні лідери 
нещодавно почали лібералізацію, та цей прогрес різко завершився місяць тому, 
коли силові органи почали агресивно розганяти демократичні мітинги. 
 
Безперервно збільшувалась кількість студентів, що виступали проти діяльності 
уряду. 
 
На вашу думку, наскільки потужний вплив можуть мати сторонні актори на акціях 
протесту в інших країнах? 
 
А. 10 Потужний вплив 
Б. 9  
В. 8  
Г. 7  
Д. 6  
Е. 5  
Є. 4  
Ж. 3  
З. 2  












Dependent Variables & Remaining Survey Questions 
З оглядом на небезпеку, яка обумовлена вище змальованою ситуацією, наскільки 
велика ймовірність того, що Ви би підписали петицію проти дій існуючого уряду? 
 















З оглядом на небезпеку, яка обумовлена вище змальованою ситуацією, наскільки 
велика ймовірність того, що Ви би звернулися до посадової особи, щоб висловити 
свої погляди на існуючу проблему? 
 
А. 10 Дуже ймовірно 
Б. 9  
В. 8  
Г. 7  
Д. 6  
Е. 5  
Є. 4  
Ж. 3  
З. 2  






З оглядом на небезпеку, яка обумовлена вище змальованою ситуацією, наскільки 
велика ймовірність того, що Ви приєдналися до законних демонстрацій у 
їхніх закликах до демократії? 
 
А. 10 Дуже ймовірно 
Б. 9  
В. 8  
Г. 7  














2. Наскільки Ви зацікавлені політикою?  
А. Дуже зацікавлений(ла) 
Б. Достатньо зацікавлений(ла) 
В. Ні зацікавлений(а), ані незацікавлений(а)  
Г. Не дуже зацікавлений(а) 
Д. Не зацікавлений(а) взагалі 
 
3. Чи Ви коли-небудь підписували петицію?  
А. Підписував(ла) 
Б. Не підписував(ла), але можу  
В. Ніколи не підпишу 
Г. Не знаю (інше) 
 
4. Ви коли-небудь відвідували мирну політичну демонстрацію?  
А. Відвідував(ла) 
Б. Не відвідував(ла), але можу  
В. Ніколи не відвідуватиму 
Г. Не знаю (інше) 
 
5. Ви коли-небудь зверталися до обраної посадової особи, щоб висловити свої 
погляди на певну проблему? 
А. Так 
Б. Не звертався(лася), але збираюсь  
В. Не звертався(лася) та не збираюсь  
Г. Не знаю (інше) 
 
6. Наскільки важливо для Вас жити в країні з демократичним управлінням? 











И. 1 Абсолютно неважливо 
  
7. На вашу думку, чи могли би Ви стверджувати, що більшості людей можна 
довіряти або чи бути обережним в спілкуванні з іншими людьми? 
А. Переважній більшості людей можна довіряти  
Б. Деяким людям можна довіряти 
В. Невеликій кількості людей можна довіряти  






9. Етнічна приналежність  
А. Українець(ка) 
Б. Росіянин(ка) 
В. Маю і українське, і російське коріння  
Г. Інше 
 
10. Вкажіть Ваш вік? 
 
11. Оцініть себе за шкалою політичної ідеології від дуже ліберального (10) до 
дуже консервативного (1)? 









И. 1 Дуже консервативне 
 
12. Наскільки уважно Ви слідкуєте за новинами?  
А. Дуже уважно 
Б. Достатньо уважно  
В. Не дуже уважно  
Г. Зовсім не слідкую 
 
13. Наскільки уважно Ви слідкуєте за міжнародними новинами?  
А. Дуже уважно 
Б. Достатньо уважно  
В. Не дуже уважно  




14. Чи вважаєте Ви, що в кінцевому підсумку Україна долучиться до «західних» 
організацій, таких як Європейський Союз? 
А. Україна, ймовірно, рухатиметься на захід  
Б. Україна, ймовірно, рухатиметься до Росії 
В. Україна, ймовірно, залишиться в рівній мірі між Заходом та Росією  
Г. Не знаю (інше) 
 
15. Наскільки важливою є підтримка «західних» держав та організацій 
демократичних протестів в Україні? 
А. Дуже важлива 
Б. Достатньо важлива  
В. Не дуже важлива  
Г. Зовсім не важлива  
Д. Не знаю (інше) 
 
16. Наскільки Ви задоволенні рівнем розвитку демократії у вашій країні?  
А. Дуже задоволений(ла) 
Б. Частково задоволений(ла)  
В. Не дуже задоволений(ла)  






























APPENDIX H: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD CONSENT FORM 




The purpose of this research project is to understand the dynamics of social movements 
in the world today. This is a research project being conducted by Peter Chereson and 
Professor Carol Leff at the University of Illinois. You are invited to participate in this 
research project because we are interested in understanding the opinions and beliefs of 
people like you. 
 
Your participation in this research study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate. 
If you decide to participate in this research survey, you may withdraw at any time. If you 
decide not to participate in this study or if you withdraw from participating at any time, 
you will not be penalized in any way. 
 
The procedure involves filling a short and anonymous survey that will take 
approximately five minutes. Your responses will be kept entirely confidential and we do 
not collect identifying information such as your name. 
 
We will do our best to keep your information confidential. All data is stored in a 
password protected electronic format. To help protect your confidentiality, the surveys 
will not contain information that will personally identify you. The results of this study 
will be used for scholarly purposes only and may be shared with professors and graduate 
students at the University of Illinois, as well as with members of the broader American 
political science research community. 
 
When this research is discussed or published, no one will know that you were in the 
study. However, laws and university rules might require us to disclose information 
about you. For example, if required by laws or University Policy, study information you 
supply may be seen or copied by the following people or groups: a) the university 
committee and office that reviews and approves research studies, the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) and Office for Protection of Research Subjects; and b) University 
and state auditors, and Departments of the university responsible for oversight of 
research. 
 
If you feel you have not been treated according to the descriptions in this form, or if you 
have any questions about your rights as a research subject, including questions, 
concerns, complaints, or to offer input, you may call the Office for the Protection of 
Research Subjects (OPRS) at 217-333-2670 or e-mail OPRS at irb@illinois.edu. If you 
have any further questions about the study, please contact Peter Chereson at 
pcheres2@illinois.edu. This research has been reviewed according to University of 







EXPRESSION OF CONSENT: Please select your choice below. 
  
Checking the "agree" option below indicates that: 
• you have read the above information 
• you voluntarily agree to participate 
• you are at least 18 years of age 
 
If you do not wish to participate in the research study, please decline participation by 
checking the "disagree" option instead. 
 
 ___Agree 
 ___Disagree 
